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THE CASE FOR THE TAXPAYING GOOD
SAMARITAN: DEDUCTING EARMARKED
TRANSFERS TO CHARITY UNDER FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAW, THEORY AND POLICY'
Johnny Rex Buckles**
The Good Samaritan may enjoy centuries of fame and adulation,'
but he finds little affirmation in the tax regime of the Internal
Revenue Code.2 The cost of the bandages, oil and wine with which he
nursed his roadside acquaintance en route to Jericho, and his
payments to the desk clerk of that first century hotel for the room of
his ailing "neighbor,"3 would be nondeductible personal expenses
under United States federal income tax law. The law is well settled
that no charitable contribution deduction is permitted for a taxpayer's
independent transfer of money or property to (or on behalf of) an
individual, no matter how deserving the recipient of funds may be
* Copyright © 2002, Johnny Rex Buckles.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author
gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the University of Houston in the
preparation of this Article. The author is indebted to former students Bruce Munson
and Melissa Williamson, and to the entire pool of research assistants (and their
supervisors, Rod Borlase and Harriet Richman) at the University of Houston Law
Center, for their efforts in collecting, cataloguing, and annotating sources. The author
acknowledges the helpful comments to prior drafts of this Article from Professors Ira
Shepard, Laura Oren, William Streng, Peter Linzer, and Alvin Warren; University of
Houston Law Center Dean Nancy Rapoport; and the author's wife, Tami Buckles.
1. See Luke 10:25-37. The parable of the Good Samaritan appears only in the
Gospel of Luke. See K.R. Snodgrass, Parable, in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels
591, 595 (Joel B. Green et al. eds., 1992). Jesus spoke the parable in response to a
question from an expert in the law, probably a student of the Jewish canon. See Luke
10:25; Alfred Edersheim, The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah 637 (1993). For
commentary on the parable, see Edersheim, supra at 637-40; Leon Morris, Luke: An
Introduction and Commentary 204-09 (Tyndale New Testament Commentaries 1988);
John A. Martin, Luke, in 1 The Bible Knowledge Commentary: An Exposition of the
Scriptures by Dallas Seminary Faculty 199,233-34 (John F. Walvoord & Roy B. Zuck
eds., New Testament ed. 1983). See generally H.G.M. Williamson, Samaritans, in
Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, supra at 724, 724-28 (discussing first century
Samaritans from the perspective of biblical and extra-biblical sources).
2. See I.R.C. § 170 (1994) (allowing a deduction for a -charitable contribution,"
as defined therein).
3. Luke 10:33-37.
4. See, for example, Tilles v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 545 (1938), affd on other
grounds, 113 F.2d 907 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 703 (1940), in which a music
teacher of a poor, young woman solicited contributions from her friends, including
1243
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Under current law, the Good Samaritan would be eligible for a
charitable contribution deduction only by channeling his charitable
impulse through a qualified charitable donee5 (let us call it "Jericho
Foundation"6 ) in hopes that Jericho Foundation will aid the injured
traveler. The Good Samaritan has no guarantee that Jericho
Foundation will use the donated funds to assist the person whom the
Good Samaritan desires to benefit. But at least Jericho Foundation is
in the business of helping others, and therefore the Good Samaritan
has some assurance that the donated funds will be used to accomplish
some socially desirable objective.
This last observation illuminates the probable reason that federal
income tax law denies a charitable contribution deduction for
transfers by Good Samaritans directly to individuals. The Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") would encounter great practical difficulty in
verifying that taxpayers' numerous inter-personal transfers truly
further charity (at least as long as charity is conceived to involve more
than the mere redistribution of resources).7 By requiring the Good
Samaritan to donate to a qualified donee such as Jericho Foundation,
the law reduces the number of benefit-providing entities that the IRS
must audit, and increases the probability that such donees will use
donated funds to advance charitable goals.'
Whatever the wisdom of this approach, unless the Good Samaritan
wields a good deal of influence over the administration of Jericho
Foundation, he cannot be certain that the foundation will use his
charitable contribution to provide the suffering sojourner with the
care and lodging which he so desperately needs.9 In the face of this
the taxpayer, to help finance the young woman's musical education. The Board of
Tax Appeals (the predecessor of the United States Tax Court) disallowed the
taxpayer's deduction claimed for amounts contributed to the fund established for the
benefit of the young woman. See id. at 551. The Board of Tax Appeals concluded that
no deduction was proper for "a charitable gift which was for the benefit of only one
person." Id. at 550.
5. See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text. Qualified donees include not
only qualified charities, but also four other types of entities. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1)-(5).
The most important of these other entities for present purposes are described in Code
section 170(c)(1): governmental units receiving gifts for exclusively public purposes.
6. A qualified charitable donee must be created or organized in the United
States (or in one of its possessions), or under the law of the United States (or under
the law of one of its states or possessions, or the District of Columbia). See I.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(A). Nonetheless, I ask the reader to indulge me in my references to
"Jericho Foundation" as I remain true to the historical context of the parable of the
Good Samaritan.
7. See Ronald W. Blasi & Richard A. Denesha, Avoiding Disallowance of
Earmarked Charitable Contributions, 9 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 160, 161-62 (1985);
John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 Va.
Tax Rev. 229, 235 (1984).
8. Cf. Blasi & Denesha, supra note 7, at 161-62 (arguing that current law's
requirements governing qualified donees facilitate monitoring by the IRS).
9. Perhaps Jericho Foundation is managed by the priest or the Levite, who
apathetically passed by the injured traveler, see Luke 10:31, :32, or perhaps the
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uncertainty, the Good Samaritan proposes a solution: he will offer to
transfer funds directly to Jericho Foundation, but will designate such
funds for the ultimate benefit of his wounded acquaintance. Does-
and should-this approach enable the Good Samaritan to deduct his
designated transfer to Jericho Foundation in calculating his taxable
income? This Article attempts to answer this question.
Although the academic literature is quite sparse on the subject,'0 a
review of case law and administrative authorities suggests that
taxpayers have attempted to utilize the basic method contemplated by
our Code-conscious Good Samaritan in a variety of forms for decades,
with mixed success. Let me be very clear on the approach at issue: a
prospective charitable donor attempts to specify the ultimate
beneficiary of funds to be transferred to the charitable donee at or
prior to the time that the transfer to the charitable donee is erecuted. In
these cases, the donor may explicitly condition the transfer on the
charitable donee's agreement to use the transferred funds to benefit a
named person. Alternatively, the donor may simply express a non-
binding preference that the charitable donee employ the transferred
funds so as to benefit the named person."
Such contributions designated for the ultimate benefit of persons
named by the transferor are referred to as "earmarked" transfers in
the tax literature."2 This Article generally refers to taxpayers who
make earmarked transfers to charity as "donors" or "transferors," and
to the charities that receive transfers therefrom as "charitable
transferees" or "charitable donees."''  The person designated to
benefit from the taxpayer's transfer to charity is referred to as the
"secondary beneficiary."
Part I of this Article initially discusses the deductibility of non-
earmarked transfers to charitable donees under current law. Part I of
foundation is inclined to reconstruct the city's walls, see Joshua 6"20, rather than aid
incapacitated wayfarers.
10. A few commentators have directly addressed the issue to a limited degree.
See, e.g., Blasi & Denesha, supra note 7, at 160-72; John McGown, Jr., Major
Charitable Gift-How Much Control Can Donors Keep and Charities Give Up?, 91 J.
Tax'n 279, 282 (1999); Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Payment to or for Another
Individual as Deductible Charitable Contribution Under § 170 of Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (26 USCS § 170), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 398, 398-406 (1988).
11. In some cases, the donor may not even articulate a clear expression of her
preference as to the use of transferred funds, but the surrounding facts and
circumstances indicate that both the donor and the donee plainly understand that the
donor fully expects the charity to use the transferred funds to benefit a certain
beneficiary.
12- See, e.g., Blasi & Denesha, supra note 7, at 163, 165, 166; McGown, supra note
10, at 282.
13. As will become apparent to the reader, the choice of the terms -donor" or
"transferor" (and "charitable donee" or "charitable transferee") depends in part
upon whether the transfer is better characterized as a donation or a purchase. If the




this Article next explores and analyzes the deductibility of transfers to
charity which are earmarked for the benefit of a secondary
beneficiary, upon the initiative of either the taxpayer or the charitable
transferee. Part II surveys existing scholarship addressing the
justification for the charitable contribution deduction under income
tax theory, pervasive norms of tax policy, and broader policy
objectives. This part also summarizes existing theories supporting the
exemption of charitable organizations from federal income taxation.
Based on the analysis in Part II, Part III critically examines the
normative question of whether, and to what extent, earmarked
contributions to charity should be deductible. Part III further
discusses both the relevance of several factors that authorities have
cited in determining the deductibility of earmarked transfers to
charity, and how a deduction for such transfers fares under several
norms and other guiding principles.
I. POSITIVE LAW OF CHARITABLE TRANSFERS
The case law and administrative authorities addressing earmarked
transfers to charity are shaped largely by sections 170 and 262 of the
Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"). Section 170(a) allows a
deduction for any "charitable contribution" made within a taxable
year. 4 A charitable contribution is "a contribution or gift to or for the
use of' designated entities that are "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes" and which meet certain requirements paralleling those set
forth in Code section 501(c)(3). 15 Thus, Section 170 of the Code
imposes two general requirements. First, no deduction under Code
section 170(a) is available unless the taxpayer has made a
"contribution or gift." Second, the contribution or gift must be "to or
for the use of" a qualifying organization. Contributions are not
deductible if they are made to a non-qualified transferee, including an
individual.
Code section 262 generally denies a deduction for any "personal,
living, or family expenses."16 In certain contexts, courts have denied a
deduction for amounts claimed to qualify under Code section 170
because they are more accurately characterized as a "personal, living,
or family expenses. "17
The first general requirement of Code section 170, and the
prohibition of a deduction for personal, living, or family expenses
under Code section 262, are of great importance when a taxpayer
expects (or reasonably should expect) to receive some material
14. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1994).
15. Id. § 170(c)(2).
16. Id. § 262(a).
17. Id.
1246 [Vol. 70
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benefit from a charitable transferee in exchange for a transfer from
the taxpayer. These provisions may result in disallowance of a
deduction regardless of whether a taxpayer earmarks her transfer for
the benefit of a secondary beneficiary. The second general
requirement of Code section 170 is most important when a taxpayer
claims a deduction for a transfer that she has designated to benefit a
secondary beneficiary.
In order to appreciate the nuances of federal income tax law
governing earmarked transfers to charitable organizations, one must
understand the basics of the law governing non-earmarked transfers
to charity. The law controlling the tax treatment of non-earmarked
contributions to charity provides insight into the rationale of cases and
administrative decisions of the IRS governing earmarked charitable
contributions, and informs the broader policy question of under what
circumstances earmarked transfers to charitable transferees should be
deductible.
A. When Neither Transferor nor Charitable Transferee
Specifies a Secondary Beneficiar)y
1. When Individuals Who Ultimately Benefit from Transferred
Funds Are Unrelated Third Parties
The paradigmatic case of a deductible "charitable contribution or
gift" to a qualified donee under Code section 170 is the transfer of
funds to an eligible charitable recipient by a donor (i) who in no
manner specifies the individuals who are to benefit from the funds
transferred to the charitable donee, and (ii) who herself, and whose
family and other household members, do not materially benefit from
the transferred funds.'" An example of a quintessential charitable
contribution is an unrestricted contribution of cash to the Girl Scouts
of America by a retired taxpayer who has no living relatives in any
way affiliated with the charity, who detests cookies and candies of
every kind (even those chocolate-covered mint treats), and who
refuses to be walked across the street by community-minded youth.
Such "blind" contributions to charity are plainly deductible.t
1& See id. § 170(c).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 51,
55 (9th Cir. 1963) ("We have no doubt that an unrestricted gift to a corporation
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes meets the requirements of
the Internal Revenue Code.").
2002] 1247
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2. When Ultimate Beneficiaries Include Transferor or Persons
Related Thereto
a. In General
A more problematic case involves the transfer of funds to a
charitable organization by a taxpayer who does not expressly specify a
secondary beneficiary, but who receives benefits from the charitable
transferee as a result of the transfer. The precise circumstances under
which a deduction under Code section 170 will be allowed in this
context are not perfectly clear under existing case law and
administrative authority. The basic rule to be derived from these
authorities, however, can be stated as follows: when a taxpayer
transfers funds to charity under circumstances in which she (or
perhaps certain other members of her family or household) should
reasonably expect to benefit more than incidentally or remotely from
the transfer, a deduction under Code section 170 may be denied (in
whole or in part), even if the taxpayer identifies no secondary
beneficiary."
The case of Winters v. Commissioner" illustrates one way this issue
commonly arises. In Winters, the taxpayers claimed a deduction for
payments to an educational fund maintained by the taxpayers' church
to support schools, one of which was attended by the taxpayers'
children. The church requested and expected the taxpayers to make
the payments, but neither the church nor the school formally
demanded that they do so.' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the taxpayers could not deduct the
payments.3 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the term "gift" in Code section 10224 in the oft-cited
case of Commissioner v. Duberstein s the Winters court held that a
20. To articulate this "basic rule" as such obviously suggests that, in certain
circumstances, a deduction will be allowed in whole or in part notwithstanding the
foregoing generalization. This article suggests some of the situations that do or may
require a departure from the general rule denying deductions in this context.
21. 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). See generally John D. Perovich, Annotation,
Payments Made to Qualified Charitable Organization in Connection with Education of
Taxpayer's Children as Constituting Deductible Charitable Contribution under §170 of
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USCS §170) or Nondeductible Expense Under §262
of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USCS §262), 33 A.L.R. Fed. 373, 373-84 (1977)
(collecting and discussing cases).
22. Winters, 468 F.2d at 779.
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 102(a) ("Gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.").
25. 363 U.S. 278 (1960); see also DeJong v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir.
1962) (stating that Duberstein's criteria for determining whether a transfer qualifies as
a "gift" that is excludible from gross income apply to the determination of whether a
"gift or contribution" has been made under Code section 170); Ehrhart v. Comm'r, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1285, 1287 (1981) (citing Duberstein and stating that the issue is
[Vol. 701248
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"contribution" for purposes of Code section 170, like a "gift" for
purposes of Code section 102, must proceed from a detached and
disinterested generosity.26  Tuition payments are not deductible
because the transferor expects, and in fact receives, a definite
economic benefit. The evidence established that the taxpayers
anticipated an economic benefit from their payments-the education
of their children. The court found that the taxpayers realized that
their payments were necessary for the operation of the schools, and
the taxpayers determined the amount of their payments, at least in
part, by reference to the expected cost to the school of educating their
children. That the taxpayers were not legally required to make the
payments was inconsequential.' The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit29 and the First Circuit -" have reached
whether the payments under consideration constituted gifts). See generally Comment,
Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under Section 170,
1968 Utah L. Rev. 475, 476 n.20 (collecting cases). In view of recent developments,
these cases are highly suspect. See infra text accompanying notes 42-56.
26. See Winters, 468 F.2d at 780 & n.3. According to Duberstein, a gift within the
meaning of Code section 102 is a transfer of property that proceeds from a "detached
and disinterested generosity" and "out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or
like impulses." 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956), and Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711,714 (1952)). If Duberstein guides
the meaning of gift in Code section 170, any number of factors could lead a court to
conclude that a taxpayer should be denied a charitable contribution deduction,
insofar as the ultimate test is the taxpayer's intent (which, under Duberstein, includes
her motives). See William A. Klein, An Enigna in the Federal Income Tar: Tile
Meaning of the Word "Gift", 48 Minn. L. Rev. 215, 219 (1963) (stating that
Duberstein's formulation of a gift "is a transfer motivated by a particular state of
mind"). For a concise criticism of Duberstein in general, see Erwin Griswold, The
Supreme Court, 1959 Term-Fonvard: Of Time and Attitudes- Professor Hart and
Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 88-91 (1960).
27. See Winters, 468 F.2d at 781.
28 See id. at 780.
29. In DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962). the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Tax Court properly
disallowed a deduction for that portion ($400) of the taxpayers' contributions
(totaling $1075) to an educational organization attended by taxpayers' children
attributable to the estimated costs of educating the children. In Deiong, the
charitable organization operating the school charged no tuition, but raised
approximately seventy percent of its annual income from contributions from the
parents of enrolled students. Parents of prospective students were asked to
contribute to the best of their financial ability, and those who were financially secure
were asked to contribute the estimated cost of education per child for each child
desiring to attend the school. Id. at 375. Parents were also asked to sign pledge cards
indicating the number of their children to be enrolled, and the amount of their
expected contributions. Id. All contributions were credited to the school's general
operating fund; no designations of funds for particular students were made. In
addition, the school did not refuse admission to any student whose parent failed to
contribute to the school. The Tax Court denied the deduction on the grounds that the
payments were in the nature of tuition, and therefore constituted nondeductible
personal expenses, rather than charitable contributions. See id. at 375-76. In affirming
the Tax Court, the court applied the Duberstein criteria for determining whether an
item of income is a "gift" and found that the Tax Court's characterization of the
payments (as tantamount to tuition paid for educational services) was not clearly
20021 1249
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essentially the same conclusion as the Winters court when presented
with like facts. The interpretative position of the IRS is largely
consistent with these cases.3'
In numerous other situations, taxpayers have been denied
deductions under Code section 170 for transfers made in
circumstances involving the receipt by taxpayers (or persons closely
related thereto) of significant benefits from charitable transferees
following the transfers. Such situations span a wide spectrum, ranging
from the provision of facilities and performance of personal services
(including nursing home facilities312  and marriage-enrichment
seminars 3) to political favors (such as favorable governmental zoning
decisions and the like3 ).
erroneous. See id. at 377-79. It appears that what most impressed the court was the
expectation that parents who could so afford would transfer to the charitable
organization an amount at least equal to the cost of educating their own children. See
id. at 379.
30. In Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), the taxpayers
transferred $900 to a tax-exempt school attended by two of their children. The school
raised its funds from transfers from the public, and received approximately forty
percent of its support from parents of children attending the school. Funds received
were accounted for in a general operating fund, not in any type of individual account
identified with any transferor or student. Admission of a student was in no way
conditioned upon receiving a payment from the student's parent or guardian. The
school solicited funds not on a per capita basis, but according to what the potential
transferor could afford. Of the $900 charitable contribution deduction claimed by the
taxpayers, the Tax Court denied an amount approximately equal to the per-student
cost of educating the taxpayers' children. See id. at 1001. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the opinion of the Tax Court, although it
invoked a different rationale. See id. at 1001-02. Whereas the Tax Court, following
the type of analysis employed in Delong, denied the deduction because the payment
to the school "proceeded primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to the
taxpayers," id. at 1001, the First Circuit adopted the more objective test of whether
the transfer by the taxpayers was to any substantial extent "offset by the cost of
services rendered to taxpayers in the nature of tuition." Id. at 1002. The court
favored this test because it obviates the need to determine the taxpayers' "motives" in
transferring a sum to charity. Id. (quoting Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v.
Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967)). Under this
objective test of value received, the taxpayers were not entitled to deduct $640 of
their transfer to the school. See id.
31. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46,47-48.
32. For example, in Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), the
taxpayer transferred money to a retirement home in connection with placing his
mother. The court considered as controlling that the nonprofit home required the
taxpayer's mother to make "founder's gift plan" payments in order to receive
admission to the home. The taxpayer also admitted to having agreed to transfer
certain amounts to the home. Because the payments were made with the expectation
of receiving a commensurate benefit in return, they failed to constitute
"contributions" under Code section 170. See generally John D. Perovich, Annotation,
Payments Made in Connection with Placing Person in Home for Aged Operated by
Qualified Charitable Organization as Constituting Tax Deductible Charitable
Contributions Under §170 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USCS §170), 34
A.L.R. Fed. 840, 840-45 (1977) (collecting and discussing cases).
33. E.g., Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62 (ruling that no deduction is allowed
under Code section 170 for amounts paid by a taxpayer to an organization following
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However, several courts have upheld a deduction if the taxpayer
presented credible evidence that the non-earmarked donation was not
made with the expectation of receiving a material economic benefit in
return for the contribution, even though the taxpayer or her family
would likely benefit to some degree from the contribution."- An
example is Marshall v. Welch, 6 in which the taxpayers (husband and
wife) transferred in excess of $1,000 to a tax-exempt organization
operating a home for disabled children and the elderly. The
taxpayer's son, who suffered from spinal disease, resided at the home.
The home did not charge patients for the care provided them, but
received support from voluntary contributions from the public. The
the completion by the taxpayer and her spouse of a marriage-enrichment seminar
provided by the transferee to the extent that the amount transferred does not exceed
the value of the benefits received by the transferor and her spouse).
34. To illustrate, in Forkan v. Commissioner 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 798 (1977), the
taxpayers conveyed a strip of land to a political subdivision in order to secure
governmental approval of the taxpayers' plans for expanding a trailer park. The Tax
Court denied the charitable contribution deduction claimed for the transfer on the
grounds that the transfer was not a "gift" because it was made in expectation of the
receipt of a benefit from the transferee (namely, permission to expand the trailer
park). See id. at 800; see also Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885,887 (9th Cir. 1970)
(denying a deduction under Code section 170 for taxpayers' transfer of property to a
city for use as a public road because the transfer was made with the expectation of
receiving public street frontage for, and favorable zoning of, taxpayers' remaining
property), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Perlmutter v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 311, 317-
18 (1965) (denying a charitable contribution deduction to taxpayers who transferred
land to governmental entities pursuant to regulations requiring subdividers of large
tracts of land to do so; stating that the transfers facilitated the ability of the taxpayers
to obtain approval of their development plans and increased the value of taxpayers'
remaining property).
35. See, for example, Dowell v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) j 9745, at
88,244 (N.D. Okla. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977), in which the court held
that a transfer in excess of $22,000 by the taxpayer to an evangelistic association prior
to establishing residency in a retirement village operated by the transferee constituted
a deductible charitable contribution. The court found that the taxpayer had not made
the transfer of funds with the intent of receiving consideration from the transferee.
The transfer was not made in lieu of other payments by the taxpayer or others, the
taxpayer had no obligation to make the gift prior to or after being admitted, and the
size of the gift had no bearing upon the fact of admission or the quality of the
residential unit occupied. See id. at 88,253-54.
Similarly, in Estate of Wardwell i. Conmissioner, 301 F.2d 632, 636-38 (8th
Cir. 1962), the court sustained a charitable contribution deduction for a transfer to a
nursing home by a prospective resident one day prior to admission in fulfillment of a
charitable pledge, where no evidence established that the parties considered such
transferred amount as consideration for admission or care rendered thereafter. The
amount transferred was to be used to endow a room for a resident not requiring
special care, but the taxpayer never in fact occupied any such room. Id. at 634-35.
Instead, she resided at all times in the home's infirmary, for which she paid monthly
sums without claiming them as deductible charitable contributions. Id. at 635. In
Revenue Ruling 72-506, 1972-2 C.B. 106, the IRS disagreed with Wardwell to the
extent that it could be construed to deny a charitable contribution deduction only
when the donor has a legally enforceable right to receive benefits as consideration for
a transfer of money.
36. 197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
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taxpayers claimed a deduction under Code section 170 for all amounts
transferred to the home (a portion of which was for the purchase of a
wheelchair for the exclusive use of their son). The court held that the
taxpayers were entitled to a deduction for the non-designated portion
of their transfers.37 The court simply reasoned that because this
portion was a "voluntary payment,"3" it satisfied the definition of a
"charitable contribution" under Code section 170.39
b. The Implications of Hernandez on Non-Earmarked Transfers to
Charity When the Taxpayer Receives a Benefit from the Transferee
Analyzing the myriad of factors bearing upon the taxpayer's intent
in transferring funds to charity is no easy task.40 Appreciating this
difficult task, some courts have declined to follow Duberstein's literal
approach of broadly focusing on whether the taxpayer has intended to
transfer an amount with the requisite "detached and disinterested
generosity." Instead, these courts look at the more narrow issue of
whether the taxpayer receives (or, under the test of some courts,
expects to receive) a material benefit (including, but not limited to,
37. See id. at 875-76.
38. In Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972), the court
denied taxpayers a charitable contribution deduction, on account of a quid pro quo.
The court distinguished this aspect of Welch from the facts before the court on the
basis that in Welch, no evidence established that the parents were encouraged or
expected to contribute to the charitable donee. See id. at 781.
39. See Welch, 197 F. Supp. at 875-76. In at least three limited circumstances, even
the IRS has ruled that non-earmarked transfers to charity are deductible,
notwithstanding that the transferor or a member of her family may benefit to some
degree from the contribution. First, the IRS has allowed a deduction when the
benefit which the taxpayer and her family can expect is no greater than that received
by every other member of the class served by the charitable transferee, and such class
constitutes a "charitable class" under the law of charitable trusts. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
80-77, 1980-1 C.B. 56 (ruling that taxpayers in each of four situations were entitled to
a charitable contribution deduction notwithstanding that they benefited from the
activities of the charities). Second, the IRS has allowed a deduction when the
taxpayer or a member of his family is an agent providing services to or on behalf of
the charitable transferee, and the agent receives from the charitable transferee
reasonable compensation or reimbursement of expenses in connection with the
performance of such services. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10 (ruling that
the father of a missionary may deduct non-earmarked contributions to a church fund
used to reimburse missionaries for certain qualified living and traveling expenses;
stating that the test in each case was whether the organization had full control of the
donated funds, and discretion as to their use). A third situation in which the IRS has
allowed a deduction is where the benefit to be received by the transferor is incidental,
remote, and small relative to the benefit to be received by the general public (or
perhaps some other charitable class). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 119
(ruling that contributions by taxpayers to a city for the removal of an unsightly
railroad were deductible, including those by taxpayers who owned property or
conducted business in the central shopping district).
40. This point is nicely advanced by the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967), discussed infra at notes 331-332,337.
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bargained-for legal consideration) from a charitable transferee
following a transfer of property. 1 The most recent guidance from the
United States Supreme Court supports the conclusion that Duberstein
should not be applied expansively in Code section 170 cases.
In Hernandez v. Commissioner,42 the issue before the Court was
whether the taxpayers, practitioners of scientology, could deduct as
charitable contributions payments made to scientology branch entities
in order to receive services known as "auditing" (involving an
encounter between a participant and an official using a machine, with
the goal of obtaining heightened spiritual awareness) and "training"
(doctrinal courses).4 3  The organization charged an amount
characterized as a "fixed donation" to participants in these services.
The Court held that the payments do not constitute deductible
contributions or gifts. The Court analyzed the legislative history of
the "contribution or gift" requirement, 5 and concluded that Congress
intended to differentiate between voluntary payments to qualified
donees (which are deductible) and payments made "in return for
goods or services" (which are not deductible)." The House and
Senate Reports47 cited by the Court provide that a transfer is a
deductible contribution or gift only if the transferor expects no quid
pro quo from the transferee.4 The Court approvingly noted that in
ascertaining whether a taxpayer's transfer to charity is made as a quid
pro quo, the IRS "has customarily examined the external features of
the transaction,"4 9 and "lower courts have generally embraced this
structural analysis."'5 The Court cited its opinion in United States v.
American Bar Endowment"' as an example of how even the Court has
41. Compare, e.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422-23 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
(stating that a deduction under Code section 170 should be denied a taxpayer who
receives or expects to receive benefits from a charitable transferee which are greater
than those received by the general public; refusing to adopt the "disinterested
generosity" test of Duberstein and citing cases that also have declined to apply such
test), with Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972) (looking solely to
the consideration received by the taxpayers in determining the deductibility of the
transferred amounts under Code section 170).
42. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
43. See id. at 684-85.
44. See id. at 685.
45. More precisely, the Court reviewed the legislative history of Code section
162(b), which denies a deduction as a trade or business expense for any "contribution
or gift" which would be deductible under section 170 in the absence of certain
limitations therein not relevant for present purposes. See id. at 690.
46. Id.
47. S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 196 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A44 (1954).
48. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 691 (citing Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422-23 (Ct. Cl.
1971)).
51. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). In American Bar Endowment, the Court disallowed a
deduction for a portion of insurance premiums paid under a group insurance policy to
a charitable organization and claimed to be deductible as charitable contributions by
2002] 1253
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
examined the external features of a transaction (rather than the
subjective motivations of taxpayers) to determine whether a taxpayer
has made a deductible contribution or gift to charity.52 Examining
such external aspects of a transaction, reasoned the Court,
advantageously "obviat[es] the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise
inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers. 5 3  Having
examined the external features of the transaction, the Court
concluded that the payments at issue were not contributions or gifts
within the meaning of Code section 170, for they were part of a quid
pro quo exchange. In exchange for money, the taxpayers received an
"identifiable benefit" associated with a mandatory, fixed price.5
The precise test which governs whether a taxpayer's contribution is
part of a quid pro quo transaction, and therefore not deductible,
under Hernandez is not entirely clear. The starting point is to observe
what Hernandez sought to avoid: "the need for the IRS to conduct
imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers." 55
Thus, a test that seeks to determine a taxpayer's subjective state of
mind broadly (i.e., her many motives) is inconsistent with
Hernandez.56
A test which looks to whether the taxpayer actually anticipates the
receipt of a commensurate benefit from the transferee in exchange for
the non-designated transfer fares much better under Hernandez. The
Hernandez Court cited two opinions that employed such a test,57
although the Court did so only for their "embrace" of the IRS's
the organization's members who participated in the policy. The amounts claimed by
the taxpayers as deductions were the insurance policy dividends paid by the insurance
company to the charitable organization, which amounts represented a refund of the
difference between the insurance company's real cost of providing insurance to the
organization's members and the amount of premiums paid thereby. Prior to
participating in the group policy, members were required by the charitable
organization to assign thereto all rights to future policy dividends. The deductions
were denied all taxpayers because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the
taxpayers had purposely contributed funds to the charitable organization in excess of
the value of the benefit (insurance coverage) received in return. See American Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
52. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 691.
53. Id. at 690-91.
54. See id. at 691-92.
55. See id. at 691.
56. Cf Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures,
The Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DePaul L.
Rev. 1, 39 (1994) ("The notion of applying the 'detached and disinterested generosity'
test to a corporation is intriguing, but the prior practice of the IRS and the Hernandez
decision render such an inquiry moot....").
57. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690-91 (citing Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d
413, 422-23 (Ct. Cl. 1971), and United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S.
105, 118 (1986)). American Bar Endowment looked to whether the taxpayers
intentionally transferred amounts in excess of the value which they received from the
charitable transferee. See 477 U.S. at 118.
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approach of examining the "external features" of the transaction.,'
One may also observe the Court's references to a taxpayer's
"expectation" of receiving a quid pro quo.59 Thus, perhaps Hernandez
supports an inquiry into a taxpayer's actual expectation of receiving a
quid pro quo.6°
However, the Hernandez Court arguably was not validating the
approach of looking at every atom of evidence bearing upon what
benefits a taxpayer actually expected (such as the taxpayer's self-
serving testimony that he lacked any hope of benefiting from a
transfer). Rather, the opinion could be interpreted as endorsing the
approach of looking at the objective evidence external to a taxpayer's
mind to determine whether there should have been a reasonable
expectation of receiving "this" (the benefit) for "that" (the transfer to
the charitable organization). 1 This understanding comports with the
Court's conclusion that the taxpayers' payments were part of a quid
pro quo exchange.62 Based upon all of the objective evidence, the
Court determined that the taxpayers had received services "in return
for" amounts transferred to the transferee.' This determination
followed the Court's prior statement that the external features of a
transaction are examined "[i]n ascertaining whether a given payment
was made with 'the expectation of any quid pro quo."'' Because the
Court shunned the approach of searching for the taxpayers' actual
motives, the Court arguably was conducting an analysis of what the
taxpayers reasonably should have expected from their transferee.
Accordingly, Hernandez may, at a minimum, be understood as
implicitly advancing the following test: a taxpayer will be denied a
charitable contribution deduction, in whole or in part, whenever the
taxpayer receives a benefit from the transferee that the taxpayer
reasonably should expect to have been provided in exchange for the
taxpayer's transfer.' The benefit is presumed to have a value
5& See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690-91.
59. See id. at 690, 692, 693.
60. For a discussion of this view of Hernandez, see Jacob L Todres, Internal
Revenue Code Section 170: Does the Receipt by a Donor of an Intangible Religious
Benefit Reduce the Amount of the Charitable Contribution Deduction? Only the Lord
Knows for Sure, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 91, 143-49 (1996).
61. For the contrasting view that Hernandez should be read in harmony with prior
decisions focusing on the taxpayer's subjective intent, see Joseph V. Sliskovich,
Charitable Contributions or Gifts: A Contemporaneous Look Back to the Future, 57
UMKC L. Rev. 437,493-98 (1989).
62. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 691-92.
63. See id. The objective evidence included the existence of fixed price schedules,
the practice of refunding sums advanced for services not later provided, the method
of accounting for pre-paid services, and the refusal to provide services free of charge.
See id.
64. Id. at 690 (citing S. Rep. No. 83-1622. supra note 47, at 196; H.R. Rep. No. 83-
1337, supra note 47, at A44).
65. Of course, because the taxpayers in Hernandez actually received a "quid" for
their "quo," one cannot be certain whether the Court also would deny a deduction to
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commensurate with the amount transferred by the taxpayer to the
charitable transferee. Those special exceptions to this general rule
that have been recognized previously' presumably survive
Hernandez, for nothing in the opinion suggests that they are invalid.67
B. When Transferor Specifies a Secondary Beneficiary
The courts have heard several cases in which a taxpayer has made a
transfer to a charitable organization and designated a named person
as the secondary beneficiary. These authorities are among the most
important sources of law in the field of earmarked contributions, and
are the subject of this section. For analytical purposes, it is helpful to
distinguish earmarked-contribution authorities involving taxpayers
who have no familial relationship to, and are not themselves, the
secondary beneficiaries from those in which such a relationship or
identity is present. The former category is addressed first.
a taxpayer who reasonably expects to receive a return benefit from a transfer, but in
fact does not receive such a benefit. In such a case, the better view appears to be that
the Court would still deny the deduction. This conclusion is supported by the Court's
several references to the "expectation(s)" of taxpayers. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at
690, 692, 693.
66. See supra note 39 (discussing three circumstances in which the IRS has ruled
that non-earmarked transfers are deductible even though the transferor may benefit
to some degree from the transfer).
67. One possible objection to this analysis is that the Court was interested only in
looking at whether a taxpayer in form received a benefit "in exchange for" a transfer
to a purportedly charitable transferee. For example, the Court stated that "[tihe
relevant inquiry.., is... not whether the payment secures religious benefits or access
to religious services, but whether the transaction in which the payment is involved is
structured as a quid pro quo exchange." Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 701-02. However, I
do not believe this objection is ultimately persuasive. It is doubtful that the Court
would have ruled in favor of the taxpayers had the church merely not been so explicit
in stating the terms under which it would provide its services to transferors. Such a
holding could result in the claiming of deductions for all types of transactions
involving personal consumption, such as payments by taxpayers for their children
attending religious schools (as long as no tuition is explicitly charged), a result clearly
not favored by the Court. See id. at 693. Rather, the Court more likely just meant that
a deduction will be denied whenever all of the facts suggest that reasonable parties
would view the transaction as having the structural elements of an exchange-
obtaining a benefit in exchange for transferring an amount to the transferee.
It would probably go too far to conclude that Hernandez implicitly endorses
the view that a taxpayer will be denied a charitable contribution deduction whenever
the taxpayer receives a commensurate benefit from the transferee as a result of the
transfer. The reason that this test likely is too expansive is that it does not mandate a
finding of a quid pro quo in order to disallow a deduction. The test would result in
the denial of a deduction whenever a taxpayer has received "this" after transferring
"that," even if no reasonable taxpayer would expect to receive a benefit in exchange
for the transfer to charity. True, Hernandez was factually a quid-pro-quo case, and
therefore the Court was not compelled to apply (or reject) this test. However, the
Court's failure to adopt the test when it probably could have done so on the facts
before it suggests that it is of doubtful validity. This conclusion is further supported
by the Court's point that the "relevant inquiry" is "not whether the payment secures
religious benefits." Id. at 701-02.
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1. When Secondary Beneficiaries Do Not Include the Transferor or
Members of Her Family or Household
a. Transferor's Binding Designation
When a taxpayer upon her own initiative designates a specific
individual to benefit from the taxpayer's transfer to a charitable
organization, the question arises as to whether the taxpayer may
deduct the amount transferred to charity under Code section 170.
Consider the following example: The taxpayer, a dedicated
philanthropist who regularly participates in a local youth-mentoring
program, identifies an intelligent young person who is from an
indigent family. The taxpayer calls a prestigious private school, which
qualifies under Code section 170(b)(1)(A), and offers to pay the
child's tuition if the school will accept the youth. The child, to whom
the taxpayer is not related, is accepted to the school, and the
philanthropist writes a check to the school for the child's tuition, as
agreed. In like circumstances, existing authorities have concluded that
the taxpayer may not claim a deduction under Code section 170(a) for
her earmarked contribution, if such designation is legally binding on
the charity.
A most apropos illustration of these authorities is Tripp v.
Commissioner, in which the taxpayer claimed charitable contribution
deductions for stuns paid to a tax-exempt college. The taxpayer
transmitted his first payment with a letter to the college expressing his
interest in both the college and the career of a certain young man
interested in attending the college.69 In the letter, the taxpayer
acknowledged his understanding that a donation to the college for a
scholarship fund is deductible only if it does not specify the
scholarship recipient. Nonetheless, the taxpayer stated as follows:
"[H]owever, if in your opinion and that of the authorities, [this
donation] could be applied to the advantage of Mr. Robert F. Roble, I
think it would be constructive."" The college informed the taxpayer
that it had credited his first payment to the account of the named
individual.71 Subsequent payments were accounted for similarly.72
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the IRS's disallowance of the claimed deduction.' The court
observed that it was clear that the taxpayer "intended to aid" the
designated individual and that the transfers "were earmarked for that
68. 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
69. Id. at 435.
70. Id.
71. Id
72. Id. at 435-36.
73. Id at 436.
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purpose."74 The college never awarded a scholarship to the named
young man, nor "took any other action obligating it to provide him
with tuition, book requirements, or miscellaneous requirements" from
any funds of the college." The payments had not been made to the
school's general scholarship fund to be used however it deemed best,
but in payment of one person's expenses. 6 The court treated the
payment as a contribution to an individual, which, under federal
income tax law, does not qualify as a deductible charitable
contribution.77
Although the facts of Tripp are analogous to those of the
hypothetical problem raised at the beginning of this subpart, Tripp is
probably not the most significant case in this area of law. Perhaps the
seminal case on the deductibility of earmarked contributions is
Thomason v. Commissioner.7 8 In Thomason, the taxpayer promised
to pay to a children's aid society the expenses for maintenance and
education of the taxpayer's former foster child, while the child was in
the legal custody of the society.79 After the taxpayer conferred with
the supervisor of the society, the society sent the boy to a for-profit
boys' ranch, which directly billed the taxpayer for the boy's
expenses. 80 The taxpayer sent the checks in payment of such expenses
directly to the boys' ranch. Had the taxpayer not agreed to pay for
such expenses, the children's aid society would have been unable to
finance the former foster child's attendance at the boys' ranch.
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that his payment
of the boy's expenses should be considered "for the use of" the society
and held that the taxpayer's claimed deduction was improper.8' Citing
Supreme Court precedent on the essential characteristics of charitable
trusts, the Tax Court stated that "[c]harity begins where certainty in
beneficiaries ends" and "the uncertainty of the objects.., forms the
essential element of charity."' A "bequest" is private, rather than
charitable, "[w]henever the beneficiary is designated by name."83 The
payments secured "special privileges" for the boy that the society
would not itself have provided, and the payments only incidentally





78. 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
79. See id. at 442.
80. See id. at 44243.
81. See id. at 443-45.
82. Id. at 443 (citing Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163 (1883)).
83. Id. at 444. The Tax Court also cited Tilles v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 545
(1938). Thomason, 2 T.C. at 444.
84. See Thomason, 2 T.C. at 444. Finding in favor of the taxpayer was not
compelled simply because the payments relieved the society of "some financial
burden." Id.
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which "an exempt organization incurs liabilities in the general
performance of its functions and requests its donors to pay their
contributions to its creditors."'  Rather, the taxpayer paid the
amounts for the benefit of only a "designated individual," not for any
"other individuals" or "other purpose of the society."'
The Tax Court in Thomason did not limit its ruling to transfers
purportedly made "for the use of" the charity, and thus Thomason is
relevant to transfers made "to" the charity. Indeed, the court stated
that the phrase "for the use of" "does not touch upon the essential
requirement of indefiniteness of bounty."'  Instead, as previously
discussed," the court emphasized that the payment was designated for
the use of a specific individual. This designation still easily could have
been present had the taxpayer made the society (rather than the boys'
ranch) the nominal payee of his check; the taxpayer simply could have
conditioned payment upon the society's transfer of funds to the boys'
ranch in payment of the former foster child's expenses (a condition
similar to the arrangement between the college and taxpayer in
Tripp). Thus, the court's rationale applies to earmarked transfers
made "to" the charitable transferee (as in Tripp), as well as to
earmarked transfers made "for the use of" the charitable transfereeY'
85. Id.
86. Id. At the inception of its legal analysis, the court summarized its rationale as
follows:
The contributions here in question were paid directly to Sunset Ranch for
the tuition and maintenance of a particular child. They were earmarked
from the beginning not for a group or class of individuals, not to be used in
any manner seen fit by the society, but for the use of a single individual in
whom the petitioner felt a keen fatherly and personal interest.
Id. at 443.
87. Id. at 444. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 171-172, the
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "for the use of" generally as "in trust for" in
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472,485 (1990).
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. A case factually similar to Thomason is Davenport v. Conunissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1585 (1975), in which the taxpayers, who were parents of a minister
employed by a tax-exempt charitable organization, made rental payments directly to
the owner of certain property. Id. at 1585-86. The property was used both as a part-
time residence for the minister and his family and as a storage and administrative site
for the charitable organization. Id. at 1586. The taxpayers argued that their deduction
was proper because the charitable organization would have been required to pay
some amount of rent to house the minister's family and to store the organization's
equipment had the taxpayers not paid it. Id. at 1586-87. The Tax Court rejected the
taxpayers' argument and held that no deduction was proper. Id. at 1587-88.
Citing Thomason, the Tax Court stated that no evidence showed that the
organization would have rented property had the taxpayers not done so, and even if
such evidence existed, the deduction would still be improper. Id. at 1587. By making
the payments directly to the property owner, the taxpayers removed the option of the
charity to use the funds as it deemed advisable. Id. This observation does not imply
that the court was requiring the charitable organization to be the direct recipient of a
contribution made "to" the charity. On the contrary, the court acknowledged the
propriety of a deduction for a gift in trust for a charity. Id. at 1587. The court stated
as follows: "[Tihe charity must have full control of the funds donated in order for a
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The IRS has reached results similar to these decisions, with or
without explicit reference thereto, in its official interpretive rulings.
For example, in Revenue Ruling 57-211, 0 the IRS ruled, with little
analysis, that payments made to a state hospital for the purpose of
reimbursing the state for the care of a patient are not deductible as
charitable contributions because they are not contributions "to or for
the use of" the state "for exclusively public purposes." 91 Similarly, in
Revenue Ruling 54-580, 9 the IRS ruled that payments for tuition
made on behalf of children attending parochial school are not
deductible as charitable contributions because they are made for the
benefit of a particular child or children.93 In contrast, payments made
to or for the use of organizations operating the schools "in carrying
out their general purposes and not in any way earmarked for the
benefit of particular children" would be deductible.94 In Revenue
Ruling 61-66, 91 the IRS denied a deduction for transfers to a university
where the transferor specifically instructed the transferee to use the
taxpayer to be entitled to a charitable deduction, and such is not the situation where
the funds are designated by the donor for the use of a particular individual." Id. at
1587-88.
In addition to citing Thomason, the court cited Kluss v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
572 (1966), and McMillan v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1143 (1959), as direct authority.
In Kluss, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's contribution to a noncharitable
organization was made "to or for the use of" such organization (and therefore was not
deductible), rather than to the charitable organizations that ultimately received some
benefits from the recipient organization's operations, where the donor's intent was to
benefit the noncharitable organization and to give it complete control over disposition
of the funds. 46 T.C. at 574-76. In McMillan, the Tax Court held that the taxpayers'
payment of the living expenses of a child they received into their household with the
expectation of adopting the child were not contributions to the charitable
organization legally obligated to support the child prior to adoption. 31 T.C. at 1146-
47. The Tax Court also opined that a critical factor in the determination of the
deductibility of an amount claimed to be a charitable contribution is the transferors'
intent. See Davenport, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1588. According to the Tax Court, the
evidence indicated that the taxpayers intended to benefit their son, and therefore the
contributions should be viewed as having been made for his benefit, not for that of
the charity (even though the payments may have incidentally relieved the charity of a
financial burden). Id.; see also Marshall v. Welch, 197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961)
(holding that payments by taxpayers to a home for crippled children and elderly
people were not deductible to the extent that funds were apparently designated for
the purchase of a wheelchair for the taxpayers' son); Patterson v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M.
(CCH) 847, 849 (1987) ("Where a taxpayer donates funds to an individual ostensibly
as a representative of a charity (or earmarks donated funds for a particular
individual), in determining whether the funds are used 'to or for the use' of a charity,
so as to be deductible, the critical factor is the taxpayer's intent (i.e., did the taxpayer
intend to benefit the charity or the individual?).... A taxpayer's intent to benefit the
charity is manifested by placing the contributed funds under the charity's control.").
90. 1957-1 C.B. 97.
91. Id.
92. 1954-2 C.B. 97.
93. See id. (citing Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441 (1943)).
94. Id.
95. 1961-1 C.B. 19.
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money as an independent research grant for a named professor.' In
denying the deduction, the IRS reasoned that the university lacked
control over the disbursement of the transferred funds, and therefore
functioned as a mere conduit between the transferor and the
professor.97
One other administrative ruling is noteworthy for its clear
articulation of what test, in the opinion of the IRS, should govern
earmarked contributions. In Revenue Ruling 68484, a corporation
was a significant employer that hired employees primarily from the
pool of graduates of educational institutions. The corporation
established programs financially supporting these schools. 9 The IRS
ruled that the transfers by the corporation to qualified charities
pursuant to these programs were deductible charitable
contributions.1" The IRS set forth the following test:
For purposes of determining that a contribution is made to or for the
use of an organization described in section 170 rather than to a
particular individual who ultimately benefits from the contribution,
the organization must have full control of the use of the donated
funds and the contributor's intent in making the payment must have
been to benefit the charitable organization itself and not the
individual recipient.10
As discussed infra,'0 2 the authorities discussed in this section do not
uniformly articulate the test that governs the deductibility of an
earmarked transfer to a charitable organization. However, these
authorities do reach uniform results in cases involving a donor who,
upon her own initiative, restricts the charitable transferee's use of
funds so as to benefit a person selected by the donor. In all such
cases, a deduction has been denied.
b. Transferor's Non-Binding Preference
When, if at all, is a deduction available to a transferor who does not
contractually restrict the charitable transferee's use of funds, but
instead merely expresses her preference that the funds be used to
benefit a person named by the transferor? Considering certain
language in the opinions and rulings discussed above, one might
expect that a taxpayer will be denied a charitable contribution
96. Id. at 19-20. At the time, the professor was on sabbatical and received no
compensation from the university and performed no services for the university. Id. at
20.
97. Id.
98. 1968-2 C.B. 105.
99. See id at 106.
100. Id. at 107.
101. Id. at 106-07 (citing Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441 (1943), and McMillan v.
Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1143 (1959)).
102- See infra Part I.B.l.c.
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deduction for a transfer to charity that is in any manner specified for
the benefit of a particular individual, even if that specification is not
legally binding on the charity. After all, we have been told by the
authorities that "the uncertainty of the objects... forms the essential
element of charity," ' 3 and that a deduction is proper only if the
donor's intent is to benefit the charitable transferee, rather than an
individual designee.) 4 One also may readily imagine situations in
which a taxpayer transfers sums to a charity coupled with an
expression of a preference that the charity use the funds in a specified
manner, yet the taxpayer and the charity alike are fully aware of the
minimal probability that the charity will use the funds in a manner
contrary to the taxpayer's wishes. 1°5
A case that generally supports the deductibility of contributions
made by a donor who merely expresses a non-binding preference that
funds be used to benefit a secondary beneficiary is Peace v.
Commissioner."c In Peace, the taxpayer mailed numerous checks
during the years in issue to a Christian missions organization.07 Each
check was made payable to the organization, although the taxpayer
wrote the names of four missionaries on the notation section of eleven
of the checks."0 ' The taxpayer also wrote three letters to the
organization at various times, each of which referred to the taxpayer's
contributions "for" or "for the support of" or to "take care of"
missionaries specified by name. 0 9 Further, the taxpayer enclosed
checks for four months in remittance envelopes that designated the
missionaries to be supported by the transfers. In response to the
taxpayer's statement on one such envelope that he preferred his
donation to support only the designated missionaries, the organization
sent the taxpayer a pamphlet making clear that all funds donated for
the support of missionaries were pooled and distributed equally
amongst all missionaries for their support."0
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's charitable contribution
deductions were proper."' The court reasoned that the taxpayer's
designation was merely an expression of desire that the organization
credit the sums to the support allowances of the named
missionaries."2 Under its policy, the transferee organization had
"exclusive control" of the "administration and distribution" of
103. Thomason, 2 T.C. at 443 (citing Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163 (1883)).
104. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. at 106-07.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 374-376.
106. 43 T.C. 1 (1964).
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3-4.
110. Id. at 5-6.
111. Id. at 7-8.
112. Id. at 7.
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donated funds.11 3 The taxpayer was aware of this fact, and intended
the contributions to be placed in a common pool."4 The court
distinguished this case from others such as Thomason, in which "the
intent of the donor was that the gift.., go directly to or be used solely
for certain specified individuals.""' 5 As in Revenue Ruling 62 -1 13 ,1b
the taxpayer's intent was to place the contributions in a fund subject
to the donee's control.117
Peace is an important case in the law of earmarked transfers to
charity, particularly when one is careful not to segregate the Tax
Court's legal conclusions from the facts of the case. No honest,
realistic observer can deny that the taxpayer desired to support the
named missionaries affiliated with the transferee religious
organization.1 8 Yet the court concluded that the taxpayer's intent was
not that the gifts pass directly to the named missionaries, but that the
funds be placed in a common pool subject to the organization's
control, in accordance with the organization's stated policy."9 A
plausible reading of Peace is that a transferor may express a
preference or wish that the transferee use the transferred funds to
benefit a person designated by the donor in furtherance of its
charitable purposes, at least where (i) the designated person is not
related to the transferor, and (ii) the charitable transferee is not
legally bound to comply with the donor's preferences (i.e., the charity
has control over the administration and distribution of the transferred
funds). Under this reading, the "donor's intent" is irrelevant, and the
determining factor is whether the donor has subjected the transferred
funds to the charitable transferee's legal control.
The IRS appears unwilling to interpret Peace quite so broadly. In
Revenue Ruling 79-81Y,1 members of a leadership-training entity
affiliated with a religious organization solicited funds on behalf of the
religious organization. The amount solicited approximated each
member's education-related costs of participating in two years of the
113. Id.; cf Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 19 (1942) (holding deductible
from testator's gross estate the value of property placed in trust to provide
scholarships to persons in need of financial aid, with a non-binding preference for
relatives of the testator).
114. See Peace, 43 T.C. at 7.
115. Id at 7-8.
116. 1962-2 C.B. 10 (discussing contributions to church fund for support of
missionaries).
117. See Peace, 43 T.C. at 8.
118. The taxpayer was personally interested in the work of those specific
missionaries, and had given some of them personal gifts apart from the transfers to
charity. See idU at 4. He plainly considered himself to be supporting the named
missionaries (as evidenced by the language of his correspondence), see id. at 3-5, and
even once transparently (albeit sincerely) expressed a desire that his contribution be
used exclusively for the named missionaries. See id. at 5 ("1 would prefer the whole
amount in [the] future to go to their support only[;] do not break it up.").
119. Itt at 8.
120. 1979-1 C.B. 107.
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training program. Before actually making any transfers, prospective
supporters would sign a pledge form that listed the name of the
member whom they would "sponsor. ' 121 The pledge form stated that
the entity's governing board retained discretion over the use of the
funds, and that they were non-refundable. 122 When fulfilling their
pledges by making payments to the entity, donors would list the
student names on pre-addressed payment envelopes. 23 On these
facts, the IRS held that the transferors could not deduct their
payments to the religious organization. 124  The IRS reasoned that
transfers to charitable donees which have been "earmarked" by the
transferor for a specified individual are nondeductible gifts to that
individual."2 Citing Revenue Ruling 62-113, the IRS stated that a
deduction is available if "a gift is intended by the donor for the use of
the organization and not as a gift to an individual,"'2 6 and then
approvingly cited Revenue Ruling 68-484 for its two-part "transferee
control" and "transferor intent" test.27 In the opinion of the IRS, a
transferor's designation of a particular student on the pledge form and
payment envelopes evidenced the transferor's intent to benefit the
individual recipient, rather than the religious organization, which was
the immediate transferee of the funds.1l 8 Moreover, because the costs
of educational services and facilities consumed by each student
approximated the expected solicitations by each student, the IRS
viewed the religious organization's control of the use of funds as
limited to that of any school over tuition payments. 2 9
c. Summary and Assessment
Unhappily for many charities and prospective donors (not to
mention the government), the law in this area lacks clarity. The
121. See id. at 107. Often, a donor was a member's parent. See id. However, when
a member's parents were unable to contribute, she was expected to solicit
sponsorships from others. Id. Because the IRS did not distinguish transfers from
parents from those from non-relatives, this revenue ruling should not be explained




124. See id. at 108.
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10). The IRS cited Tripp v.
Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964), as a case denying a deduction for an
earmarked transfer. For a discussion of Tripp, see supra text accompanying notes 68-
77.
127. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1979-1 C.B. at 108 (citing Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. 105).
128. Id.
129. Id. The point of this remark in the revenue ruling is not entirely clear.
Presumably, the IRS meant only that funds received by the religious organization
were necessarily used to provide the educational services and facilities for the benefit
of the students, rather than for other exempt purposes.
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judicial and administrative authorities do not uniformly articulate any
single test for determining whether a transfer to charity is deductible if
the transferor to some degree designates the secondary beneficiary.
Most authorities appear to rely upon the law of charitable trusts,
either explicitly or by implication. The apparent position of the IRS is
far from generous to transferors in this area.
An analysis of the relevant authorities indicates that the courts and
the IRS have relied most extensively on one or more of three
factors13° in determining whether a transferor is entitled to deduct a
transfer to a charitable transferee when the transferor, upon her own
initiative, designates the secondary beneficiary. The first factor is
whether the charitable transferee has the right to exercise legal
control over the disposition of the transferred funds. Both
Davenport131 and Peace1 32 relied heavily upon the presence or absence
of the charity's legal control over the funds at issue in reaching their
decisions. 3 Thomason may be understood similarly, insofar as the
court noted that the taxpayer's payments were marked for a particular
person, "not to be used in any manner seen fit by the society."'-
Likewise, in Tripp the court observed that the payments received by
the college had not been made to a general scholarship fund from
which the school could disburse sums to whomever it wished.3 5 The
IRS views the presence of the charitable transferee's control over
transferred funds as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
deductibility under Code section 170, as is apparent from the two-part
"transferee control" and "transferor intent" test of Revenue Ruling
68-484,136 followed in Revenue Ruling 79-81.' 7
A second relevant factor is whether the taxpayer's transfer is used
to pay an amount that the charitable transferee otherwise would be
responsible for paying, without any designation by, or agreement with,
the taxpayer. Thus, the court in Tripp observed that the transferee
college never obligated itself to provide for the secondary
beneficiary's education from its own scholarship funds." Similarly, in
130. As discussed below, some authorities also rely on a fourth factor the
relationship between the transferor and the secondary beneficiary. See infra notes
360-373 and accompanying text. In cases not involving a quid pro quo payment
securing benefits for a taxpayer or a member of his family, it does not appear that this
factor, standing alone, has been accorded the same importance as the other three
factors discussed herein. Rather, it is probably seen as relevant in establishing the
presence of another factor: transferor intent.
131. See Davenport v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585,1587-88 (1975).
132. See Peace v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 1, 7-8 (1964).
133. See supra notes 89, 106-129 and accompanying text.
134. Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441,443 (1943).
135. See Tripp v. Comm'r, 337 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1964).
136. 1968-2 C.B. 105, 106.
137. 1979-1 C.B. 107, 108. The absence of transferee control was also fatal to the
deduction in Revenue Ruling 61-66, 1961-1 C.B. 19,20.
138. See Tripp, 337 F.2d at 436.
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Thomason, the court emphasized that the taxpayer's payments
purchased "special privileges" for the former foster child that the
charity would not have extended in its usual operations, and
contrasted the facts before the court with the situation in which a
charity asks donors to pay outstanding liabilities incurred by the
charity in conducting its normal activities. 39 Moreover, although the
court in Peace did not cite this factor as such, in ruling for the taxpayer
it heavily relied upon the organization's general policy of pooling all
contributions supporting its missionaries. 140 Therefore, one may
understand Peace as holding for the taxpayer in part because the
charitable transferee had indeed assumed responsibility for the
support of the missionaries designated by the taxpayer through the
donations the charity received from all sources.
Notwithstanding the judicial reliance upon this factor, the IRS does
not appear to place great weight on it, at least not consistently.'4' For
example, the IRS ruled in Revenue Ruling 57-211 that payments
made to a state hospital to reimburse the state for the care of a patient
are not deductible because they are not contributions "to or for the
use of" the state "for exclusively public purposes. '142 Because the
ruling provides few facts, discerning its full force and scope is difficult.
Namely, it is not clear whether the patient was expected to pay for her
care. If so, a reasonable person would not expect the state to provide
the hospital care for free, and therefore the taxpayer was rightly
disallowed the deduction. However, if the patient was not able to pay
for her care, it would generally fall upon the state to incur all costs
associated with the hospital care. In that case, the taxpayer's payment
surely would have relieved the state of a liability for costs incurred in
carrying out its public purposes, and under the foregoing cases, this
factor would suggest the propriety of the charitable contribution
deduction. The failure of the ruling to distinguish the two cases of
patients (one financially stable, and the other poor) at least suggests
that this factor is not always accorded great significance by the IRS.
A final factor of importance to some courts and the IRS is whether
the transferor's intent in making the transfer is to benefit the
secondary beneficiary, rather than the charitable transferee. To
illustrate, the Tripp court noted that the taxpayer intended to benefit
the secondary beneficiary from the time he transferred amounts to the
college.'43  Perhaps more importantly, the court in Davenport
characterized as a "critical factor" that the transferor intended to
benefit the secondary beneficiary.'" Most striking of all is the IRS's
139. See Thomason, 2 T.C. at 444.
140. See Peace, 43 T.C. at 7-8.
141. See Rev. Rul. 57-211, 1957-1 C.B. 97.
142. Id.; see also supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
143. Tripp, 337 F.2d at 436.
144. Davenport v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585, 1588 (1975).
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two-part test of Revenue Ruling 68-484, the second prong of which
states that "the contributor's intent in making the payment must have
been to benefit the charitable organization itself and not the
individual recipient. ' 145 The IRS later applied this test in Revenue
Ruling 79-81 to deny a deduction for contributions designated for
particular students, notwithstanding that all transfers to the charity
were non-refundable, and that the charity's governing board reserved
the legal right to dispose of funds however it so determined.'4 6 The
IRS opined that a transferor's designation of a particular student
manifested the transferor's intent to benefit the individual recipient,
rather than the immediate charitable transferee of the funds.
In addition to failing a normative analysis,'47 this reliance by the
IRS and some courts upon the transferor's intent to benefit a named
individual is at least suspect in the wake of Hernandez. Of course, in
Hernandez, the Court was not called upon to address the deductibility
of transfers to charity coupled with the transferor's designation of an
unrelated secondary beneficiary." But the rationale and approach of
the Court in Hernandez are quite relevant to the matter of whether, or
perhaps to what extent, the courts and the IRS may continue to probe
the transferor's "intent" to benefit the secondary beneficiary, rather
than the charitable transferee. In Hernandez, the Court extolled the
virtues of examining the external features of a transaction in
determining whether a taxpayer has made a deductible contribution
or gift to charity. 4 9 Examining such external aspects of a transaction
precludes "the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into
the motivations of individual taxpayers."'5 - Thus, if the inquiry into
the deductibility of a certain transfer involves a determination of what
motivated the transfer, the inquiry is misguided under Hernandez. In
other words, under Hernandez, the courts and the IRS should not
determine the deductibility of a transfer to charity on the basis of
whether a given taxpayer was motivated by the desire to benefit in
some way a named person affiliated with the charitable transferee.
However, if the inquiry is limited to examining the "external features"
of the transaction so as to determine whether the transferor has truly
subjected the transferred funds to meaningful control and oversight by
the charity, the inquiry into the transferor's intent would appear
acceptable under Hernandez.'5'
145. Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. at 106-07.
146. See supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text (discussing Revenue Ruling
79-81,1979-1 C.B. 107).
147. See infra Part III.A.1.
148. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,680 (1988).
149. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
150. Hemandez, 490 U.S. at 690-91.
151. See supra notes 104-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of Peace,
which follows this approach.
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A separate question is what should be the governing standards for
determining the deductibility of a transfer to charity when the
transferor designates a secondary beneficiary. Before such question is
explored, this Article examines two other major aspects of positive
law: the deductibility of transfers made to charity when the donor
specifies himself or related persons as the secondary beneficiaries, and
the deductibility of transfers made to charity with the knowledge that
the charity has pre-selected a named secondary beneficiary who will
benefit from the transferred funds.
2. When Secondary Beneficiaries Include Transferor or Members of
Her Family or Household
a. Transferor's Binding Designation
Compared to the law governing earmarked transfers to charity in
the circumstances described thus far, the law is refreshingly
straightforward in its treatment of transfers to charity when the
transferor designates herself or a close relative as the secondary
beneficiary of the transfer, and the transferor's designation is binding
on the charity. As a general rule, a charitable contribution deduction
is not allowed in such cases. 52 Such express designations resulting in
benefits from the charity to the donor often constitute one of the most
egregious types of efforts to designate the people who will benefit
from donated funds. They generally represent the classic quid pro
quo exchange resulting in the denial of a deduction under Hernandez.
Insofar as Hernandez teaches that a taxpayer will be denied a
charitable contribution deduction whenever she reasonably should
expect that she will receive a benefit from the transferee in exchange
for her transfer (which benefit is presumed to be commensurate to the
amount transferred),'5 3 it follows that a transferor's binding
designation of herself (or perhaps a close relative or household
152. See, e.g., Cooper v. Comm'r, 264 F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1959) (holding that
payments to a college and university for the expenses incurred by taxpayer's
grandchild were not deductible charitable contributions); Marshall v. Welch, 197 F.
Supp. 874, 875-76 (S.D. Ohio 1961) (holding that payments by taxpayers to a home
for crippled children and elderly people were not deductible to the extent that funds
were designated for the purchase of a wheelchair for the taxpayers' son; holding that
funds not designated for the exclusive benefit of taxpayers' son were deductible);
Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33, 34-35 (D. Mass. 1933) (holding that
payments for tuition charged by an educational institution for the education of the
taxpayer's children were not deductible as charitable contributions; stating that
tuition paid on behalf of children is a type of family expense), aff'd, 67 F.2d 986 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934); Fausner v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 620, 623-25 (1971)
(holding that payments made by taxpayers to parochial schools and a military
academy for tuition and books for taxpayers' children were nondeductible personal,
living or family expenses, rather than deductible charitable contributions).
153. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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member) as the secondary beneficiary will foreclose a charitable
contribution deduction. Indeed, even under the most restrictive
possible interpretation of Hernandez-that a deduction is unavailable
for a transfer to charity that is structured in form as a quid pro quo
exchange-a transferor's binding designation of herself as the
secondary beneficiary should result in disallowance of a charitable
contribution deduction.
When the private benefit inherent in the exchange is received
directly by the transferor or a member of the transferor's family, a
deduction is also properly denied based on Code section 262, which
generally denies a deduction for any "personal, living, or family
expenses."'" When the quid is received by the taxpayer in exchange
for the quo provided to the charity, the transfer to charity would
appear to be a nondeductible "personal" expense under Code section
262.155 Similarly, if the quid is received by a member of the taxpayer's
family in exchange for the quo provided to the charity, the transfer
should be nondeductible as a "family" expense under Code section
262.156 Unsurprisingly, in quid pro quo cases involving the receipt of a
benefit from a transferee charity by a member of the family of the
transferor, several courts have cited Code section 262 as support for
denying the deduction."
b. Transferor's Non-Binding Expression of Preference
What are the tax consequences of a transfer to charity when the
transferor designates herself or a close relative as the secondary
beneficiary of the transfer, but the transferor's designation is merely a
non-binding preference communicated to the charity? Arguably, a
deduction might be proper where the charity in fact conveys a benefit
upon the secondary beneficiary who is "preferred" by the transferor,
if the charitable transferee actually has legal control over distribution
of the transferred funds."5 However, under Hernandez, this position
would be unwarranted in many situations.
154. I.R.C. § 262 (1994).
155. I& When the benefit provided by the charity in exchange for a transfer
thereto is enjoyed by a member of the taxpayer's family whom the taxpayer is legally
obligated to support (such as a minor child), one could also characterize the expense
as a "personal" expense of the taxpayer.
156. At some point, lines must be drawn concerning the degree of kinship that
qualifies a person as a member of the taxpayer's family, if the availability of the
deduction hinges upon whether a secondary beneficiary is considered a member of
the taxpayer's family.
157. See, eg., Channing, 4 F. Supp. at 34-35; Fausner, 55 T.C. at 624.
158. Some support for this position arguably appears in a line of cases involving
testamentary trusts in which the trustee is directed to give preference in making
distributions to the testator's relatives, who are members of a large, indeterminate
class of potential beneficiaries. See, eg., Canal Nat'l Bank v. United States, 258 F.
Supp. 626, 630 (D. Me. 1966) (stating in dicta that the purposes of a testamentary trust
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The dispositive factor in Hernandez is whether the transferor
reasonably should expect that she will receive a benefit from the
transferee in exchange for the transfer. A taxpayer may reasonably
expect a return benefit, even though her designation of the secondary
beneficiary is expressly non-binding. For example, if the charity
commonly provides goods, services, or other benefits to those who
transfer to the charity sums equal to the fair market value of those
goods, services, or benefits,159 under Hernandez the transfer should
not qualify as a deductible charitable contribution. In such
circumstances, the deduction should be denied regardless of whether
the transferor makes a binding designation of herself as the secondary
beneficiary, merely expresses a non-binding preference for herself as
the secondary beneficiary, or remains absolutely silent about what
individual shall benefit from the transfer. 6'
are charitable even though preference in distributions is to be given to relatives of the
testator who otherwise qualify as charitable distributees); Estate of Sells v. Comm'r,
10 T.C. 692, 699-701 (1948) (holding deductible from a testator's gross estate the
value of property placed in trust, the income of which would be used to provide
scholarships "first to relatives or other boys or girls"); Estate of Robinson v. Comm'r,
1 T.C. 19, 23-24 (1942) (holding deductible from testator's gross estate the value of
property placed in trust to provide scholarships to persons in need of financial aid,
with a nonbinding preference for relatives of the testator); cf Commonwealth Trust
Co. of Pittsburgh v. Granger, 57 F. Supp. 502, 503-04 (W.D. Pa. 1944) (holding
deductible from a testator's gross estate bequests to educational institutions for the
purpose of establishing scholarships to qualified applicants who were relatives of
testator, where non-relatives could receive the scholarships if no qualified relatives
applied). However, a deduction is improper if a small group of relatives of the settlor
are the primary beneficiaries of the trust. See Davis v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 416, 422-25
(1970); cf Granger, 57 F. Supp. at 504 (stating that had the testator "strictly limited
his trusts to the use of his relatives," no deduction would have been proper).
159. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing transfers to
charitable schools).
160. On the other hand, there may be situations in which a transferor who makes a
non-binding recommendation of himself or a family member as the secondary
beneficiary should be entitled to a deduction for his transfer to charity under
Hernandez, even when the secondary beneficiary in fact receives a benefit from the
charity following the transfer. For example, consider a taxpayer who endows a
Boston homeless shelter with numerous beds, and expresses a non-binding preference
that any relatives of the taxpayer be allowed to occupy the beds if need be. At the
time of the transfer, the taxpayer's family consists solely of her three sons, who are
excelling in graduate schools of law, medicine, and business at Harvard. In a freakish
turn of events, all three sons drop out of school, avoid all contact with their mother on
account of shame, and march straight to the homeless shelter, where the director
(who recognizes who they are) promptly assigns them to the beds purchased with the
funds transferred by their mother. In this rather extreme hypothetical, no taxpayer
would reasonably expect that her family will receive a commensurate benefit from the
transferee in exchange for the transfer. Thus, under Hernandez, the deduction should
be available to the taxpayer, notwithstanding her expression of a non-binding
preference as to the secondary beneficiaries.
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C. When Charitable Transferee Unilaterally Pre-selects an Individual
to Benefit from Funds Transferred by Taxpayer
The final major situation to be analyzed under existing positive law
is also the most thought-provoking. Consider the following example.
An international hunger-relief organization solicits funds to feed
children. The organization sends the taxpayer a picture of one
hundred famished children and asks her to support a child whose
picture has been circled by the charity by sending the charity an
amount with which the organization can feed the child for one year.
A brief biography of the pre-selected child is mailed with the
solicitation for funds. The taxpayer is moved with compassion for the
child, and sends the charity the amount requested, directing it to use
the funds to feed the designated child. The legal question thus raised
by this hypothetical is the following: when a charitable organization,
rather than the transferor, initially designates a particular individual
to receive the benefit of transferred funds in furtherance of the
organization's charitable purposes, are transfers to the charity made
by transferors specifically for such designated persons deductible as
charitable contributions? At least under certain circumstances,
existing authorities appear to answer this question affirmatively.
At first blush, permitting a taxpayer to deduct a transfer in this
situation seems to contradict several principles and factors that courts
and the IRS use to evaluate the deductibility of contributions to
charity. For example, one guiding principle has been that "the
uncertainty of the objects ... forms the essential element of
charity." '161 Further, some authorities state that a deduction is proper
only if the donor's intent is to benefit the charitable transferee, rather
than an individual designee. 6 Finally, the charity's post-transfer
discretion over the use of the transferred funds is highly
circumscribed. Although the charity will have physical control of the
taxpayer's funds transferred thereto, the charity has accepted the
transfer upon the express understanding that the funds will be used to
benefit a specified individual.
Notwithstanding these observations, the taxpayer in the preceding
hypothetical has a strong case for a charitable contribution deduction
under existing precedent. In Winn v. Commissioner," three churches
supported the work of a foreign missionary. To raise support for the
missionary, one church sponsored several special days named in honor
of the missionary, on which days a church elder (the missionary's
father) deposited contributions he received on behalf of the church
161. Thomason v. Comm'r, 2T.C. 441,443 (1943).
162. See, ag., Rev. Rul. 68-484, 1968-2 C.B. 105, 106-07. Of course, as discussed
above, inquiring into the taxpayer's subjective motivation for making a contribution
to charity is probably unjustified after Hernandez.
163. 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979).
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into a personal account of the missionary. 164 The taxpayer, a first
cousin of the missionary, wrote a check designated for the
missionary's fund and claimed a charitable contribution deduction. 65
Reversing the Tax Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the contribution was "for the use of" the
church, and therefore the deduction was properly claimed, because (i)
the church sponsored the missionary days for the express purpose of
raising money for a charitable purpose of the church; (ii) a church
officer received the donations and handled them in accordance with
the church's wishes; and (iii) the contributions were in fact distributed
as the church had intended. 166
The Fifth Circuit revisited the holding and rationale of Winn in
Brinley v. Commissioner.1 6 The Brinley court interpreted Winn to
hold that the church therein had maintained "control" over donated
funds because the church had solicited funds for a specific charitable
purpose. The court distinguished Winn from cases disallowing a
deduction where donors unilaterally have restricted contributions for
the use of private individuals: "A different situation arises.., where
the charitable organization solicits funds for a specific charitable
purpose.... [T]he charity has control and discretion because it has
created a specific charitable cause and has solicited funds in support of
that cause."1" The court concluded that control is established where,
as in Winn, a donor makes a contribution to a charity in response to
the charity's solicitation of funds in support of a named charitable
purpose.1
69
A few years after Brinley, the Supreme Court decided Davis v.
United States,7' which plainly overrules Brinley, but is not necessarily
inconsistent with Winn. In Davis, the Supreme Court denied a
deduction to taxpayers who (as in Brinley) claimed a deduction for
payments made directly to their son, a missionary of their church,
which payments were requested (at least in form) by the taxpayers'
church. The Court held that a contribution is "for the use of" a
charity if it is held in a legally enforceable trust for the charity or in a
164. Id. at 1065.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986). The Brinley court was faced with the decision of
whether the taxpayers could deduct payments made directly to their son, who was
engaged in missions work in the United States. Vacating and remanding the
judgment entered by the Tax Court, the court held that the taxpayers could deduct
the payments if they could show either that their payments primarily benefitted their
church or if the church maintained discretion as to the use of the donated funds. Id. at
1336. To the extent that Brinley held that the taxpayers could deduct payments made
directly to their son, it has been overruled by Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472
(1990). See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
168. Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1335.
170. 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
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similar legal arrangement. 17 Most important to the present analysis,
the Court reasoned that when contributions are placed in a trust for a
charity, the charity "'ha[s] significant legal rights with respect to the
disposition of donated funds." t
How Davis affects Winn is debatable. The Davis Court did not
interpret the phrase "to or for the use of," but only "for the use of."
Nor did the Davis Court even speak to the issue of the degree of
"transferor uncertainty" that must exist as to the identity of potential
ultimate beneficiaries. Therefore, the question remains as to whether
a transfer made directly to a charity, or even one purportedly made in
trust for a charity, is deductible as a charitable contribution when the
transferor (i.e., the donor or settlor) responds to a solicitation by the
charity for funds that will benefit designated individuals. To be sure,
the Fifth Circuit in Winn stated that the transfers made to the officer
of the church were "for the use of" the church. If the court did not
intend the phrase "for the use of" to mean "in trust for," the opinion
is not good law under Davis. But the opinion need not be so read.
First, one may view the church officer in Winn as the trustee of the
transferred funds at issue, who disbursed the funds to the designated
missionary's account at the request of the beneficiary of the trust (i.e.,
the church). Insofar as the intention to create a trust is necessary to
establish a trust relationship,73 this view of the facts may be
untenable. More plausible is that the church officer received the
transferred funds at issue as an agent of the church, and in that
capacity transferred them at the request of the church (the principal)
to the designated missionary's account. Under this view of the facts,
the court's decision is justified because there was a contribution "to"
171. See id at 485. The Court found support for its interpretation in the legislative
history of Code section 170, which initially allowed a deduction only for contributions
"to" charitable corporations and associations; the section was thereafter amended to
allow a deduction for contributions made to charitable trusts and foundations. See id.
at 480-81. Furthermore, the phrase "for the use of" suggests a -trust relationship"
under the common law, which views a "use" as a form of trust arrangement. See id. at
481. Moreover, understanding "for the use of" as "in trust for" (or in a similar legal
arrangement) comports with the congressional goal of encouraging the development
of useful charities, insofar as a charity that is the beneficiary of a trust has the legal
authority to compel a trustee to adhere to the terms of trust and thereby "ensure that
donated funds are properly used." Id. at 483. Any broader interpretation of the
phrase "for the use of" "would tend to undermine the purposes of § 170 by allowing
taxpayers to claim deductions for funds transferred to children or other relatives for
their own personal use." Id. at 485.
In dictum, the Court also mentioned the nature of contributions "to" a
qualified donee, one aspect of which is relevant for present purposes. The Court
stated that "a contribution made in trust for a charity does not give the charity
immediate possession and control, as does a donation directly to a charity." Id. at 483-
84. Thus, it appears to be the Court's understanding that "possession and control" of
donated funds by the charitable transferee is generally inherent in a contribution "to"
the charitable transferee.
172. Id. at 483.
173. See infra note 354 and accompanying text.
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the church, even though the court characterized the contribution as
having been made "for the use of' the church. This interpretation
finds additional support in the court's reference to another opinion
holding that a contribution designated for specific charitable purposes
is still made "to or for the use of' the charitable transferee. 174
Moreover, the rationale of Davis does not compel the conclusion
that the Supreme Court would have denied the deduction claimed by
the taxpayer in Winn. The Davis Court observed that a statutory
interpretation which conveys to the charity "significant legal rights"
over funds is superior to one which does not. Although the charity in
Winn relinquished the power to name ultimate beneficiaries upon
establishing a fund on behalf of one missionary, it does not follow that
the charity relinquished all legal rights to ensure that funds would be
properly used. To the contrary, the charity in Winn took possession of
the funds through a church elder and distributed its funds in
accordance with a pre-approved plan to accomplish a specific
charitable purpose. Moreover, the opportunity for fraud that was
present in Davis was not present in Winn, at least not to the same
extent. 75
Further support for the position that Winn remains good law
appears in Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner.176 In Estate of Hubert,
the decedent's estate claimed a deduction for a bequest made to two
trusts. The decedent's will provided that the income of each trust
would be distributed to a charitable organization "for the purpose of
implementing" the missionary work of two individuals designated by
the decedent. 177 Upon the retirement of the missionaries, the income
and principal of each trust would be distributed to a charitable
organization for the purpose of supporting the two missionaries and
their spouses. On the death of the two missionaries, any remaining
principal would pass to the charitable organizations for mission
purposes. 178
Citing Davis and Thomason, the IRS argued that no deduction was
proper because the charitable organizations to which the trust income
(and later the principal) were distributed lacked full control over the
donated funds. 79  The Tax Court rejected the IRS's argument.
174. Wynn v. Comm'r, 595 F.2d 1060, 1065 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Phinney v.
Dougherty, 307 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1962) (emphasis added)).
175. Analogous support appears in two administrative rulings. See Rev. Rul. 69-
473, 1969-2 C.B. 37 (ruling that taxpayers may deduct their unreimbursed
expenditures for indigent expectant mothers placed in their home by a charitable
organization); Rev. Rul. 66-10, 1966-1 C.B. 47, 48 (ruling that a taxpayer may deduct
his unreimbursed expenditures for providing necessaries for hurricane victims
referred to the taxpayer by a charitable organization).
176. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1993).
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According to the court, Davis and Thomason were distinguishable
because the charitable organizations in those cases never actually
received donated funds, either outright or in trust." The real issue,
according to the court, was whether the decedent intended his
donations to benefit the work of the charities through the named
missionaries. The court noted that the missionaries had been engaged
in missionary work for a number of years, and during his life the
decedent had financially supported the missionaries at the request of a
local church.181 The decedent had no relationship to the missionaries
other than through the church. The charitable organizations retained
discretion in determining the amount of funds to be given the
missionaries during their retirement and the methods of applying the
funds. Finally, under general principles governing charitable trusts,
each charity had discretion in implementing its charitable purposes,
and state attorneys general have responsibility for ensuring that a
charity properly serves its purposes. Under all of these facts, the Tax
Court held that the bequest had been made "exclusively for charitable
purposes." 182
Estate of Hubert is hardly a model of clarity. The most important
finding of the court is that the decedent "intended the bequests to be
used to implement the missionary work of the charitable organizations
through the named missionaries."'" This much of the opinion is
consistent with Winn, which also involved a transfer to a charity to
implement its work through a named missionary. However, Estate of
Hubert goes even further than Winn, because no finding of the court
establishes that, at the time of the bequest in trust, the decedent knew
of a charitable beneficiary of the trust that had "pre-selected" both
missionaries designated by the decedent." Rather, the decedent
essentially created a trust to benefit whatever charity could be found
that would carry out its purposes by supporting the missionaries
designated by the decedent. Yet even as Estate of Hubert was quite
generous to the taxpayer in this regard, its dictum leaves many open
questions. The court stated that on different facts, it might have
found that the transferor intended the bequest "to benefit one
individual rather than the general public," in which case the charitable
beneficiaries of the trusts would be mere conduits, and the deduction
would be denied. 8' Thus, the "transferor intent" factor appears again,
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1067.
183. Id. at 1066.
184. The opinion recites that both missionaries at one time had been supported at
the request of a particular church (with which the decedent-the settlor of the
taxpayer-estate-was once affiliated), and that one of the missionaries was still
supported by that church. See id. at 1065. However, there was no finding that the
other missionary was supported by that church as of the date of the decedent's death.
185. Id. at 1067 n.3.
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even after Hernandez, and it is not clear in exactly what situations the
Tax Court will disallow the deduction on the grounds that the
transferor "intended" to benefit an individual, rather than the
charitable transferee.
II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION
DEDUCTION UNDER INCOME TAX THEORY, NORMS OF TAX POLICY,
AND OTHER POLICY OBJECTIVES
In framing a methodology for determining whether, and to what
extent, earmarked transfers to charity should be deductible by the
transferor, it is helpful to discuss theories both rationalizing the Code
section 170 deduction in general, and those rationalizing the
exemption of charities from federal income taxation. While these
theories may not provide a definitive answer to the question of when,
if ever, earmarked transfers to charity should be deductible, the
existing body of legal scholarship analyzing the justification for the
charitable contribution deduction in general provides helpful
normative and descriptive guidance. Three major scholarly
discussions are particularly significant. The first discussion concerns
whether the deduction makes sense under income tax theory.
Commentators debate whether "income" as an economic concept can,
to some meaningful degree, be determined, and whether charitable
contributions are or should be a component of an income tax base
under prevailing norms of tax theory and policy.18 6 In a second
discussion, the deduction is analyzed primarily in light of objectives
that plainly transcend the internal logic and structure of the income
tax and prevailing tax policy norms.'87 The third discussion seeks to
justify the general exemption from federal income taxation enjoyed by
qualified charitable donees as well as other entities described in Code
section 501(c).11
186. By "prevailing norms of tax policy," I mean those criteria that are pervasively
invoked to determine the fairness and efficiency of the tax. For an overview of the
most commonly cited tax policy norms, see Joseph M. Dodge et al., Federal Income
Tax: Doctrine, Structure, and Policy 19-30 (2d ed. 1999); see also Joseph M. Dodge,
The Logic of Tax: Federal Income Tax Theory and Policy 85-88 (1989) (summarizing
tax policy criteria).
187. In distinguishing the first and second approaches, I by no means intend to
imply that income tax problems can be adequately resolved strictly by reference to
"pure" economic concepts inherent in the definition of income. As others are quick
to remind us, see, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions
Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393, 1416-18 (1988), although concepts of "income" set
broad parameters for what should be included in the tax base, ultimately all kinds of
policy choices bear upon the decision to include or exclude an item from the tax base.
I distinguish the various approaches in this paper primarily to highlight the emphases
of their proponents, and to ensure that their perspectives are properly identified.
188. See generally I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994) (generally exempting from federal income
taxation those entities described in Code section 501(c)).
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A. The Justification for the Charitable Contribution Deduction Under
Income Tax Theory and Tax Policy Norms
1. Charitable Contributions as Non-Consumption
In his seminal article discussing what personal deductions should
exist in arriving at an ideal income tax base," Professor William
Andrews articulates his defense of the charitable contribution
deduction primarily in terms of income tax theory (aided, to be sure,
by tax policy norms). 90 The general thesis of Professor Andrews is
that under an ideal income tax, each taxpayer is taxed on his or her
"aggregate personal consumption and accumulation of real goods and
services and claims thereto."' 9' Professor Andrews embraces this
thesis as a logical (if not literal) application of Henry Simons' familiar
definition of personal income, which, reduced to its essence, is
personal consumption plus accumulation.' - Andrews argues that if
income indeed means consumption plus accumulation, a deduction is
appropriate whenever money is expended for anything other than
personal consumption or accumulation. 93 For Andrews, taxable
personal consumption consists solely of the consumption of "divisible,
private goods and services," the consumption of which "by one
household precludes enjoyment by others."'" Taxable personal
consumption therefore does not include a taxpayer's consumption of
"collective goods whose enjoyment is nonpreclusive," nor does it
189. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tix, 86 Harv. L
Rev. 309 (1972).
190. Cf. id. at 312 (stating that the ideal income tax must be "refined to reflect the
intrinsic objectives of the tax," and that it is "imperative to consider carefully whether
a provision can be defended by reference to intrinsic matters of tax policy before
evaluating it as if it were something else").
191. Id. at 313.
192 Id. The long-form definition of income suggested by Simons is as follows:
"Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." Henry
Simons, Personal Income Taxation 50 (1938).
193. See Andrews, supra note 189, at 325; cf. Alvin Warren, l'ould a Consuimption
Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale LJ. 1081, 1084 (1980) ("As used in this
Article, 'consumption' means the ultimate use or destruction of economic
resources... and 'accumulation,' the retention or saving of such resources.").
Although Professor Warren does not discuss the charitable contribution deduction in
this article, his thesis is relevant to the present inquiry. Warren argues that in
designing a personal income tax system, one must consider not only the Haig-Simons
concept of a taxpayer's personal income, but also the aggregate tax base. The
aggregate tax base should be the product of society's total private capital and labor
during the taxable period. Because gratuitous transfers are not productive in and of
themselves, the law should not tax both the donor and the donee in the year of a gift.
See id. at 1085-88. Under this theory, one can justify the charitable contribution
deduction as a means of preventing the over-taxation of a society's aggregate income.
194. See Andrews, supra note 189, at 314-15.
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include the "nonmaterial satisfactions" derived from a taxpayer's
mere act of charitable giving."'
Professor Andrews discusses contributions to two types of
charitable entities, and argues that in both cases, contributions do not
constitute consumption which should be subject to tax. First, in the
case of contributions to an organization which redistributes donated
funds to the poor, consumption or accumulation represented by the
funds (i.e., the "using up" of private goods and services during the
taxable period or the increase in wealth during the taxable period) is
shifted from the donor to the impoverished recipients of funds
donated to charity, and the latter should not be subjected to taxation
at the higher rates of tax designed for the donor's relatively higher
standard of living.196 Moreover, allowing a charitable contribution
deduction places the donor in the same position as a similarly situated
taxpayer who donates services to a charitable donee; in the case of the
latter, although no deduction is available for the value of the
contributed services, no taxable income is imputed to the volunteer
for her services.197 Andrews also discusses contributions to charity
that are not necessarily used to meet the basic needs of the poor.198
Such contributions include those made to churches, private schools,
symphony associations, and other institutions which to some degree
directly benefit the contributors. Andrews posits that a deduction is
proper for contributions to such organizations because they generally
produce public goods (or common goods), and such goods are not
enjoyed by contributors in proportion to the level of their
contributions. Such goods may even be (and often are) open to
enjoyment by those who did not contribute anything. 19 9 According to
Andrews, not taxing a contributor for the amount of a mere donation
to such an entity, in contrast to an amount specifically paid in
purchase of a good or service, is proper because there is often no
satisfactory way to value the benefits provided by the charitable
donee to a particular recipient of the common benefit.00
195. Id. at 315.
196. Id. at 347. Andrews recognizes that this analysis logically would result in
allowing a donor a deduction made for gifts to individuals. However, under the
assumption that interpersonal gifts occur mostly between members of the same
family, one may justify the current tax treatment of gifts under the theory that income
is ultimately taxed at rates appropriate to the household whose consumption it
supports. The charitable contribution deduction may be seen as authorizing a
deduction only for consumption that a taxpayer shifts to parties who are not in the
taxpayer's own household. See id. at 348-51.
197. See id. at 347 (describing situations in which individuals are not taxed on the
value of the service rendered).
198. See id. at 356-70.
199. See id. at 357-61 (discussing gifts to churches and educational institutions that
may be used by those who did not contribute).
200. Id. at 358-59. Moreover, insofar as the benefits from the operations of the
entity flow beyond the immediate recipients of a good provided by the entity, the tax
system encourages the entity to provide such benefits by allowing a deduction for
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The justification for the charitable contribution deduction advanced
by Professor Andrews has its share of critics.2- In some sense
expanding on the work of Professor Mark Kelman,11 Professor
Stanley Koppelman raises one of the most ambitious objections to
Andrews' theory.2 3 Professor Koppelman relies upon the concept of
income championed by Professor Stanley Surrey-"the power to
consume that is reduced to economic rights and is capable of
valuation."' Under this concept of income, what really matters is
accretion, which represents the increased power to consume!"
Although Professor Simons formulated income as consumption plus
accumulation, those two elements should be viewed merely as "the
two possible uses of accretions to wealth during the accounting
period," not as "terms to be defined independently."2" Professor
Koppelman finds support for the concept of income as the power to
consume in theories of social welfare, which focus on the welfare of
the individual, or on the aggregation of individual welfare.21 He
argues that "[t]axation intended to promote individualistic
conceptions of welfare should also be based upon individual measures
of welfare."2' If income is selected as the tax base because it is the
best measure of economic well-being, "it should be interpreted in an
individualistic way." 2' An individual taxpayer's "power to consume"
is, according to Koppelman, the only major concept of income that
"adopts an individualistic measure of welfare. ' '21u What distinguishes
nondeductible personal consumption from deductible expenditures is
the "current personal benefit" derived by a taxpayer from the
transaction.211 Professor Koppelman then argues, in relevant part,
that if income means the power to consume, all voluntary
expenditures unrelated to income-producing activities constitute
contributions thereto. See id
201. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 187, at 1414-26 (criticizing Andrews' theories
concerning deductions); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: t'lu They
Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal
World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831, 831-58 (1979) (criticizing Andrews' notion of -private
preclusive appropriation").
202. See Kelman, supra note 201, at 834 (arguing that income -tautologically
consists of consumption plus savings" and that all money which a taxpayer controls or
disposes of voluntarily must be characterized as either consumption or savings).
203. See Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax,
43 Tax L. Rev. 679,688-90 (1988).
204. Id. at 694. Prof. Surrey's concept of income is rooted in the wvritings of
Professor Henry Simons. See generally Simons, supra note 192, at 49 (conceptualizing
income as the value of rights that may be exercised in consumption).
205. See Koppelman, supra note 203, at 694.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 697-705 (discussing various theories on promoting welfare in
society).
208. Id. at 703.
209. Id.




taxable consumption.1 2  He specifically states that charitable
contributions should not be deductible, because "[t]he expenditure of
cash or property represents a clear personal benefit to the donor. 23
What is this "clear personal benefit" received by the donor?
Koppelman never supplies the answer explicitly. He does, however,
refer to "the personal satisfaction resulting from voluntary
expenditures" as a form of personal benefit.214 Perhaps, then, the
"clear personal benefit" is nothing more than the utility presumed to
be derived from a donation by a rational donor.
For present purposes, I need not contribute to the debate between
Professor Andrews and others such as Professor Koppelman. It is
now sufficient to observe only two points. First, if Andrews is right,
both earmarked and non-earmarked transfers to charity generally
should be deductible under Code section 170, unless the transfers
secure special, private privileges for the transferor (or perhaps for
members of her household). Secondly, if Koppelman is right, a
deduction should be denied for non-earmarked transfers to charity
and earmarked transfers alike. Both transfers consist of funds that
represent the pre-transfer power to consume wealth.
2. Charitable Contributions as Reductions in Individual Welfare
Some tax policy theorists take a different track from that of
Professor Andrews, and one that conflicts with the theory of Professor
Koppelman, in defending the charitable contribution deduction, but
one still grounded primarily in the familiar language of tax policy
norms. These theorists argue that a charitable donor is less well-off
after making a charitable donation than she was before the
contribution.2 5 One expression of the argument is that a taxpayer
who makes a charitable contribution "has neither the ability to use
these funds for his or her private benefit nor the same ability to pay
taxes" after making the contribution.2 6 One could also express the
argument purely in terms of utility: a charitable contribution
deduction is appropriate because the contribution reduces the
taxpayer's welfare.
212. See id. at 706.
213. Id. at 707.
214. Id. at 705.
215. See Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in
America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector 128 (1975).
216. C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective
Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable
Organizations, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 399, 405 (1995). In discussing this view, these
commentators purport to be explaining Professor Andrews' income measurement
theory. See id. at 404-05. However, their brief explanation appears to reduce the
rationale for the deduction to the need to account for the difference between a
taxpayer's material well-being pre- and post-transfer. Professor Andrews' theory is
considerably more complicated.
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Professor Mark Gergen sees this argument as resting on both the
premise that taxable income should be computed by reference to the
satisfaction that a taxpayer receives from entering into financial
transactions (albeit, through general rules that do not probe any
specific taxpayer's utility), and the premise that the pleasure derived
by a donor from a gift to charity is not commensurate with the
pleasure from other personal expenditures."7 While the first premise
is debatable, it surely represents one tax policy norm that enjoys a
wide following.218 The second premise is more commonly attacked on
the theory that the "voluntary" nature of a charitable contribution
implies that it is just as utility-enhancing as any other personal
expenditure; otherwise, a rational taxpayer would not make the
charitable contribution.2 19 According to this objection, insofar as a
charitable contribution does not reduce the well-being of the
transferor (by theoretical necessity), her tax base must not be reduced
by the amount of the charitable contribution. Of course, this
objection assumes that people always act so as to maximize their
utility.' Although this assumption is one supported by traditional
economics theory, it is subject to no small number of difficulties. 21
However, at a minimum, it is safe to say that charitable giving likely
generates some utility to donors. Such utility may consist of the pure
joy of knowing that one's donated dollars may improve society in
general, the relief of a conscience burdened by an awareness that
some people are suffering because of poverty, a sense of merit or self-
righteousness in fulfilling a perceived moral duty to share, the
"bragging rights" for a large gift to a respected charitable institution,
or the mere desire to silence those who repeatedly solicit funds for
charity.'
For present purpose, it matters not how much utility, or what form
of utility, a charitable donor reaps from a gift. What matters is simply
that the charitable contribution deduction is quite firmly entrenched
under federal income tax law, notwithstanding that charitable
contributions likely generate utility to donors in a variety of forms,
217. See Gergen, supra note 187, at 1426.
218. Cf. Dodge et al., supra note 186, at 23, 24 (discussing reasons for the -wide
intuitive appeal" of the principle that taxpayers should sacrifice to government
according to their standard of living or well-being). Professor Koppelman's argument
against the charitable contribution deduction, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 203-214, is another example of an argument relying upon the taxation of
individual well-being as a norm of tax policy.
219. E.g., Kelman, supra note 201, at 880.
220. See Gergen, supra note 187, at 1429.
221. See id. at 1429-33 (criticizing the view that charitable giving necessarily results
from the utility-maximizing behavior of donors).
222. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio St. LJ. 1379, 1399-1400 & n.51, (1991) [hereinafter Hall &
Colombo, The Donative Theory].
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and that such utility may be, in any given case, a significant motivation
for making the charitable gift.
B. The Justification for the Charitable Contribution Deduction
Under Broader Policy Objectives
Another important theory justifying the deduction is that it
provides a necessary subsidy to institutions that produce public
goods.2" Professor Gergen offers a nice exposition and refinement of
this theory, 4 which may be summarized as follows: Without some
sort of governmental subsidy such as the charitable contribution
deduction, society will tend to underfund the provision of public
goods on account of the freeriding problem." Numerous charitable
organizations produce goods and services which may be characterized
as public goods, on account of either the direct or indirect benefits of
their activities.26 However, freeriding, the essence of which is that
some people will refuse to pay for goods for which no formal charge
can be imposed, 7 tends to result in the under-production of public
goods.
Borrowing from economics literature, z8 Gergen explains why a
charitable contribution deduction (or credit) may well be superior to a
223. A public (or collective) good is one, the consumption of which (1) does not
reduce its availability to others (i.e., the good is non-rival); and (2) is non-exclusive
among consumers (i.e., nobody can be excluded from partaking of the good). See
Gergen, supra note 187, at 1393-98. A good may be classified as public even if it is not
purely non-rival or non-exclusive. A good is considered public as long as the cost of
excluding an individual from consumption of the good is greater than the marginal
cost of supplying the good to her as an additional consumer. See id. Stated another
way, a good is considered public if supplying it freely is cheaper to society than
charging each user for it. See id.
224. See id. at 1396-1414.
225. Id. at 1398.
226. See id. (indicating examples such as churches, museums, and schools).
227. Instead, such people will rely on others to finance the provision of the goods.
See id. The thinking goes something like this: If I will benefit from the provision of a
good (say, clean air), but someone else will benefit equally from clean air, and if I will
have plenty of clean air if someone else pays for it, then I will wait for someone else to
pay for the clean air. The only way that my payment would ensure that I have enough
clean air for myself is if I also pay for the air that others will breathe, but I am
unwilling to pay for another person's use of clean air. If all or most of the population
thinks in this manner, clean air will not be produced absent some type of intervention
by government.
For a variety of reasons, even those who are willing to pay something will not
pay a sufficient amount for the good. See id. Such reasons include the desire not to be
exploited by freeriders, a lack of confidence in successful collective action, and
undervaluing collective goods. See id.
228. Professor Gergen relies primarily on two works: Harold M. Hockman &
James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30 Nat'l
Tax J. 1 (1977), reprinted in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions 224 (S. Rose-
Ackerman ed., 1986); and B. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of a Voluntary Nonprofit
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra,
at 21.
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direct governmental subsidy for the production of public goods.
Private charitable giving enables small groups with a high preference
for a public good to secure the good through collective action without
the need to garner the political support for a direct governmental
subsidy. If a majority of voters is indifferent as to the good, a
significant probability exists that no direct subsidy for the good would
be forthcoming. A tax subsidy in the form of a charitable contribution
deduction or credit may therefore be necessary to overcome the
freerider problem that would otherwise prevent production of a
sufficient quantity of the good.29
Why would we want to subsidize a public good that is unlikely to be
produced by a direct governmental subsidy? After all, one might
quite naturally posit that if the democratic process would not produce
a public good through a direct subsidy, then such a good necessarily
should not be produced. Professor Gergen explains by way of
illustration why a charitable contribution deduction may result in the
production of a public good that is closer to the ideal than the non-
production of the good that would occur if voters were to reject a
direct governmental subsidy:
The answer to this riddle lies in the allocative imperfection of taxes.
People who desire more of a collective good, but who do not place
great value on the increase, may refuse to support a subsidy because
they fear that they will bear a disproportionate share of the tax cost.
Recall our three-person society considering a two-unit park costing
$3.00 per unit. A and B place a $1.00 value on a one-unit park and
$0.50 of value on the second unit. C values each unit at $2.00. If A
and B assume that the taxes to pay for the park will be shared
equally, they will refuse to vote for a two-unit park because the
marginal cost to each of them ($1.00) outweighs the benefit (SO.50).
The problem exists because taxes are not calibrated to account for
variations in preference for goods supported by government. Tax-
free treatment of contributions is so calibrated, albeit roughly,
because it imposes most but not all of the cost of increased support
for a good on donors. -0
Professor Gergen concedes that a deduction is a blunt mechanism
for allocating the cost of a good.'1 However, notwithstanding its
flaws, "it better matches expense with preference in cases of collective
goods for which demand is universal but heterogeneous."'  A
deduction may be the sole available mechanism for distributing the
cost of a public good among freeriders. -3
229. See Gergen. supra note 187. at 1398-99.
230. Id. at 1402.
231. Id. at 1402-03.
232. Id. at 1403.
233. See id. Stated another way, a deduction "enables people with a high
preference for a good to shift some of its cost to low-preference free riders." Id.
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Professor Gergen also discusses an aspect of giving that economic
models tend to ignore: the utility derived by donors from giving. -
Many donors are willing to subsidize a public good in an amount that
far exceeds the value placed upon the good by the donors because of
other utility generated from giving. 5 Professor Gergen acknowledges
that this "overpaying" for public goods by philanthropists may mean
that too much of a good is sometimes produced, but considers it more
likely that philanthropy just results in the rest of society paying a
smaller "price" for the good than otherwise would be required. 36
Gergen argues that because of the freeriding problem, most charities
are more likely to be underfunded than overfunded.237 Providing a
charitable contribution deduction shifts only a small part of the cost of
a public good to freeriders by reducing the aggregate tax base, thereby
increasing the portion of tax revenues that must be raised from all
taxpayers, including freeriders 38 The utility that donors receive from
charitable giving "makes this imperfection [i.e., the shifting of only a
small portion of costs to freeriders] more tolerable. 2 39 The idea is
that the freeriding problem is so severe that the additional incentive to
donate arising from the various forms of utility associated with giving
is alone insufficient to result in the production of adequate public
goods by charity; the charitable contribution deduction, coupled with
the utility of giving, will likely result in a more optimal production of
public goods.
C. Theories Supporting the Exemption of Charitable Transferees
from Federal Income Taxation
A third scholarly discussion of relevance to the issue under
consideration is that which seeks to explain the (or perhaps "a")
rationale for exempting certain nonprofit entities from federal income
taxation. To be sure, many theories of the income tax exemption for
certain nonprofit entities would justify a governmental subsidy for
organizations that are not qualified donees under Code section 170(c).
Nonetheless, a working knowledge of the key features of each
theory24 will prove quite helpful for present purposes because the
234. See id. at 1407-10.
235. See id. at 1407-08.
236. Id. at 1408-09.
237. See id. at 1409.
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. 1 am constrained to limit my discussion of these theories, so I attempt to
reduce them to their essence. Consequently, I cannot do full justice to their depth of
analysis or sophistication of insight. Instead, I offer a brief survey of these theories,
with an emphasis on their features that weigh most heavily upon the subject of this
Article. In addition to these theories of tax exemption, see Evelyn Brody, Of
Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. Corp. L.
585 (1998), for an argument that charities are in some sense "co-sovereigns" with the
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theories often raise points of application to the charitable contribution
deduction and its justifiable scope.
1. Income Measurement Theory
One rationale for the exemption of certain nonprofit entities is the
income measurement theory advanced by Professor Boris Bittker and
George Rahdert. Under this theory, taxable income is a concept
designed to apply to profit-seeking taxpayers- as a result, it is highly
impracticable to determine the taxable income of many nonprofit
entities, since these entities' "receipts" are often not revenues from
sales of a product or service to the payors, and their "expenses" are
not amounts paid for the generation of profits. ' Although appealing
for its simplicity, the theory has been thoroughly debunked by other
scholars. For example, Professor Henry Hansmann observes that (i)
many nonprofits receive no or little income from donations, but rely
instead on commercial operations as a source of funds, (ii) even
donations to organizations providing services to third parties can be
broadly viewed as "purchases" (that generate revenues to the
nonprofit donees) of such services on behalf of the ultimate
beneficiaries; and (iii) the costs of providing those services would be
deductible "business-related" expenses of the charities.242
2. Subsidy Theory
More promising is the subsidy theory, which has been invoked to
justify the charitable contribution deduction per se. It has also been
raised in support of the tax exemption of organizations that provide
goods which society deems worthy of governmental support-goods
that generate a public benefit.2-43 The theory is often expressed in the
form of the argument that charities deserve governmental subsidy
through income tax exemption because they do what government
otherwise would be required to do.2'4 As Professor Rob Atkinson has
observed, the theory is also sometimes more broadly conceived to rest
upon the premise that many nonprofits (especially charitable
state for certain tax purposes. Viewing charities as co-sovereigns with government
has no clear implication for deducting earmarked transfers, and therefore this
explanation for the charitable income tax exemption is not discussed in this Article.
241. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizationsfirom Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale LJ. 299, 307-14 (1976).
242- See Henry B. Hansmann. The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Incone Taxation. 91 Yale LJ. 54. 58-62 (1981)
[hereinafter Hansmann, Tie Rationale].
243. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (stating
that charitable exemptions are justified because exempt entities confer a public
benefit that enhances the operations of public institutions directly funded by
government).




organizations) deserve governmental support not only because of the
nature of the goods and services that they provide and to whom they
provide them, but also because of the secondary benefits resulting
from the manner in which the organizations operate.24 Such asserted
benefits include innovation and the promotion of pluralism. 46
Professor Hansmann offers a nice assessment of the subsidy
theory.47 First, Professor Hansmann observes that the exemption for
nonprofit entities can be justified under the subsidy theory only if
there is a sensible explanation of why the exemption is "not granted as
well to for-profit providers of the same services" (assuming, of course,
that they exist). 48 One explanation is that because nonprofit entities
are prohibited by law from distributing their net earnings to those who
manage or control their operations, we have some assurance that a
subsidy to a nonprofit will benefit consumers of the organization's
goods and services through lower prices or higher quality.2 4
However, even consumers of a for-profit firm would receive most of
the benefits of a subsidy if the firm operates in a competitive
market.20 Thus, confining the subsidy to nonprofits is appropriate
only if market failure hinders competition among firms. Hansmann
identifies "contract failure" as one likely form of market failure. The
gist of contract failure is that some or most consumers are unable "to
make accurate judgments concerning the quality, quantity, or price of
services provided by alternative producers."'" If contract failure is
245. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. Rev.
501, 605-10 (1990) [hereinafter Atkinson, Altruism]; Rob Atkinson, Theories of the
Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27
Stetson L. Rev. 395,402-04 (1997) [hereinafter Atkinson, Theories].
246. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 244, at 11, 17-18.
247. See Hansmann, The Rationale, supra note 242, at 67-71.
248. Id. at 67.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 67-68. Hansmann articulates the contract failure argument in more
detail as follows:
Contract failure arises when, owing to the nature of the service itself or to
the circumstances under which it is consumed, the purchasers of the
service-whether we style them donors or consumers-are likely to have
difficulty in (1) comparing the quality of performance offered by competing
providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after a purchase is
made, whether the service was actually performed as promised. As a result
of such conditions, ordinary market competition may be insufficient to
police the performance of for-profit firms, thus leaving them free to charge
excessive prices for inferior service. In such circumstances consumers often
turn to nonprofit providers, which, owing to the nondistribution constraint,
have less opportunity and incentive to exploit consumers than do for-profit
firms, and thus serve as fiduciaries of a sort for their consumers.
Id. at 69. Professor Hansmann states that the problems of contract failure are most
apparent in the operations of donative nonprofits, which typically deliver services to
third parties (rather than to donors), and in the delivery of indivisible public goods.
Id. at 70. However, contract failure can exist even in connection with commercial
nonprofits that deliver complex personal services. See id. For a more detailed
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present, it is conceivable that "profit-seeking producers" would
"divert to themselves some portion of the benefit of a tax subsidy,"
unbeknownst to donors .252  Thus, in cases of substantial contract
failure, nonprofit entities may actually serve consumers more
efficiently than their for-profit counterparts. a3 Notwithstanding this
conclusion, Hansmann raises the following astute question: If
consumers would rationally choose a nonprofit firm over a for-profit
company on account of perceived contract failure, why is a
governmental subsidy necessary?'- For Hansmann, a theory to
supplement the subsidy theory is essential in order to answer this
question.
An alternative basis for limiting the subsidy to nonprofit enterprises
discussed by Hansmann is that they tend to produce public goods,
"which would be undersupplied without subsidies.""-  Professor
Hansmann acknowledges this explanation as "a plausible rationale for
subsidizing nonprofit producers of certain services," but dismisses its
force with respect to those tax-exempt organizations (like schools,
hospitals and nursing homes) that provide services for compensation,
which Hansmann characterizes as "essentially private-serviceinstitutions."' "
3. Compensation for Capital Constraints
Dissatisfaction with the subsidy theory led Professor Hansmann to
his capital formation theory. Tax exemption compensates for
nonprofit entities' difficulties in raising capital, and a capital subsidy
can promote efficiency when provided to nonprofit firms in those
industries in which nonprofit entities are better service-providers than
for-profit entities (on account of contract failure, for example).
Hansmann explains that nonprofits necessarily lack access to equity
capital because they are prohibited from distributing net profits to
shareholders. The remaining sources of capital are therefore debt,
donated capital, and retained earnings. Donations are an insufficient
source of capital because of their unpredictable timing (as well as
amount), and because freerider incentives "presumably keep the flow
of contributions to donative nonprofits-many of which provide
public goods-well below the socially optimal level."2' 1 Debt is also
description of contract failure, see Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 845-73 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann. The Role].
252. See Hansmann, The Rationale, supra note 242, at 68.
253. Id at 70.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 68. This argument, of course, is prominent in the subsidy thesis
expounded by Professor Gergen in the context of justifying the charitable
contribution deduction. See supra text accompanying notes 223-233.
256. See Hansmann, The Rationale, supra note 242, at 68.
257. Id. at 72.
258. Id. Having made this point. Hansmann recognizes that the charitable
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an inadequate source of capital, because lenders are generally
unwilling to provide a high percentage of the capital needs of
nonprofits. 9 Therefore, retained earnings assume critical importance
in financing capital expansion. Hansmann reasons that without the
exemption from income tax, retained earnings would significantly
decrease, thereby further hindering nonprofit entities that are already
constrained for capital.26
Although Professor Hansmann's theory reflects many notable and
useful insights, the theory has been criticized in certain respects
relevant to this Article. Professor Atkinson has criticized Hansmann's
rationale because (among other reasons) it "implies that a defense of
the charitable exemption can only be made in terms of economic
efficiency. ' 261 Professor Atkinson reminds us that the subsidy theory,
which Hansmann argues is inadequate, embraces values furthered by
at least some nonprofits quite apart from considerations of economic
efficiency:
[E]fficiency is only one of several metabenefits2 62 that the traditional
subsidy theory attributes to nonprofits. The most prominent others
are pluralism and diversity. Hansmann's economic analysis raises a
critical question that is answered only implicitly and
unsystematically in the traditional subsidy theory: why are these
metabenefits not provided in the market? More specifically, does
not the free market provide the greatest possible pluralism and
diversity? Certainly not, if these assorted virtues are interpreted-
or expanded-to include modes of resource allocation that are
alternatives to government fiat on the one hand and ability to pay on
the other. On this view, the free market and its constituent for-
profit firms by definition fail to supply the one metabenefit that
charity by its nature does provide-altruism.2 63
For Atkinson, who offers his own theory of tax exemption discussed
in the next section, the "metabenefit" of altruism takes on extreme,
even inexplicably extreme, importance.
contribution deduction encourages a more generous flow of contributions than would
be the case without the deduction. However, even with the incentive offered by the
charitable contribution deduction, Hansmann opines that the private return from a
donation in support of a public good is still considerably below the effective cost of
the contribution to the donor. Id. at 72 n.65.
259. See id. at 73.
260. See id. at 74.
261. Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 245, at 604.
262. By "metabenefits," Atkinson means "benefits that derive not from what
product is produced or to whom it is distributed, but rather from how it is produced or
distributed." Id. at 605.
263. Id. at 608-09.
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4. Altruism Theory
Professor Atkinson posits that the critical distinction between truly
nonprofit entities (which deserve income tax exemption) and for-
profit entities (which are and should be subject to income tax) is that
the former organizations exhibit altruism. -' For Atkinson, an entity
exhibits altruism whenever the satisfactions that donors obtain from
giving do not take the form of a material quid pro quo for
donations.265 An organization is "altruistic" if it is one that confers
benefits on persons other than its controllers and financial
supporters.266  Moreover, an organization is altruistic under
Atkinson's formulation even if it provides certain benefits enjoyed by
donors themselves, provided that such benefits are public goods, or
that the receipt by individual donors of benefits is independent of the
amount of their respective gifts. 67 The essential concept, then, is that
an entity merits tax exemption if it confers benefits on persons other
than those who control and fund the entity. Professor Atkinson does
not attempt a comprehensive defense of the virtue of subsidizing
altruism. He is content to observe its "presumptive appeal," -" suggest
that exempting altruistic organizations would necessarily "promote a
pluralism of ends,' 2 69 and respond to a few anticipated objections to
his theory.270
Atkinson is careful to distinguish his concept of altruism from
stricter notions of altruism. He describes his concept as "weak"
altruism, in contrast to "strong" altruism,2 ' t which exists only if an act
is undertaken with completely selfless motives.2 - Such is not true
with respect to Atkinson's concept of altruism:
The altruism I have identified need not be subjectively pure. The
donors I have described may be motivated wholly or in part by a
desire for fame, a good name, divine favor (now or hereafter), or
some other "selfish" concerns.... What is distinct about my donors
is not that they give without gain, but that any satisfaction that they
derive from giving is not in the form of a material quid pro quo for
their donation.273
In support of this concept of altruism, Atkinson notes the difficulty
in ascertaining precisely what prompts a particular act-a purely
selfless regard for others, a desire for social acclaim, or a clear
264. See id at 509-10.
265. See id. at 526, 529-33, 537, 542. 552. 565-66.
266. See id. at 533.
267. See id. at 566.
268. Id. at 628.
269. Id. at 629.
270. See id. at 630-37.





conscience. 27 He reasons that "human institutions must be satisfied
with examining outer appearances, leaving things of the heart to
higher authorities."275 In short, subjective motives of donors "do not
coun t.127
6
Atkinson's altruism theory has been criticized primarily for (i) the
enormous number of institutions that would qualify as "altruistic" and
therefore would be exempt from income tax under his approach, and
(ii) the absence of any clearly articulated normative basis for
exempting all altruistic organizations from income tax.277 Chief
among such critics are Professors Mark Hall and John Colombo, who
offer their own theory of tax exemption of charitable organizations, a
theory examined next.
5. The Donative Theory
Professors Hall and Colombo theorize that the only institutions
worthy of tax-exempt "charitable" status are those able to "attract[] a
substantial level of donative support from the public." '278 They reason
that donative institutions merit a tax subsidy "because the willingness
of the public to contribute demonstrates both worthiness and
neediness., 279 Organizations selected as objects of philanthropy "are
of special worth in the public's estimation.""28 Specifically, the very
existence of substantial giving to an entity indicates that the
organization provides a collective benefit that the private market and
the government cannot supply.28' The resort by such an organization
to soliciting contributions "evidences that its needs are not being met
elsewhere. ' ,282 Why is an additional subsidy needed if the institutions
are recognized as being both worthy of support and needy?
Reminiscent of Professor Gergen's analysis of charitable contributions
and the freeriding problem associated with public goods, 2 3 Professors
Hall and Colombo summarize their answer to this question as follows:
We can be assured that donations themselves will not fully satisfy
this need since donors do not lightly relinquish their assets; in the
274. See id. at 527.
275. Id. at 529; cf 1 Samuel 16:7b (New International Version) ("The Lord does
not look at the things man looks at. Man looks at the outward appearance, but the
Lord looks at the heart.").
276. Atkinson, Altruism, supra note 245, at 530.
277. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of
Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 Wash. L. Rev.
307, 383-84 (1991); Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222, at 1383
n.5, 1416-21.
278. Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222, at 1383-84.
279. Id. at 1385.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 1392.
282. See id. at 1385.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 228-233.
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absence of a quid pro quo return, the free rider incentive that affects
the motivation to give tells us that donors systematically will give
less than the deservedness that they perceive (as measured
hypothetically by their willingness to purchase the good if it were
capable of being delivered in ordinary market transactions). Hence.
the existence of substantial donative support from the public at large
signals the need for an additional, shadow subsidy to take up the
donative slack.284
According to Hall and Colombo, organizations receiving donative
support merit subsidization through every conceivable tax mechanism,
including exemptions from tax as well as the charitable contribution
deduction.' Indeed, Hall and Colombo believe that their theory
explains the basis for the charitable contribution deduction just as
thoroughly as it explains the rationale for tax exemption.' "'The
deduction encourages more giving, and the exemption helps the gift to
go further."'
A feature of the donative theory of Professors Hall and Colombo of
special interest to this Article, and which resounds with a familiar
"Atkinson" ring, is that the subjective motivation for a donation is
completely irrelevant to the issue of whether the object of a donation
qualifies for a subsidy (whether that subsidy be tax exemption or the
charitable contribution deduction): "all that matters is whether a
payment is in fact a donation, which is revealed by a quid pro quo
test."'  Hall and Colombo recognize that under economic theory,
giving is never truly altruistic (i.e., completely selfless) because giving
occurs only if some positive or negative incentive impels the donor to
give. 9 A "cynical view of philanthropy" postulates that contributions
to charity are merely the product of donors' self-interest; donors give
because doing so results in some form of private benefit to them, not
because their gift will provide a public benefit. -' Hall and Colombo
identify four categories of private benefits that may induce donors to
give to charity: (1) "[d]irect, tangible benefits the donor receives from
the supported services," such as the opportunity to view programs by
those who give to public television, (2) "[p]sychic benefits" from the
mere act of giving; (3) "[p]urely selfish [indirect] benefits," such as the
prestige of philanthropy; and (4) benefits received as part of a quid
284. See Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222, at 1385: see also
id. at 1392-93 ("The free riding incentive tells us. however, that these donations
systematically fall short of supplying the objects of philanthropy at an optimally
desired level, that is, the level that would be supplied if the products or services were
capable of being purchased (or did not suffer from government failure).").
285. See id. at 1387.
286. See id. at 1393.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1389.
289. See id at 1399.
290. See id. at 1401.
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pro quo exchange (i.e., the outright purchase of a good or service)."'
Hall and Colombo argue that a tax subsidy is unjustified only in the
case of transfers securing the last category of benefits for a purported
donor (who is really just a "purchaser"), because this category consists
of transactions involving purely private consumption of goods and
292services.
Professors Hall and Colombo defend allowing a subsidy in the first
of these categories-when the donor receives a direct, tangible
benefit-because the receipt by the donor of a private benefit does
not diminish the deservedness of the subsidized activity.2 93  For
example, a person who contributes to public television may do so
because she enjoys watching it, but because public television has
characteristics of a public good, presumably she could have enjoyed
just as much programming had she never donated a dime.294 Contrary
to the conclusion that her gift is not worthy of a tax subsidy, the fact
that she has an interest in the programming in some sense verifies that
the service has real benefit, particularly if donations are made by
many others. 295  It is equally important that an organization is
supported by donations rather than purchases of goods or services,
because it indicates that supporters make a sacrifice.296 Even as a
donor enhances her own welfare, she simultaneously enhances the
welfare of other people.297 Moreover, because any given donor might
have chosen to freeride on the contributions of others, we can expect
contributions to be suppressed below the optimal level of desired
shared benefits in the absence of a tax subsidy.29s Thus, the subjective
motive of a donor in such situations, which may be grounded in a
sense of moral obligation to pitch in for a service or good that the
donor enjoys to some degree,299 is quite irrelevant to the issue of
whether a tax subsidy is justified.3"
291. Id. at 1401-02.
292. Id. at 1413-15.
293. Id. at 1403.
294. See id. 1403-04.
295. See id. at 1404.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 1405.
299. See id. at 1404. In so arguing, Professors Hall and Colombo criticize Professor
Gergen's analysis for "supposing that a tax subsidy is not deserved when giving is
motivated by the donor's desire to benefit personally from the supported service
rather than to benefit someone else." Id. at 1403. They explain that it is "incorrect, or
at least incomplete" to argue that people who donate to public television do so
because of the enjoyment that they derive from viewing programs. See id. While I
agree with them that viewing public television does not alone answer the question of
whether a viewer who donates to public television should be entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction, I do not characterize the argument against a deduction (or
the argument in favor of a partial deduction) in such cases as one based principally on
the motive of the donor. Rather, I see the argument against a deduction (or the
argument in favor of a partial deduction) as resting primarily on the objective fact
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As to the second category of benefits received by donors. Hall and
Colombo discuss the economics literature which distinguishes
between a donor's "act utility" and her "result utility.""' A donor
receives act utility from the sheer act of giving to address a social
need, without regard to whether the charitable recipient beneficially
employs the donation.)' By contrast, a donor's result utility is
satisfaction derived "by bettering some social condition.""'' Hall and
Colombo acknowledge that if pure act utility characterizes most
donations, their theory would be seriously weakened, insofar as the
level of donations received by an entity may have nothing to do with
its worthiness.0"  However, they argue that "virtually all gifts are
motivated by a mix of act and result utilities."Y' Act utility is akin to a
private good associated with giving that induces donors to discover an
unmet public need, and result utility is akin to the public good
associated with giving, which is characterized by the freerider
problem. 36 Although we cannot be certain whether act utility is less
than result utility, and therefore whether society's pleasure in
participating in charitable giving is less than the actual social value
produced from donated funds,307 an inherently self-correcting feature
of charitable giving tends to minimize the possibility that donations
will exceed a socially optimal level." This mechanism-which
Professors Hall and Colombo call the "market in altruism-"' - may be
explained as follows: Because donors have many choices from which
to satisfy the desire to give, they will tend to choose to donate to
charitable donees furthering the most worthy and needy cause.,s for
that the donor has made a transfer of consideration to a qualified donee and
thereafter receives some material benefit from the transferee. The problem is ho., to
value that benefit for income tax purposes. regardless of the donor's motivations for
making the gift. A presumption that the value of the benefit received by the donor is
at least equal to the amount of the contribution may merely serve as a con'eniecn:
for valuing the benefit. Theoretically. the proper approach may be to allow the
taxpayer to admit evidence in her individual case of the value of programming that
she received during the year of her contribution so as to rebut the presumption. Of
course, this approach presents its own practical difficulties, %%hich are particularly
acute in the case of public goods. I am not suggesting that I would endorse this %-,hole
enterprise. But analyzing the problem in this manner does. I beliee. demonstrate
that the fundamental reason for disallowing a deduction (or allo\tng only a partial
deduction) in such cases is not ultimately based upon a donor's subjective motive. but
upon her receipt of a material benefit from the donee.
300. See id. at 1406.
301. Id. at 1407-10.
302. See id. at 1407.
303. Id. Another way to think of these teims is that act utilit. stresses means.
whereas result utility stresses ends. See id.
304. See id. at 1408.
305. Id.
306. See id. at 1409.
307. See id.




doing so will maximize their utility.31° As gifts combined with tax
subsidies begin to approach the socially desired level, perceptive
donors will tend to adjust their gift-giving. As social conditions
change, donors will redirect contributions to donees supporting
objects which become relatively worthier and needier.31' Thus, even
recognizing the distinction between act and result utilities, Hall and
Colombo conclude that the donor's motive does not matter.312
Hall and Colombo then analyze the third category of benefits
derived by donors: purely selfish benefits that the donor desires to
receive indirectly from making a gift to charity (such as promoting
one's reputation in the community).313 In the first two categories of
benefits, a reasonable assumption is that the motive to give involves
some regard for the welfare of another person.314  However,
Professors Hall and Colombo acknowledge that some charitable
giving may be motivated entirely by the donor's desire to promote his
material well-being. They illustrate such giving with a donor whose
contribution results in a building named after her in order to receive
community recognition.315  They argue that, notwithstanding the
donor's apathy about whether the quality of education is enhanced by
the gift, the gift will likely "signal worthiness" because "the social
approval desired by the donor" would be unattainable "unless the
object of the publicized gift were considered worthy by a broad
segment of the public. '316 For similar reasons, purely selfish giving
also likely signals an organization that needs a subsidy."7 Insofar as
the object of the donation probably deserves a subsidy even in this
extreme case where a donor is driven exclusively by selfish motives,
Professors Hall and Colombo conclude that "donations generally
deserve subsidy without engaging in close empirical examination of
the precise motives behind individual acts or categories of
philanthropy." '318
6. Risk Compensation Theory
A final theory that has been offered as a rationale for the income




313. See id. at 1410-13.
314. See id. at 1411.
315. See id.
316. Id. "Thus, even the most self-interested donation qualifies under our
deservedness criterion if the private reputational benefit enjoyed by the donor serves
as a proxy for social worthiness, in the same way that act utility serves as a proxy for
result utility." Id.
317. See id. at 1412.
318. Id. at 1413.
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theory" of Professor Nina Crimm.19 In brief, Professor Crimm argues
that the value of income tax exemption is essentially a governmental
subsidy that compensates providers of public goods for otherwise
uncompensated risks inherent in the production of public goods- "
Crimm argues that the provision of public goods "is clearly associated
with pure risk-that is, the potential for production of loss, but not
gain, realization. '321 Because the provision of a pure public good can
result only in loss (absent a governmental subsidy), a rational, risk-
averse firm would never choose to supply such a public good as its
sole product.3" If the choice is whether to supply a "mixed" public
good (i.e., one that has characteristics of both private goods and
public goods), a rational firm would not choose to supply such good if
"it is perceived that the public portion of the mixed public good...
exceeds the private portion.'"  Crimm argues that because "in the
real world" it is difficult for a firm to bifurcate the public and private
portions of a mixed good for purposes of evaluating potential return,
"it would be unexpected that a for-profit start-up firm would decide to
provide a mixed public good or service." -24  Crimm reasons that,
because charitable organizations by law must act in accordance with
their purposes, they must provide "pure and mixed public goods and
services,"" and therefore must assume pure risk. "for which no
pecuniary gains are possible."326  Without being compensated for
assuming such risk, organizations would not choose to form for the
purpose of supplying public goods and services327 The idea is that the
market for public goods itself will not offer charitable organizations
an expected return sufficient to compensate them for the risks that
they assume. Income tax exemption, according to Professor Crimm, is
an expected return that charitable organizations receive from the
federal government, which functions as an insurer of such pure risk'
(i.e., "the government pays a risk premium").2 9
319. See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Eremption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation. 50 Fla. L Rev. 419 (1998).
320. See id. at 439-55.
321. Id. at 448.
322. See id. at 449, 451.
323. Id. at 450.
324. Id. at 451. On this latter point, Professor Crimm's theory faces some difficulty,
for in the "real world" private, for-profit firms do provide mixed goods and services.
Prime examples are proprietary schools and hospitals. Presumably, in such cases,
these firms perceive that the "private" elements of their goods and services have a
value that is sufficient to justify business operations. But if this is so. we must
question why nonprofit schools and hospitals need a subsidy. Professor Crimm's
theory, as articulated to date, does not appear to resolve this issue.
325. Id. at 452.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 453.
328. See id. at 454.
329. Id. at 455.
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Although it is articulated in terms of risk compensation, Professor
Crimm's theory can be seen as a variant of the traditional subsidy
theory. Her essential idea is that charitable organizations produce
public goods, and the consuming public, left to themselves, will not
pay for the socially desirable quantity of such goods. Government is a
suitable financier to pay for part of the price of public goods (i.e., the
pure risk premium associated therewith) in order to result in their
satisfactory production. This is the essence of the subsidy theory.
7. Concluding Observations of Rationales for the Charitable Income
Tax Exemption
Selecting the most persuasive rationale for the exemption of a
charitable entity's income from federal income taxation is well beyond
the scope of this article. Nor is it my task to attempt to harmonize
these theories into a new grand theory of exemption. What is
appropriate for present purposes is to offer some brief observations of
what the foregoing theorists may contribute toward analyzing
whether, and in what circumstances, earmarked transfers to charity
should be deductible.
First, there are fairly persuasive reasons for concluding that the
charitable income tax exemption and the charitable contribution
deduction promote economic efficiency to some degree. In the
absence of a tax incentive for charity, one would expect market
failures to result in a sub-optimal production of public goods and
services. If an earmarked transfer to charity helps correct a market
failure, a deduction may be appropriate.
Secondly, non-economic factors may also support the charitable
income tax exemption (and the charitable contribution deduction).
Such factors include the promotion of diversity and altruistic
behavior. If earmarked transfers to charity promote these values, the
case for deducting them becomes stronger.
Third, the decision to grant an income tax exemption for charitable
entities and to grant a charitable contribution deduction for transfers
to those charities should not hinge on whether a court (much less the
IRS) determines that a donor "desires" or "intends" to help the
world, with no regard for the pleasure received by the donor in so
doing. Such an inquiry is fraught with difficulty, and is often quite
beside the point of attempting to encourage donations that benefit
society. Thus, if the case against deducting earmarked transfers to
charity rests largely on the position that an earmarking donor does not
have a sufficiently selfless mental state, the argument for the
deduction becomes even more compelling.
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III. A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
EARMARKED TRANSFERS TO CHARITY
In this section of the Article, I discuss various factors that should
and should not bear upon whether, and to what extent, earmarked
transfers to charity merit a charitable contribution deduction. Some
of these factors may be thought of as "case specific," whereas others
are more properly characterized as "systemic" considerations. This
section evaluates factors that have been considered important by the
courts, the IRS, and commentators, and determines their relevance to
the present normative inquiry.
The analysis of this section forms the basis for a proposed
framework for determining whether earmarked transfers to charity
should be deductible. It is extremely important to bear in mind that
the analysis of this section, and ultimately my proposed framework,
assume the existence of the charitable contribution deduction of Code
section 170 for non-earmarked transfers and the federal income tax
exemption for charitable organizations described in Code section
501(c)(3). I do not evaluate whether, in an ideal world, the charitable
contribution deduction should be available (or should be substantially
overhauled). Nor do I argue the overall merits of federal income tax
exemption for charitable organizations. Instead, I offer my
framework for the deductibility of earmarked contributions as a way
to improve (or in some cases, simply clarify) existing law under the
assumption that Code sections 170 and 501(c)(3) will remain primarily
as they now exist. In other words, the matter I seek to address in this
section is how the federal income tax law should treat earmarked
transfers to charity, in a world where current Code sections 170 and
501(c)(3) are largely unchanged.
A. Case Specific Factors
In this sub-section of the Article, I discuss the relevance of four
factors that the courts and the IRS have relied upon in deciding the
deductibility of earmarked transfers to charity: (i) whether the
transferor's subjective intent in making the transfer is to benefit the
secondary beneficiary or the charitable transferee: (ii) whether the
charitable transferee exercises formal legal control over donated
funds; (iii) whether the charitable transferee would have used the
amount in question to benefit the secondary beneficiary "but for" the
designated transfer; and (iv) the existence of some familial or other
personal relationship between the transferor and secondary
beneficiary.
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1. Intent of Transferor to Benefit a Particular Individual
I reject the practice of the IRS and apparently some courts3 ' when
determining the deductibility of an earmarked transfer to charity of
broadly inquiring into whether the transferor subjectively intends to
benefit the secondary beneficiary, "rather than" the charitable
transferee. This inquiry (in its broad form) should be rejected both
for practical administrative reasons, and for theoretical reasons. With
respect to the former, the IRS (and the courts) would do well to
follow the lead of the First Circuit in Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v.
Commissioner,33" ' which artfully expressed that any attempt to decide
the precise motivations for a transfer to charity is a futile task. 32 Any
number of factors may motivate a donor to transfer sums to charity,
and it is virtually impossible to determine those that dominate in any
case. Attempting to do so requires the expenditure of considerable
judicial and administrative resources, with little hope of reaching the
"correct" determination. Indeed, as discussed above, the Hernandez
Court itself recognized the imprecise nature of inquiries into the
subjective states of mind of taxpayers making transfers to charity. As
Professor Atkinson has aptly remarked,
For legal purposes, we cannot simply say an organization is
charitable if its collective heart, or the hearts of its supporters, are in
the right place and leave it at that. We must be able to say, with a
degree of assurance, that a particular organization in fact meets the
test at a particular time. As I have said elsewhere, state of mind may
330. See supra text accompanying notes 143-150.
331. 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
332. See id. at 146-47. In Crosby Valve, the court was highly critical of employing
Duberstein's "detached and disinterested generosity" standard in resolving
controversies involving Code section 170, for reasons explained in the following
excerpt:
While agreeing with the holding of the Tax Court, we think it necessary to
register our disagreement with the majority's emphasis upon a purely
charitable motive as a prerequisite for a deductible charitable contribution.
Were the deductibility of a contribution under section 170(c) of the [Code]
to depend on "detached and disinterested generosity", an important area of
tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value
judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality. Community good will, the
desire to avoid community bad will, public pressures of other kinds, tax
avoidance, prestige, conscience-salving, a vindictive desire to prevent
relatives from inheriting family wealth-these are only some of the motives
which may lie close to the heart, or so-called heart, of one who gives to a
charity. If the policy of the income tax laws favoring charitable
contributions is to be effectively carried out, there is good reason to avoid
unnecessary intrusions of subjective judgments as to what prompts the
financial support of the organized but non-governmental good works of
society.
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be as provable in principle as the state of digestion, but it is a good
deal more difficult to prove in practice.333
In addition to the administrative problem of attempting to
determine the donor's intent, there is a far more compelling basis for
rejecting this factor: except in cases that are properly viewed as
involving disguised consumption of a predominately private nature,31
the transferor's desire to assist a named individual is, at worst,
theoretically irrelevant. Consider a taxpayer who donates $100 to a
charitable homeless shelter and specifies that his gift be used to feed
whatever homeless person the charitable donee may choose. Another
taxpayer donates $100 to the shelter and specifies that the money be
used to feed "Frank," an unrelated homeless person known by the
donor to reside at the shelter. Clearly, the donor in the latter case
intends to benefit a particular individual. But why does this fact
matter? If the response is that the latter donor has made a personal
gift, not a charitable contribution, this is actually no response at all,
but merely a conclusory statement. The issue to be decided is whether
the donor has made a personal gift (nondeductible under current law)
or a charitable contribution.
Equally unsatisfying is the response that, if the donor "intends" to
benefit a named person, his "intent" cannot be to benefit charity. 31
Indeed, this position appears to be a premise of Revenue Ruling 79-
81.336 However, to assert that, in the illustration of the previous
paragraph, the taxpayer in the latter case has less desire to benefit the
charity than the taxpayer in the former case, is patently absurd. The
transfer in each case supports the work of the donee charity to the
same degree, for in each case, the donation is to be used to assist one
person who is a bona fide member of the charitable class served by the
charity. The only difference is that the latter taxpayer, like the Good
Samaritan, knows the face of the secondary beneficiary. But knowing
the face of the secondary beneficiary-and even wanting to feed
him-in no way detracts from the legitimacy of the charitable work
subsidized by the transfer. What matters is not that the transferor
wants to ensure that the donee's charitable operations benefit a
named person, but that such transferor supports the donee so that it
will perform its charitable work. As the Crosb Valve court
insightfully recognized, "[I]n the case of a contribution to a charitable
organization, the law's policy finds charity in the purposes and works
333. Atkinson, Theories, supra note 245, at 401.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 365-371.
335. Cf. Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222. at 1435 n.159
(observing that a donor's gift to CARE for a child that the donor "adopts" for hunger
relief is probably motivated in part by a general desire to alleviate worldwide
starvation).
336. 1979-1 C.B. 107; see supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text.
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of the qualifying organization, not in the subjective intent of the
contributor."3 37
Accordingly, when a donor transfers a sum to charity and
designates the secondary beneficiary, as long as the secondary
beneficiary is a member of the charitable class served by the donee, as
a general proposition the gift, if accepted by the donee in its own
right, is inherently "charitable" because it furthers the charitable
purposes of the donee. There may be cases, of course, when one may
rightly question whether a transfer sufficiently furthers the charitable
purposes of a donee, or whether the transferor receives some benefit
from the transferee that is inconsistent with characterization of the
transfer as a deductible charitable gift.338 But these issues may be
resolved satisfactorily without resorting to a judicial or administrative
probe of the donor's state of mind. Absent such special
circumstances, the law should simply recognize that a donor's desire
to further indisputably charitable work may legitimately coincide with
his desire to help a designated soul. The search for whether the donor
"intends" to benefit a secondary beneficiary is, as a general
proposition, quite beside the point of whether the gift furthers
charity. 339
2. Exercise of Control by Charitable Transferee over Transferred
Funds: Avoiding the Conduit Problem
As discussed above, many authorities stand for the proposition that
a transfer purportedly made to a charitable transferee is not a
deductible contribution "to" the charity if the charity does not
exercise formal legal control over the donated funds.340 In the case of
a donation made "in trust for" a charitable donee, presumably this
test would look to whether the charity exercises some degree of
control over the funds that are ultimately distributed from the trust.-
The question arises as to what extent the charitable donee must
exercise "control" over donated funds so as to result in a deduction
for the amount of the contribution.4 2
337. Crosby Valve, 380 F.2d at 147.
338. See infra text accompanying notes 365-373.
339. This is not to say that donor intent is entirely irrelevant. As argued below, it is
relevant for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether a donor intends to create an
express trust for the benefit of a named individual (or a mere agency relationship with
the charity), rather than to make a gift to the charity in its own right.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 131-137. Davis v. United States, 495 U.S.
472, 483-84 (1990), supports this requirement of donee control.
341. Cf Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064, 1066-67 (1993)
(finding adequate control by a charity receiving income from a trust to support the
work of named missionaries through the charity, where upon the missionaries'
retirement, the charity had discretion as to distributions of principal and income).
342. For ease of discussion, this section will focus on the control that must be
present in the case of a transfer purportedly made "to" a charitable transferee. An
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One view would be that the charitable donee must have the
absolute right to use contributed funds in any manner that it sees fit,
notwithstanding any expression of preference by the donor. 1 3 This
approach is consistent with, but not compelled by, Peace.' A second
view would be that the charity has exercised sufficient control over
donated funds as long as either (i) the charity maintains absolute
discretion over the use of donated funds at all times, or (ii) completely
independently of any preference expressed by a potential donor
beforehand, the charity itself has unilaterally committed itself to
provide some benefit to the secondary beneficiary. In other words,
under the second view, a deduction is still available to donors if the
charity has "pre-selected" a particular beneficiary, and then solicits
contributions from donors who contribute funds to the charity which
are designated for the secondary beneficiary. This approach is
consistent with Winn.: A third view, and the one adopted in this
Article as a general proposition, is that a charitable donee exercises a
sufficient degree of control over an earmarked contribution as long as
the charity receives delivery of the donation and accepts the donation
in its own right. No case of which I am aware has explicitly adopted
this approach. '  However, for several reasons, I believe this approach
is superior to the others.
I must first explain exactly what this approach entails. By stating
that sufficient control is present if the charity "receives delivery of the
donation and accepts the donation in its own right," I mean to convey
two major points. First, the charity, or one acting on behalf of the
charity (who is not, and who is not acting for, the secondary
beneficiary or the transferor), must receive actual, symbolic or
constructive delivery of the donated cash or other property. Secondly,
acceptance of the contribution by the charitable organization "in its
own right" means that the charity must receive the funds as its own
assets; the charity must not be acting merely as an agent for the
essentially similar analysis would apply to the necessary degree of a charity's control
over distributions from a charitable trust, in the case of distributions made "for the
benefit of" the charitable donee.
343. An even more demanding standard would be to deny a deduction for any
contribution made by a donor who in any manner specifies even a preference that the
donation be used to benefit a particular individual. This approach would plainly run
afoul of Peace v. Commissioner. 43 T.C. 1 (1964): Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d
1060 (5th Cir. 1979): and Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1993).
For reasons discussed below. I would disagree with any attempt to modify existing law
so as to adopt this approach.
344. See supra notes 106-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of Peace.
345. See Note, Does Charity Begin at Hoine? The Tax Statuts of a Pavnit to an
Individual as a Charitable Deduction, 83 Mich. L Rev. 1428. 1441-42 (1985) (arguing
that a charitable donee that makes a grant to a researcher whom it desires to support
and then solicits funds to fund the grant "is presumably exercising an appropriate
level of oversight").
346. Although the facts in Estate of Hubert can justify a contrary interpretation.
one may argue that this view is largely consistent with the reasoning of this opinion.
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transferor or the secondary beneficiary, nor may the charity receive
the funds as trustee of an express private trust for the benefit of the
secondary beneficiary. 47 By accepting the funds "in its own right,"
the charity is therefore bound by law to use the funds in a manner
consistent with its charitable purposes, both under state law and in
furtherance of its tax-exempt purposes, as required by Code section
501(c)(3).
In order to understand why this third view of control is defensible, it
will be helpful to compare initially the first two views. What is the
rationale for rejecting the first view (absolute control over donated
funds by charitable donee at all times prior to distribution thereof) in
favor of the second view (absolute control of funds or pre-selection of
secondary beneficiary by charity)? In the case of the second view,
there is a very high probability that donations will be used in
furtherance of the charitable purposes of the donee. Consider the
following example of a church like that in Winn?48 The church,
desiring to further world missions in obedience to the Great
Commission, 9 ordains an individual to the mission field. The church
desires to send the individual to proclaim the gospel in Singapore.
Lacking sufficient funds, the church solicits contributions specifically
for the purpose of financing the missionary's work across the seas.
Should the fact that donations designated for the missionary are now
restricted for a particular purpose (and will support a named
individual) result in denial of a deduction because the donee does not
have absolute "control" of donated funds following receipt thereof?
347. Insofar as the "intent to create a trust" is a pre-requisite to the formation of a
trust, I am well aware that "donor intent" rears its head once again. However, under
my proposed approach, establishing whether a donor intends to create a private trust
at least confines the scope of the inquiry into donor intent. If the transferor and
charitable donee take the necessary steps to make clear that a transferor has not
created a private trust (which, as I suggest infra, can be done fairly expediently).
determining "donor intent" presents no major difficulties.
348. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
349. See Matthew 28:18-20; Luke 24:46-49. The Great Commission refers to Jesus'
post-resurrection, pre-ascension commandment to His disciples to make disciples of
all the peoples of the earth. See 1 Warren W. Wiersbe, The Bible Exposition
Commentary 107 (1989). The commission includes both the proclamation of
salvation from sin through faith in Jesus and the exhortation to obey his teachings. See
id.; Louis A. Barbieri, Jr., Matthew, in The Bible Knowledge Commentary: An
Exposition of the Scriptures by Dallas Seminary Faculty, supra note 1, at 13, 93-94;
cf., e.g., John 20:31 (stating that the Apostle John recorded his account of the
miraculous signs performed by Jesus "that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ,
the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in His name"); Acts 4:12
(recording the address of the Apostle Peter in which he proclaimed that "salvation is
found in no one else" but Jesus); Acts 16:31 (recording the exhortation of the Apostle
Paul to "believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved."). In the context of
Matthew's gospel, the Great Commission is quite striking, for its international vision
is the culmination of a text that emphasizes Jesus as the Servant-King of Israel who
has fulfilled the prophesies of Hebrew scripture. See Donald Guthrie, New Testament
Introduction 32-33 (4th rev. ed. 1990).
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The Winn court answered this question negatively, and rightly so.
The need for a charity to exercise "control" over donated funds is
ultimately grounded in the desire to ensure that donated amounts are
expended for bona fide charitable purposes. In the case of "blind"
contributions, the federal income tax law assumes that a charitable
donee will use donated funds in furtherance of its charitable mission.
In a sense, the law "trusts" the donee to act charitably and uses
various enforcement mechanisms"" to attempt to ensure that the
donee does so. We assume that the appropriate officer, committee, or
even governing board of a charitable donee will ascertain an
appropriate charitable disposition of donated funds, and then will
dispose of such funds after due reflection. But there is no reason to
assume that a worthy disposition of funds can or should be
determined only after such funds have been received. To continue
with my previous illustration, there is no apparent reason that a
decision by a church body to support a particular missionary is any
more credible when it is made with funds in hand, rather than before
the funds have been raised. In both cases, the same people bound by
law to act in the interests of the church are responsible for charting a
course of action, and in both cases, they may be liable for breaching
their duties to the church. What is critical is that the appropriate
decision-makers within an organization actually exercise judgment
concerning the disposition of donated funds, not that they exercise
such judgment at a particular point in time before disposing of such
funds. For this reason, unless there are systemic reasons for
disfavoring a deduction for donations to charities that have pre-
selected secondary beneficiaries,35' the second view of sufficient
charity control is superior to the first.
This analysis brings me to an evaluation of the third view of
sufficient charity control. Under this view, which as a general
proposition I adopt, a charitable donee exercises a sufficient degree of
control over an earmarked contribution as long as the charity receives
delivery of the donation and accepts the donation in its own right. At
first blush, this view seems quite expansive. It does not query whether
a donor has expressed a mere preference (as opposed to making a
legally restricted gift), and it does not explicitly look to any outward
manifestation of pre-contribution decision-making activity by
charitable donees (as does the second view of sufficient charitable
donee control). Upon closer inspection, however, this third view of
sufficient donee control is not at all radical. Indeed, this view requires
virtually the same degree of "trust" in the credibility of charitable
decision-making as that required under the first two views.
350. See infra text accompanying notes 396-402.
351. See infra Part III.B.
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As argued previously, and consistent with the second view, a
deduction may be entirely proper even if the charitable donee decides
upon the disposition of funds that it merely contemplates receiving
(but has not yet received). Once this point is accepted, it becomes
clear why a deduction is generally appropriate whenever the charity
accepts an earmarked contribution in its own right. In such cases, by
accepting the donation that is restricted for the purpose designated by
the taxpayer-donor, the charity presumably has exercised decision-
making authority concerning the disposition of donated funds. That is
to say, just as a decision to decline the gift implies that the charity has
determined that benefiting the secondary beneficiary will not further
its charitable purposes, so does a decision to accept the gift imply that
the charity has determined that benefiting the secondary beneficiary
does further its charitable purposes. Otherwise, the charitable
organization exposes itself to considerable legal risks. If the premise
of Code section 170-that a charity will dispose of a donation in a
manner consistent with its charitable purposes-is correct, the
presumption should be that it makes no difference whether the charity
reaches its decision with respect to such disposition prior to or after
receiving the gift. If the premise of Code section 170 is not correct,
then the entire system of allowing a deduction for charitable
contributions should be questioned, not just the deductibility of
earmarked contributions.
The preceding analysis makes apparent why the third view requires
a charity to receive funds in its own right and to take delivery thereof.
A charity that is not in actual or constructive possession of donated
funds is less able to supervise the disposition of funds so as to ensure
that they are in fact deployed in a manner that furthers charitable
purposes. Thus, the court reached the correct result in Davenport v.
Commissioner52 for the simple reason that the charity never received
the funds and thus could not decide upon their disposition. In
addition, a charity that does not receive funds "in its own right" has
less incentive to use funds in a manner that furthers exempt
purposes 353  Hence, the presumption of Code section 170 that
352. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585 (1975); see supra note 89.
353. Consider, for example, a transfer of cash to a charitable organization by a
taxpayer who restricts the use of the cash for the purchase of a new television set for
the executive director of the organization. Because the executive director is
adequately compensated, the board of directors is unwilling to accept the gift on
behalf of the organization and supplement her salary in kind. However, the board is
perfectly willing to authorize one member of the board to accept the cash on behalf of
the executive director and purchase the gift for her. In this situation, the cash is never
received by the organization in its own right. At most, the organization (through its
board member) is an agent of the taxpayer and/or the executive director with respect
to the acquisition of the television set. As such an agent, the charitable organization
is not bound to use the cash to advance charitable purposes.
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donations will be used for charitable purposes is inapplicable. In such
situations, the deduction is properly denied.
Admittedly, the legal relationship between the transferor and the
charity must be determined under this third vew, and in this regard,
the "intent" of the transferor is relevant to a limited degree. For
example, in ascertaining whether the relationship between the
transferor and the charity is that of settlor and trustee (i.e., whether an
express trust has been created), it is basic common law that such a
relationship exists only if the settlor intends to create a trust.3-
However, determining whether a transferor intends to create a trust
relationship is a more limited inquiry than probing donor intent for
the purpose of seeking out primary motivations for the transfer, such
as the desire to see a secondary beneficiary assisted. Thus, the inquiry
does not suffer from the same weaknesses of broadly probing "donor
intent," as some authorities have done. ' Indeed, charities can do a
great deal to reduce the complexities of determining the existence of
the requisite donor intent. For example, before accepting an
earmarked gift, a charity may simply inform the donor that by
accepting the gift, the charity is receiving it as its own property and
will use the donation in the manner specified by the donor because
the charity has concluded that doing so furthers its charitable mission.
Further, the charity can plainly state that it is not accepting the funds
as trustee of an express private trust, and that the donor will be
assumed to agree to these terms of the gift upon acceptance thereof
by the charity. A standard form letter to a prospective donor of an
earmarked gift should usually sufficeb "
The major foreseeable objection to the third view of donee control
is the argument that allowing a deduction in cases sanctioned under
the third view (but not under the first or second views) tends to place
too much pressure on charities to defer to the judgment of donors as
to the allocation of funds dedicated to charitable purposes. The
354. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills. Trusts. and Estates
567 (6th ed. 2000): 1 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fmtcher, The Law of Trusts § 23
(4th ed. 1989).
355. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (discussing Winters v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972)): supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964)); supra note 89
(discussing Davenport v. Commissioner. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585 (1975)): supra notes
106-119 and accompanying text (discussing Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 1 (1964));
supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text (discussing Rev. Rul. 79-81, 1979-1 C.B.
107); see also supra text accompanying notes 143-146 (summari/ing cases in which the
donor's intent was an important factor).
356. If a charity does not take such steps, a court called upon to decide the
deductibility of an earmarked transfer to charity must look at other available
evidence bearing upon whether the transferor has created an express trust. Yet even
then, the inquiry is more precise than examining the various motives of the donor to




argument is not that the charity lacks sufficient legal control over
earmarked funds, but that the charity in such cases will be more
inclined to accept the judgment of donors as to the worthiness of the
secondary beneficiaries, or perhaps to appease such donors, than in
the case of non-earmarked transfers. I address this argument below,
for I see it more as a "systemic" consideration. For present purposes,
I am content to demonstrate that the "control" test advanced by
courts is in some sense illusory, if it requires any more legal control
than that which I have advocated. The three views of sufficient donee
control discussed herein tend to collapse. As long as a charity accepts
a donation in its own right and takes delivery of the donation, we have
presumptive assurance that the charitable donee will use the restricted
donation for a charitable purpose, and therefore that a deduction is
generally appropriate.
3. The "But-For" Test of the Benefit Provided to the Secondary
Beneficiary
Some courts have denied a deduction for an earmarked transfer to
charity partly because no evidence established that the charity would
have used the amount in question to benefit the secondary beneficiary
in the absence of the designated transfer. 7 We may think of this as
the "but-for" test of the benefit to be conferred upon the secondary
beneficiary: no deduction is proper if, but for the designated transfer
to charity, the charity would not have conferred a benefit upon the
secondary beneficiary. The rationale for the test presumably is that,
absent evidence that the charitable transferee would have expended
donated funds in any event precisely as contemplated by the
transferor, we have no guarantee that the funds will be employed for a
legitimate purpose (or at least for a purpose worthy of a tax subsidy).
In the limited case in which the primary effect of the transfer is to
secure the secondary beneficiary's private consumption of a good or
service without regard to whether doing so uniquely furthers a
charitable purpose of the charitable transferee, I agree with this
approach s.3  However, in most cases, I believe that employing this
"but-for" test is misguided.
In the first place, the apparent rationale of the "but-for" test has
been largely discredited by the analysis in the immediately preceding
section of this Article. As demonstrated therein, insofar as the law
generally assumes that a charitable donee will use donated funds in a
manner that advances a charitable purpose which therefore is worthy
of a tax subsidy, and because the precise point in time at which a
charitable donee determines that a disposition of funds for a certain
purpose is appropriate makes no difference, the presumption should
357. See supra text accompanying notes 138-142.
358. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
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be that a charitable donee will use the restricted donation for a
charitable purpose (which is worthy of subsidy).
Perhaps more compellingly, the "but-for" test potentially ignores
the marginal benefit to charity of an additional dollar of donations.
Consider a charitable organization that cares for orphaned children in
a group home. Of the ten rooms in the home, nine are occupied by
children, and one is vacant and unfurnished. The organization has a
steady flow of non-designated contributions each month sufficient to
feed and clothe the nine children and provide for their other basic
needs, but has no excess funds. A generous donor who knows of a
certain child whose parents have both tragically died in a car accident
offers to pay the costs of furnishing the tenth room and the added
costs of providing for the basic daily needs of the child, as long as the
home agrees to accept the child into residency. Having considered the
child's circumstances, and having determined that admitting the child
would clearly further the charitable purposes of the home, the
organization accepts the designated donation. In this hypothetical,
prior to accepting the designated transfer, the organization is using its
funds in a manner that furthers charity to the best of its ability. But
this does not mean that the organization has no desire to do more.
Indeed, as I have so crafted the facts, the organization furthers charity
much better by accepting the earmarked contribution. " The
important point for present purposes is simply that the "but-for" test
potentially has the perverse effect of stifling legitimate charitable
operations. The test ignores that a charity may value a marginal
dollar precisely because it enables the charity to further its charitable
mission by benefiting an individual who otherwise would be without
assistance, or by providing a valued benefit to an individual who
otherwise would have received some lesser benefit.
This latter point also serves to indict the -but-for" test for
overlooking the reality of similar charitable fundraising practices
which do not result in the disallowance of a charitable contribution
deduction. Consider a law school (described in Code section
170(c)(2)) seeking to fund an endowed chair for a professor of human
rights law. Currently, the school does not have the money to support
a teacher in this field, but all the faculty and senior administration
agree that offering courses in human rights law would greatly enhance
the curriculum of the school. So the school launches a campaign to
raise funds restricted for the purpose of building an endowment to
provide a reasonable salary for a new professor of human rights law.
On these facts, contributions to the school which are restricted for the
endowment are plainly deductible under federal income tax law. This
is so even if the endowment is financed through the contribution of a
359. Not only is an additional member of a charitable class benefitted, but also the
organization eliminates the waste of excess capacity in its building.
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single taxpayer. That the school would not offer human rights courses
or hire a professor with any expertise in human rights law "but for"
the restricted contribution is wholly irrelevant. Indeed, the whole
point of soliciting funds for the restricted purpose of building an
endowment for a human rights law professor is to meet a need that
otherwise would be unmet.
Of course, in this example, there was substantial evidence that the
restricted contribution furthered exempt purposes. We must further
analyze below whether there are systemic considerations that militate
against a deduction for earmarked contributions which are destined
for secondary beneficiaries. For present purposes, I seek only to show
that the "but-for" test, as a general matter, is largely inconsistent with
the premise of Code section 170, may stifle charitable operations, and
is theoretically inconsistent with accepted practices of charitable
organizations in fundraising.
4. Identity, or Pre-Existing Relationship, Between Transferor and
Secondary Beneficiary
Some authorities discussing the deductibility of earmarked transfers
to charity apparently have considered relevant the existence (or non-
existence) of some familial or other personal relationship between the
transferor and secondary beneficiary.316 The better view is that this
"relationship factor" is relevant only in cases involving (or, perhaps,
potentially involving) an identity or special relationship (to be
discussed below) between the taxpayer and the secondary beneficiary,
where the designated contribution is part of a quid pro quo exchange.
a. Where No Special Relationship or Identity Exists Between
Transferor and Secondary Beneficiary
Perhaps the best place to begin the analysis of the relevance of the
relationship factor is to determine when the relationship between the
transferor and secondary beneficiary generally should not be a
negative factor: when the taxpayer and the secondary beneficiary are
separate taxpayers who have never been members of the same family
or household. Let me return to the taxpayer who makes a designated
contribution to a homeless shelter for the purpose of feeding his
street-side acquaintance named Frank. The secondary beneficiary is
not related to the taxpayer by blood or marriage and is not a member
of the taxpayer's household, so we need not concern ourselves with
the disallowance of "family expenses" under Code section 262.
Further, the taxpayer's securing of benefits for Frank will not relieve
the taxpayer of any support obligation imposed upon her by state law
360. E.g., Estate of Hubert v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064, 1065 (1993);
Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943); Rev. Rul. 79-81, 1979-1 C.B. 107.
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(such as the duty of a mother to support her child), so the taxpayer's
contribution in no way confers a non-tax financial benefit upon her.
Moreover, the goods and services provided by the shelter to Frank are
not those for which he is expected to pay any amount approaching
market value. In other words, this example is not one involving a
charity that functions as a "commercial nonprofit"- ' (such as a private
parochial school charging tuition, or a hospital charging room fees).
Accordingly, if the shelter accepts the designated gift, we have good
reason to believe that the shelter considers Frank a worthy, needy
homeless person, and a member of the organization's charitable class.
As argued above, and as developed more fully below, the federal tax
laws generally should allow philanthropy to have a face. That this
face is known by the taxpayer is usually no grounds for disallowance
of the deduction.
Some judicial authority is consistent with this much of the
analysis.362 In Estate of Hubert, the Tax Court in upholding a
charitable contribution deduction-'" observed that the only personal
relationship between the transferor and one of the supported
missionaries was through a church that supported the work of the
missionaries, a church in which the settlor had taught one of the
missionaries as a youth in Sunday School." This relationship can
properly be considered one of minimal personal contact: certainly, the
missionary was never a member of the settlor's household. Moreover,
the benefit received by the missionary, from whatever charity
accepted distributions from the trust established by the settlor, was in
the form of financial support for conducting ministry, a benefit for
which the missionary was not expected to pay. In these respects,
Estate of Hubert is similar to the case of the taxpayer who makes a
designated contribution to a homeless shelter for the purpose of
feeding Frank. Neither secondary beneficiary is a member of the
taxpayer's household, and the benefits provided to the secondary
beneficiary are not those for which he is expected to pay a market
price. Just as the taxpayer who donates to the homeless shelter should
receive a deduction for his designated contribution, so should (and
did) the estate in Estate of Hubert.
361. I borrow the term "commercial nonprofit" from Professor Hansmann. See
Hansmann, The Role, supra note 251. at 840-41.
362- See, e.g., Estate of Hubert. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064. See supra notes 17(-185
and accompanying text for a discussion of Estate of Hubert.
363. More precisely, as discussed above, the deduction for charitable bequests for
estate tax purposes was upheld. The transferor was the settlor of the trust established
under the will of the decedent leaving the taxable estate at issue.
364. See Estate of Hubert. 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1065.
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b. Where Transferor and Secondary Beneficiary Are Identical or
Have a Special Relationship: The Case of Commercial Benefits
In contrast to those instances involving no identity or relationship
between the taxpayer-transferor and the secondary beneficiary, we
have good reason to deny a deduction in the case of certain
relationships between the taxpayer-transferor and the secondary
beneficiary, especially when they are the same person. This is perhaps
most clear where the benefit provided by the charitable transferee is a
market-priced,36 5 private or semi-public good or service. Consider, for
example, a law school charging $20,000 for tuition per student. A law
student transfers $20,000 to the school and designates herself as the
secondary beneficiary, who is to receive $20,000 worth of credit to her
financial account at the school. If the law school accepts the restricted
transfer, the student should not be allowed a charitable contribution
deduction. The student's designated transfer inherently constitutes a
quid pro quo exchange. By designating herself as the secondary
beneficiary, the law student conditions her transfer on the receipt of a
material commensurate benefit. Indeed, the charitable transferee's
acceptance of the transferred amount requires the charity essentially
to return the value of the transferred amount to the transferor.
Where a taxpayer structures a transaction with a charity to plainly
receive a commensurate material benefit, we have serious reason to
doubt that such transfer is worthy of a tax subsidy in the form of the
charitable contribution deduction.
First, and most obviously, such a transaction involves private
consumption; the law student in our example has really just
"purchased" the value of benefits that she will receive. As a matter of
positive law, the transfer is a nondeductible personal expense under
Code section 262. Normatively, the transfer is plainly not a deductible
charitable contribution under Professor Andrews' theory of personal
deductions because it secures private consumption for the taxpayer.
Moreover, the law student has not suffered a decrease in material
well-being (assuming that her education is worth at least as much as
what she paid for it). Further, the transaction is not characterized by
altruism, the theoretical justification for one form of tax subsidy
(income tax exemption) advanced by Professor Atkinson. 66 In
addition, because of its inherent quid pro quo, the transaction is not
properly characterized as a "donation" worthy of subsidy under the
365. By a "market-priced" good or service, I mean a good or service provided by
nonprofit entities in the business of providing goods and services to customers at
prices that likely are not substantially below the cost of providing them. Goods and
services provided by the typical "commercial nonprofit" are those in view. I do not
mean to suggest that the goods and services are necessarily priced the same as those
provided by for-profit firms.
366. See supra Part II.C.4.
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analysis of Professors Hall and Colombo." 7 More generally, the
traditional subsidy theory would not support a charitable contribution
deduction for a payment of tuition as long as one makes the
reasonable assumption that the value of the private benefit secured by
the payment (i.e., the value of education enjoyed by the law student in
our example) is at least as great as the monetary amount of the
payment. There is no need to subsidize the transfer through the
charitable contribution deduction to induce the taxpayer to make
tuition payments which are equal to the value of the education that
she will receive.
A similar case is that involving a designated transfer to charity that
secures consumption of a market-priced, private or semi-public good
or service by another member of the taxpayer's household. The
textbook example of this case is the taxpayer's payment of tuition for
her child attending private elementary school. If the secondary
beneficiary (i.e., her child) is someone whom the taxpayer is legally
obligated to support, characterizing the tuition payment as the
taxpayer's private consumption of a good or service presents no major
difficulties. In exchange for the tuition payment, the taxpayer secures
educational services for her child, which the law requires her to do (in
some form). The taxpayer is simply buying a service that she must in
some manner provide her child. For the reasons discussed in the
previous paragraph, no charitable contribution deduction should be
available to the taxpayer. This, of course, is precisely the result
compelled by current law.3 s
One may argue more generally that a deduction should be denied in
any case in which the secondary beneficiary-whose consumption of a
market-priced, private or semi-public good or service is secured by the
taxpayer's designated transfer-is a member of the taxpayer's
household (regardless of whether the taxpayer is legally obligated to
support the secondary beneficiary). This argument would borrow
from those provisions of the Code that tend to treat the proper
taxpaying unit (for certain purposes) as the household or family,
rather than as the precise individual whose consumption is at issue.' v
Of course, in order to implement this view of the "household," one
must draw lines so as to determine exactly what persons constitute
members of the same household of the taxpayer. Such line-drawing is
never easy, and is to some degree arbitrary in distinguishing close
cases. However, some courts have considered the "familial-like"
367. See supra Part II.C.5.
368. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
369. For example, the so-called "'kiddie tax" may result in the imposition of a tax
on the unearned income of a minor child of the taxpayer at the rate that would apply
to the taxpayer's income. See I.R.C. § l(g) (1994). In addition, some, like Professor
Andrews, view the nondeductibility of personal gifts between individuals as resting on
the assumption that most such gifts occur between persons of the same consuming
taxable unit (such as family members). See Andrews. supra note 189, at 34849.
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relationship of the taxpayer and the secondary beneficiary to be
relevant. Namely, the Tax Court in Thomason (in which a charitable
contribution deduction was denied) observed that the taxpayer who
paid for his former foster child's residency at a special ranch had a
"keen fatherly and personal interest" in the boy, who had been a
member of the taxpayer's household for several years prior to the
transfer.370 The most plausible theoretical justification for the court's
reliance on this factor is that no deduction should be available for a
taxpayer's payments securing the private consumption of a good or
service by a member of the taxpayer's household.37'
c. Where Transferor and Secondary Beneficiary Are Identical or
Have a Special Relationship: The Case of No Commercial Benefits
The examples that I have employed thus far in this section of the
paper-those involving payments securing market-priced goods and
services consumed by the taxpayer or members of her household-
present a fairly obvious case for denying the deduction. What if the
benefit provided by the charitable transferee to the secondary
beneficiary is not a market-priced, private or semi-public good or
service? The following hypothetical, which involves an identity
between the taxpayer and the secondary beneficiary, illustrates the
question presented. A charitable organization headquartered in New
York City is organized to promote justice for the poor through the
legal system. To encourage pro bono representation of clients by
members of the bar in private practice, each year the organization has
awarded $1000 to an attorney in recognition of outstanding service to
the indigent. The taxpayer, a partner of a large New York law firm,
offers to donate $1000 to the organization for the purpose of awarding
a grant to the taxpayer, who for the past twenty years has spent 300
hours per year representing indigents. The organization accepts the
designated transfer, and awards the $1000 to the taxpayer in a public
ceremony. Should the taxpayer receive a charitable contribution
deduction for the transfer?
Under the typical quid pro quo analysis, the answer is "no." The
transaction is, at bottom, a type of exchange. Because the taxpayer's
transfer to the organization is conditioned on the charity's acceptance
of the "gift's" restrictions, the charity can accept the transferred funds
only by committing itself to retransfer them to the taxpayer. That is
to say, in exchange for the transferred funds, the charity will award an
370. Thomason v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 441,443 (1943).
371. That the taxpayer in Thomason once served as a foster parent of the child
then in the custody of the children's aid society does not necessarily mean that the
child should be considered a member of the taxpayer's household at the time of the
transfer. The precise boundaries determining who should be considered members of
a taxpayer's household are not obvious. I do not attempt to decide these boundaries
in this paper.
1312 [Vol. 70
THE TAXPAYING GOOD SAMARITAN
equal sum to the taxpayer pursuant to the taxpayer's designation.
Such is the essence of a quid pro quo. The very structure of such an
earmarked transfer causes the deduction to fail under Hernandez.'
More generally, one may conceptualize the transaction as a
"purchase" of an award by the taxpayer, which results in no deduction
under the donative theory of Professors Hall and Colombo. Finally,
the transaction lacks the element of altruism, and therefore fails the
test of Professor Atkinson's altruism theory.
On the other hand, could one not argue that the representation of
indigents indeed produces great public benefit, and therefore it is
appropriate to encourage transfers that tend to foster the production
of this benefit? The argument would reason that the charitable
organization in the hypothetical reasonably believes (as indicated by
its history of providing awards) that public awards for pro bono
representation tend to increase the provision of legal services for the
poor. Further, because the charitable organization in the hypothetical
agreed to accept the designated transfer on its own terms, the
organization presumably concluded that accepting the transfer and
issuing the award to the taxpayer would further its charitable mission
(as argued above). The charity must, if challenged by the IRS or the
office of the state attorney general, be able to justify its acceptance of
the gift on the terms specified by the donor. Moreover, from a
practical perspective, the charity must be able to defend its award as a
legitimate execution of its charitable mission in order to attract future
donations from prospective donors. So why not allow a charitable
contribution deduction to the taxpayer in the hypothetical,
notwithstanding the inherent quid pro quo?
The answer best lies in the subsidy theory. Because the transfer
secures for the taxpayer-transferor a private material benefit equal to
the amount of funds transferred to the charity,"' the traditional
372. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text. Because the hypothetical
assumes an identity between the taxpayer-transferor and the secondary beneficiary,
allowing a charitable contribution deduction would not result in erosion of the tax
base, as long as the award from the charitable transferee is included in the taxpayer's
income as a realized accretion to wealth over which the taxpayer exercises dominion.
See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Under current law.
however, the initial transfer would not be deductible. Accordingly. the award itself
should not be included in the taxpayer's income. In other words, because the
taxpayer and secondary beneficiary are identical, the transaction should be treated as
a wash. Such a wash may not occur if the taxpayer and secondary beneficiary are not
identical. For example, assume that in the previous hypothetical, the taxpayer
designated his daughter (a practicing attorney) as the secondary beneficiary. If the
daughter's income tax bracket is lower than that of the taxpayer, allowving the
taxpayer a charitable contribution deduction and including the award in the
daughter's income would result in lower revenues for the federal government.
373. Obviously, the transfer would also likely confer a non-material benefit upon
the transferor in the form of the honor of receiving the public service award. This




subsidy theory does not suggest the need to encourage the transfer
with a deduction. In other words, we could expect the taxpayer in our
hypothetical to offer the designated transfer to charity even without
the incentive of a charitable contribution deduction (as long as he is
not required to include the award in income), for the value of the
award is no less than the amount of his transfer. Accordingly, society
will not lose the benefit of the organization's promotion of pro bono
representation.
B. Systemic Considerations
Section III.A of this Article discussed whether, and to what extent,
certain case-specific factors should be relevant in determining the
deductibility of earmarked contributions. In this subsection of the
Article, I evaluate how various "systemic" factors bear upon the
normative question of whether, and to what extent, earmarked
transfers to charity should be deductible as charitable contributions.
Each factor embodies norms (or deviations therefrom) that
earmarked transfers may or may not advance. The extent to which
such transfers are likely to advance (or violate) such norms is the
subject of this discussion.
1. Encouraging Pluralism: The Voice of the Small Donor
As noted above, one asserted benefit of the charitable sector (and
perhaps the nonprofit sector in general) is that it promotes pluralism.
The argument that the nonprofit sector promotes pluralism is in many
respects just a non-technical way of saying that nonprofits are likely to
provide goods and services that would not be provided by government
or for-profit firms (or in a manner that such entities would not
provide). As previously discussed, there are economic justifications in
support of the nonprofit sector (and charities in particular) when the
production of a good or service falls short of the socially optimal ideal
on account of the dual failures of government and private enterprise.
However, the notion that pluralism is itself a valued norm, and should
be encouraged, appears to be broader than this economics
justification. To value pluralism is to value the rich diversity of
opinions and tastes that typify the many subcultures of our society,
quite apart from whether promoting this diversity can be justified
under an economic analysis. Is there any reason to believe that
allowing a charitable contribution deduction for earmarked transfers
to charity will promote pluralism? I believe such a reason exists.
In the real world, the donor of large sums to charity commonly
exercises a prominent voice in the operations of the charity, at least to
the extent impacted by his or her donation.374 This observation should
374. See McNulty, supra note 7, at 250 ("A related concern is that wealthy
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not be shocking. Indeed, in critiquing Professor Andrews' defense of
the charitable contribution deduction, Professor Mark Kelman
observes that donors of large sums commonly receive great deference
from charitable donees.375 One form of deference is respecting the
donor's opinion of how the donated funds should be used by the
donee. Sometimes, a large donor is given a compelling voice over
charitable operations through placement on the governing board of
the charity. But less formal means of deferring to the donor's wishes
are available, and probably quite common. Consider a prospective
donor who transfers $1 million for an endowed chair in tax law at
State Law School. What is the likelihood that State Law School w'ill
hire a professor of whom the donor does not approve? In reality, the
probability is low. State Law School will likely be quite deferential to
the donor's preferences. 76 To hire a professor of whom the donor of
a large sum does not approve not only virtually ensures that the law
school will never see another dime from that donor when there is
probably "more where that came from," but also increases the
likelihood that the institution will earn a reputation for not
"cooperating" with generous stakeholders, thereby undermining
future efforts to raise funds.
This practical power of wealthy donors does nothing to preclude the
deductibility of their contributions under current law. As discussed
above, although some courts look to the charity's control of donated
funds (as does the IRS), the test of control is one of legal rights, not
"real world" economic pressures. Moreover, as discussed below, a
system which encourages accountability by charitable transferees to
donors has considerable theoretical appeal. But if a legitimate goal of
the charitable sector is pluralism (as an independent value, or as
means for advancing other values, such as efficiency), a problem
remains. The problem is not necessarily that charitable organizations
grant large donors a voice in their affairs, but that they grant so little
voice to small donors.
In addition to the law's tolerance of extensive practical control over
donated funds by donors of large sums, the law further perpetuates
the disparity of "voice" between wealthy donors and those of modest
means in the context of gifts designated to benefit a particular
individual through the treatment of private foundations. Consider a
contributors have the power to direct contributions through the charities to
beneficiaries of their choice and that the form of the present tax allowance enhances
that power.").
375. See Kelman, supra note 201, at 856-58.
376. This does not necessarily mean that the donor will effectively (though
informally) select the professor to be hired. However, the donor may well be given
such deference that he or she exercises what is tantamount to veto power. If the
donor strongly objects to the candidate favored by State Law School, it will likely




taxpayer with plenty of money to hire good legal counsel to help her
incorporate a private foundation37 7 described in Code section
501(c)(3), and obtain recognition of the private foundation's tax-
exempt status from the IRS. The taxpayer transfers a handsome sum
to the private foundation and obtains a charitable contribution
deduction for the gift. The taxpayer is named as one of the three
members of the private foundation's board of directors, and the board
is self-perpetuating (i.e., the board members elect their successors).
Of course, the articles of incorporation of the private foundation,
which were drafted by the taxpayer's legal counsel with great
sensitivity to the taxpayer's wishes, name two other people as
directors, hand-picked by and highly deferential to the taxpayer. If
the private foundation-through its board of directors dominated by
the taxpayer-desires to make a grant to an individual, and the grant
furthers a charitable purpose of the foundation (for example, the
grantee is poor and in need of temporary shelter), can the private
foundation do so under current law? Yes, indeed it can. 78 What an
individual cannot do directly under current law, she can do indirectly
through a private foundation-if she has the financial means to justify
the formation and operation of a private foundation, and to hire legal
counsel who can advise her how to do so.
Of course, private foundations are not utilized by those who lack
financial resources sufficient to justify their formation and operation.
Private foundations are utilized primarily by those who are fairly
financially secure. Thus, the best that a person of moderate means
could hope for under current law is "deference" from charities.
However, contrast the deference given the donors of large sums with
that which one would expect to be given the donors of small sums.
While a donor who makes a small gift may well have a preference for
how that gift will be used, unless the gift is formally restricted, there is
a lower probability that the charitable transferee will follow the advice
of the small donor, or even seek it. A charitable transferee has a less
compelling financial reason to defer to the wishes of small donors,
unless they can act collectively. Allowing a deduction for earmarked
contributions, however, gives small donors with little financial
leverage a greater potential for a meaningful voice. The only way that
the charitable transferee will receive the donation is if it accepts the
377. See I.R.C. § 509(a) (1994) (defining private foundation). A private foundation
is essentially a charitable organization that is neither a "traditional" operating charity
(such as a school, hospital, or church) nor an organization broadly funded by the
general public. A private foundation typically furthers charity by making charitable
grants.
378. In general, nothing prevents a private foundation from making a grant to an
individual. If the grant is for travel, study, or similar purposes, the foundation must
(prior to making the grant) adopt certain procedures and obtain approval of such
procedures from the IRS, and must limit the grant for activities specified in the Code.
See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(3) & (g).
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gift on its own terms. Doing so requires the charity to consider the
preferences of the small donor. It is one thing for a charity to
disregard the advice of a small donor after receiving the donation in
hand, where the only downside is the possibility that the offended
small donor will not give again (i.e., a possible future small donation
may be lost). It is quite another thing for a charity to turn down a
small donation that is ready to be dropped at the charity's doorstep, if
only the charity agrees that the donor's restricted use will indeed
further charitable operations.
Granted, a small earmarked contribution will not suffice to endow a
university chair, and therefore it is unlikely that the preference
expressed by the small donor in such a case will promote pluralism.
But in other contexts-such as when a social welfare agency receives
an earmarked contribution for helping a flood victim, or for assisting a
poor family with mounting medical bills-there is a greater
probability that the charitable transferee will give serious
consideration to the worthiness of the secondary beneficiary. In such
cases, by increasing the voice of small donors, allowing a deduction for
earmarked charitable contributions tends to promote pluralism.
Indeed, once a charitable transferee agrees that a designated
secondary beneficiary is a worthy recipient of a benefit financed with
the designated transfer, the charity may decide to devote unrestricted
funds to benefit the secondary beneficiary. In this manner, the voice
of the small donor is amplified, and pluralism is further promoted.-"
2. Efficiency Gains and Losses
Will permitting a charitable contribution deduction for earmarked
contributions promote or undermine economic efficiency? At the
outset, I must confess that I cannot credibly purport to answer this
question definitively. However, I am convinced that there are
persuasive reasons that a deduction for such contributions tends to
promote economic efficiency, and that arguments against the
deduction on efficiency grounds are not without difficulties. While I
cannot prove that a deduction for earmarked contributions is efficient,
I believe I can make a plausible case that such a deduction is
economically efficient, or at least is not necessarily economically
inefficient.
379. Admittedly, there is some risk that the donors of large sums-who consist in
part of affluent individuals and large corporations-will achieve an even greater voice
than that which they currently enjoy if they can deduct contributions restricted to
benefit a named secondary beneficiary. However. because such donors already have
such a significant voice in the affairs of charitable donces. it is likely that the net result
would be to give donors of small sums a relatively greater voice than that which they
now possess. If so, allowing a deduction for earmarked transfers to charity %vill still
tend to promote pluralism.
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As a threshold matter, I must explain why a taxpayer's making of
earmarked contributions is not inherently inconsistent with the
commonly accepted economics justification for the existence of the
nonprofit sector advanced by Professor Hansmann: contract failure.
As discussed above, 8° contract failure exists because transferors of
funds are unable to ensure that their transferred funds are actually
used to benefit members of the targeted class of beneficiaries. This
inability to monitor the desired "bang for the buck" may be
attributable to the separation of the donor and the ultimate
beneficiary (i.e., donors cannot determine whether their donations for
hunger relief have actually reached starving Ethiopian children), the
impossibility of measuring one's contribution to the production of a
public good, or the difficulty in judging the quality of service or goods
provided by a charitable entity. Does the making of an earmarked
contribution necessarily "solve" these instances of contract failure,
thereby removing the justification for the provision of the benefit by
charitable transferees in the first place?
In answering this question, we must first understand which
instances of contract failure are germane to the present inquiry. For
reasons discussed below,38' there are good reasons to deny a deduction
for earmarked transfers to charity that secure the secondary
beneficiary's consumption of private goods and services for which she
normally would be expected to pay a market price. Thus, in the case
of the typical commercial nonprofit (like a school or hospital), the
only instance with which we need concern ourselves is that involving a
taxpayer's payment of a good or service on behalf of someone whom
the service-provider would not normally charge-such as an indigent
(in the case of a hospital that customarily provides charity care). In
such a situation, the taxpayer's earmarked contribution to secure
medical care for the indigent secondary beneficiary is a transaction
plagued just as much by "contract failure" as the taxpayer's payment
of medical care for herself. Indeed, the potential contract failure is
probably even greater in the case of the payment on behalf of the
indigent, for the taxpayer herself does not have first-hand knowledge
of some symptoms of illness experienced by the patient (i.e, the
taxpayer cannot personally feel the patient's pain or relief therefrom).
In the case of charities providing classic public goods, earmarked
contributions would likely not even arise, and would have no unique
effect even if they did arise. By definition, public goods are available
for consumption by all consumers. An earmarked contribution to a
charity providing a public good will benefit the secondary beneficiary
to the same degree as a non-earmarked contribution. Whatever
contract failure applies to contributions to charities that produce
380. See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
381. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
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public goods does so without regard to whether the contributions are
earmarked.
The most problematic form of contract failure in the context of
earmarked contributions is that involving the separation of the donor
and the secondary beneficiary. In Professor Hansmann's example of
contributions to CARE, where the donors are separated from
ultimate beneficiaries by an ocean,-' - earmarked contributions are
characterized by the same major contract failure that characterize
non-earmarked contributions: the taxpayer has little way of ensuring
that the particular child she has chosen to feed will receive the benefit
of her donation. The economics justification for the provision of
hunger relief across the seas applies equally to those entities that
receive earmarked contributions and those that do not.
But what about local charities, where donors live in close proximity
to the people served by the charity? In such cases, it is true that
contract failure is surely not as severe as in the case of donations to
ameliorate hunger overseas. A taxpayer can to some degree monitor
the effectiveness of local charities in meeting human needs.
Moreover, the ability to monitor local human welfare charities is
enhanced through earmarked contributions. Does this ability to
monitor charitable transferees reduce contract failure to such a degree
that it renders the existence of the charitable sector superfluous? I do
not believe so.
First, it is highly unlikely that the ability to deduct earmarked
contributions will result in all contributions being earmarked. Many
donors simply do not have sufficient knowledge of the members of
charitable classes served by charitable donees so as to designate them
by name. Secondly, even many of those who earmark contributions
will likely rely on charities to provide benefits to secondary
beneficiaries without significant oversight. It will be more expedient
for many donors simply to designate the secondary beneficiaries, and
then rely upon the charities to honor the designation. No doubt, some
donors will indeed monitor whether their designations have been
honored. But this is not a reason to reject the deductibility of
earmarked contributions on efficiency grounds. Rather, it may well
be a reason to favor them. If charities believe that some donors will
be monitoring them, they are more likely to comply with the donors'
designations.
Of course, compliance with the designations of donors is efficient
only if we assume that the exercise of "donor voice" itself promotes
efficiency. That is the heart of the present inquiry. What are the
plausible efficiency gains from earmarked contributions?
One conceivable efficiency gain from earmarked contributions is a
reduction in the costs of gathering information concerning worthy
382. See Hansmann, The Role, supra note 251, at 846-47.
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ultimate beneficiaries of charitable operations. Of the many
charitable uses of funds, charities must decide which causes are the
most deserving and in need of support. Charities providing benefits to
particular individuals must gather information and evaluate potential
recipients of benefits in order to determine how best to distribute
scarce resources. A donor who offers an earmarked contribution
serves the potentially helpful service of identifying a worthy and
needy recipient of charitable funds. Indeed, in many cases, it is likely
that the donor will have become aware of the secondary beneficiary's
need in the course of everyday discourse, with little extra expenditure
of time and money. Allowing donors to deduct earmarked
contributions is a way to encourage the efficient "passing on" of
information from donors to charities concerning ultimately worthy
causes.383 True, donors could convey such information to charities
without making a deductible contribution thereto. But there are two
major advantages to allowing the deduction. First, it encourages the
charities to consider the donor's suggestion seriously; the gift cannot
be accepted in good faith unless the charity has decided upon the
merits of the restriction. Secondly, when a donor parts with her
money (as opposed to offering nothing but advice), we have credible
evidence that the donor is a true believer in the worthiness of her
cause. She "puts her money where her mouth is."
Another efficiency gain of earmarked contributions is the
maximization of donors' "result utility." As discussed above in the
context of the donative theory of exemption advanced by Professors
Hall and Colombo,3" the result utility derived by the donor lies not in
her personal participation in giving, but in her perception that the
amount contributed will help society. Result utility mirrors the actual
social value in accomplishing the activity supported by the donation. 8 '
By encouraging earmarked contributions through the tax subsidy of a
charitable contribution deduction, we tend to maximize donors' result
utility, and thereby maximize the social value in accomplishing
designated charitable purposes.
Another way of expressing this point is that a charitable
contribution deduction for earmarked transfers tends to encourage
donations from individuals who otherwise would not give to charity
383. One could counter with the argument that the whole process may be
inefficient because it forces charities to consider secondary beneficiaries that have no
merit, itself a costly prospect. However, many donors who offer earmarked grants
could be expected to have gathered a fair amount of information (often at a low cost,
as noted above) to convey to charities, and to present the information to charities in a
manner that is easily apprehended. Doing so maximizes the probability that the
charity will accept the gift. While evaluating such information involves costs, they are
likely not as extensive as the costs to charity of the entire process of gathering
information, organizing it, and then evaluating it.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 301-312.
385. See Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222, at 1409.
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because they believe that their transfers will not have a meaningful
impact.386 As professor Gergen has observed, people are less likely to
subsidize a good produced by a social welfare agency when they feel
that their prospective contribution is tiny relative to the enormous
needs of society, and therefore will not make any real difference.
However, a donor who is allowed to earmark her contribution has the
satisfaction of knowing that her contribution will be used to benefit an
individual whom the donor believes is worthy. The donor is more
likely to see her contribution as making a difference. Moreover,
encouraging this type of a gift with a tax subsidy potentially enhances
the impact of a single donor, insofar as the value of a deduction allows
her to contribute a greater amount than she otherwise would have
been able (or even inclined) to contribute (i.e., in the absence of a
deduction).
For example, consider a taxpayer in a 30% income tax bracket who
has $50,000 of gross income for the taxable year. The taxpayer is
willing to part with $100 of his funds on an after-tax basis in order to
further charity meaningfully. In other words, our taxpayer is willing
to be out-of-pocket in an amount equal to $15,000 (the amount of his
federal income taxes (30% of $50,000) if no charitable transfers are
deductible) plus $100 in transfers to charity, or a total of $15,100 in
out-of-pocket expenditures, leaving him with $34,900 ($50,000 -
$15,100). Also assume that the taxpayer's transfer to charity (say, a
homeless shelter) would indeed be socially desirable. However, if no
charitable contribution deduction is available for earmarked gifts, the
taxpayer may well not make any contribution to a homeless shelter
because he just does not feel that his transfer will make a significant
difference in any single person's life. Now consider a second scenario,
which assumes that the law permits a charitable contribution
deduction for earmarked contributions. Encouraged by the prospect
of "making a difference," the taxpayer makes a deductible transfer to
a homeless shelter and earmarks a named homeless person as the
secondary beneficiary of the transfer (as a recipient of meals provided
by the shelter for one full month, for example). If the taxpayer can
deduct the value of the earmarked transfer, the taxpayer can
contribute about $143 to the shelter and remain in his desired after-
tax position: his income tax bill will be 30% of ($50,000-$143), or
about $14,957, to which we add $143 for his transfer of cash to the
homeless shelter, for total out-of-pocket expenditures of $15,100.
That leaves our taxpayer with $34,900, his desired amount after
making expenditures for taxes and charity. More importantly, with
386. Cf McNulty, supra note 7. at 236 (arguing that a social good is promoted when
freerider problems are reduced on account of the appropriation of some benefit by
donors, such as the knowledge by a donor of a private gift that the gift will benefit
someone she knows in a manner visible to the donor).
387. See Gergen, supra note 187, at 1448.
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the deduction for earmarked contributions, a charitable organization
now has an additional $143 to conduct its operations, which it
otherwise would not have received.
In the previous illustration, the deduction for earmarked
contributions was efficient because it induced the taxpayer to transfer
funds that he otherwise would not have transferred, and, by
stipulation, in a socially desirable quantum. However, perhaps my
example misleadingly assumes only two scenarios. Perhaps we have a
third scenario, in which our taxpayer is willing to make a personal gift
to a homeless person in the amount of $100. Such a gift would cost
the taxpayer $100 both before and after taxes, because the gift is
nondeductible for federal income tax purposes. After paying taxes of
$15,000 (30% of $50,000), and making a gift of $100 to the homeless
person, the taxpayer is left with $34,900, his desired amount after
making expenditures for taxes and charity. As this example suggests,
one may argue that a subsidy for earmarked contributions is
inefficient, because in the absence of a deduction therefor, donors
would simply give the secondary beneficiaries nondeductible personal
gifts. Thus, we must ask if there is any reason to favor a deduction for
earmarked contributions over a system in which we simply let a
taxpayer make a nondeductible personal gift.
One advantage of providing a deduction for the earmarked
contribution is the oversight function performed by the charity itself.
The charity can ensure that the value appropriated by the homeless
person is in the form of food (or shelter), not substances harmful to
the person (such as alcohol or other drugs)." Encouraging
contributions to charitable transferees thereby improves the chances
that members of the charitable classes served by the charities are truly
helped."9  Another advantage is the "signaling" function of
388. I recognize that a personal gift can be made in kind (i.e., I can buy a
hamburger for a homeless person or, like the Good Samaritan, pay for his lodging at a
hotel). However, it is probable that a charitable donee, the routine activities of which
include the provision of benefits in kind on a large scale, can provide such benefits
more efficiently than can most individual taxpayers. Admittedly, this point does not
mean that charities actually operate as efficiently as they could. See infra text
accompanying notes 403-414 for a discussion of this issue. However, if charities would
operate more efficiently with greater donor involvement, it is probable that making
gifts to charities often would be more efficient than making personal gifts in kind to
individuals. See generally McNulty, supra note 7, at 236 (stating that charities may or
may not be more efficient than individuals in furthering charitable goals).
389. One could counter that this argument fails to explain why we should not
simply let donors make nondeductible earmarked grants to charities. After all, a
nondeductible earmarked grant still places funds squarely in the hands of charities,
which thereafter can make certain that secondary beneficiaries receive only
appropriate forms of benefits. One response to this counter-argument is that a
deduction may be necessary to encourage the optimal level of charitable giving.
Another response is that many charities are probably discouraged by their legal
counsel from accepting earmarked grants. Why so? They are (in many cases)
nondeductible under current law. As such, the charity that receives an earmarked
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earmarked transfers. If a taxpayer makes a personal gift to a disaster
victim, while that victim may be aided to some degree, she may still
have a significant remaining unmet need. As argued above, -9"
allowing a deduction for earmarked contributions encourages
taxpayers to convey useful information to charities, which may be able
to provide even greater support for those in need. Finally, relative to
the amount of the nondeductible gift, allowing a deduction for the
earmarked contribution allows the taxpayer to make a larger pre-tax
transfer for the ultimate benefit of the secondary beneficiary at the
same after-tax cost of the transfer. In our previous example, the
deduction for the earmarked gift resulted in $43 of additional funds
(relative to the amount of the nondeductible personal gift) being
dedicated to charitable purposes.
Another plausible argument that a deduction for earmarked
contributions may encourage a taxpayer to give more to charity
involves the donor who believes that a prospective charitable donee
will (or may) mismanage unrestricted funds. Such mismanagement
may take the form of misfeasance (such as paying excessive
compensation), or the mere devotion of funds to uses that the donor
does not consider worthy of support.391  At least in some cases,
monitoring whether a charity complies with the donor's designated
use is easier than determining whether a charity has "wasted" assets
through mismanagement. This perceived benefit of facilitating the
accountability of charities to those who monitor their advancement of
charitable purposes may be just the incentive that some donors need
to transfer funds to charity.
So what is the most important efficiency loss that a deduction for
earmarked contributions may create? It is probably an oversupply of
benefits to named secondary beneficiaries. In other words, the major
risk is that a taxpayer (or taxpayers as a group) are likely to donate a
sum of earmarked contributions in excess of the socially optimal level.
This loss would occur when the taxpayer's choice of a secondary
beneficiary is misguided, as when the secondary beneficiary is less
deserving of support than others whom the charity desires to
contribution cannot legally communicate with donors in such a way as to suggest that
they have made deductible "'charitable contributions" thereto. An unsophisticated
donor is unlikely to understand the legal niceties involved, and charity-donor
relations are likely to be strained when the donor is later informed that the charity
cannot acknowledge the receipt of any deductible charitable contribution.
Sophisticated donors are more likely to know the rules, of course. But chances are
that they are also the taxpayers who make larger donations, and the charitable
transferees will be more attentive to their wishes in any case (i.e.. they do not need to
earmark their grants to further the charitable causes that they desire to further).
390. See supra text accompanying note 383.
391. Winn v. Commissioner provides a good example of such a taxpayer. In Winn,
the taxpayers wished to ensure that donated funds would further the church's work
through a designated missionary, rather than fund the activities of the World Council
of Churches. See Winn v. Comm'r, 595 F.2d 1060, 1065 (5th Cir. 1979).
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benefit.392 This loss also would occur when the taxpayer's choice of
the secondary beneficiary is sound, but the amount of the donation is
in excess of the socially optimal level.393 How do we begin to analyze
the magnitude of this risk of efficiency loss?
The best that I can do presently is to focus attention on some major
assumptions that underlie the analysis of this potential efficiency loss.
If we assume that charities are trustworthy, that they make efficient
decisions regarding the use of donated funds (notwithstanding what
donors' perceptions may be), it is far from clear that allowing a
deduction for earmarked contributions is a bad idea. 94 Clearly, if the
donor offers an earmarked contribution that is indeed socially
optimal, we could expect a wholly "trustworthy" charitable donee to
accept the gift. Further, under the assumption of trustworthy
charitable donees, if a prospective donor designates an unworthy
secondary beneficiary, the prospective charitable donee generally can
be trusted to refuse the gift. The major risk arises when the
prospective donor specifies a "worthy" recipient, but one whom the
charity considers "less worthy" than another whom could be helped
by the prospective donation. In that situation, how will the parties-
both the prospective donor and the donee-behave? Answering this
question obviously requires more assumptions.
If we assume that donors are stubborn, arrogant taxpayers who will
not give to charity unless they "get their way" when specifying a
restricted use, then a prospective donee might be inclined to go ahead
and accept the designated gift on the theory that helping a worthy
secondary beneficiary (who is not "the worthiest" potential secondary
beneficiary) is better than helping nobody at all. But is this result
necessarily inefficient, relative to the world of giving under current
law? It is inefficient only if we assume that those "stubborn, arrogant
taxpayers" would have made unrestricted gifts to the charitable
transferee in the absence of a deduction for earmarked contributions,
and that such donors' contributions are the only source of funds that
392. Cf Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 222, at 1461 ("The
aberrational, idiosyncratic desires of a single individual may not reflect the desires of
any significant portion of society and thus may not be worthy of a public subsidy.").
393. Cf Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of
the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 470
(1996) ("Because donors often do not consume the services they donate, donor
control can lead to inefficient overproduction of what particular donors want to
support."): Gergen, supra note 187, at 1425 (observing the risk of misallocation of
resources when donors make restricted gifts).
394. If we assume that charitable organizations generally cannot be trusted to make
good decisions (even when subject to existing enforcement mechanisms), then current
law should be significantly reformed. As discussed below, there are persuasive
reasons to believe that charitable organizations engage in sub-optimal behavior.
However, it is doubtful that managers of most charities engage in the most egregious
form of misbehavior (the private appropriation of charitable funds) to any great
degree. See infra text accompanying notes 396-402.
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may benefit the "worthiest" secondary beneficiaries. Such
assumptions are at least problematic, particularly in view of the prior
assumption that such taxpayers believe that only they can best
determine worthy charitable uses. We would rightly question whether
such taxpayers would have made unrestricted charitable gifts under
current law.
If we assume that donors will listen to the reasoning of prospective
"trustworthy" charitable donees who believe that an earmarked grant
would not best further charitable purposes, it would not be at all
unreasonable to expect that such donors would simply offer other
earmarked transfers-ones which earmark funds for the benefit of the
"worthiest" secondary beneficiaries identified by charitable donees.
Such a process could be expected to produce a socially desirable level
of benefits to secondary beneficiaries (although the transaction costs
associated with communications between donors and charitable
transferees would likely be higher than in the case of unrestricted
gifts).
Perhaps this analysis is far too simplified. One could argue that the
greatest risk of loss in efficiency from allowing a deduction for
earmarked grants is simply that a charitable transferee, in this
situation and this alone, will substitute its "optimal decisions" for
donors' "sub-optimal decisions." Under this argument. charities can
generally be trusted to devote funds to socially optimal uses, as long as
they are left to their own decision-making processes. Stated another
way, charities are indeed trustworthy. but only when they are free of
the influence of donors. The risk is that charities will abdicate their
decision-making function to donors, to the detriment of society.
Because this precise argument presents its own nuances, I take it up
separately in the next section of this Article.
3. Abdication of the Decision-Making Function of Charities
a. In General
Whether a deduction for earmarked contributions is unjustified
because it uniquely tends to result in the abdication of a charitable
organization's decision-making function is a complex issue. Recall the
basic argument: a deduction for an earmarked contribution will
encourage the substitution of a charitable organization's "optimal
decisions" for the "sub-optimal decisions" of donors. I will refer to
this as the "abdication" argument. In analyzing the abdication
argument, I wish to identify explicitly this argument's assumptions,
analyze such assumptions, and place the argument in the proper
context of the present inquiry. I shall undertake the last of these
objectives first (and briefly).
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In the limited context of what this Article tackles-the deductibility
of earmarked transfers to charity-the abdication argument is not in
itself sufficient to compel the disallowance of the deduction. If the
premises of the argument are true, then the deductibility of all types
of charitable contributions subject to donor-initiated restrictions
should be questioned. But under current law, most restricted gifts are
plainly deductible. Admittedly, this observation, standing alone, does
not necessarily mean that earmarked contributions should be
deductible. After all, if deductions for expenditures A and B are
equally unjustified, that we allow a deduction for B does not
necessarily mean that we should allow a deduction for A. However,
other objections to the abdication argument may be raised.
In so doing, we now should identify the major assumptions of the
abdication argument. The first assumption of the abdication
argument is that charities, left to themselves, make good (i.e., socially
beneficial, or perhaps even socially optimal) decisions regarding the
use of donated funds. The second assumption is that as a class, donors
who designate secondary beneficiaries make poorer (i.e., less socially
desirable) decisions than independent charitable organizations
regarding the use of donated funds.3 95 The third assumption is that
charities which normally make good choices concerning the use of
donated funds will defer to the inferior choices of donors (i.e.,
charities will make poorer choices) if donors can deduct their
earmarked transfers to charity. Each assumption merits critical
reflection.
As to the first assumption of the abdication argument, current law
provides several checks to prevent the most egregious forms of
mismanagement. The prohibition against private inurement of a
charitable organization's net earnings,396 the requirement that a
charitable organization be organized exclusively397 and operated
primarily398 to further an exempt purpose, the excise tax on "excess
benefit transactions" engaged in by public charities,3 99 and various
excise taxes imposed on private foundations (and private persons
having a special relationship therewith)40 all serve to curtail many
types of misfeasance. The IRS is the "enforcer" of these limitations.
395. One could collapse the first two assumptions into one: charities, left to
themselves, make better decisions than donors as a class. However, expressing the
assumptions in three-fold form is analytically useful because it so plainly invites a
critical examination of the behavior of charities. The following discussion is useful
regardless of the form in which the abdication argument is expressed.
396. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
397. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501-1(a)(1), (b)(1)(i)(a).
398. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501-1(c)(1).
399. See I.R.C. § 4958.
400. See, e.g., id. § 4941 (imposing excise taxes on acts of self-dealing between a
private foundation and a disqualified person); id. § 4945 (imposing excise taxes on
taxable expenditures of private foundations).
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Several of these limitations are just versions of the "nondistribution
constraint" 1 imposed upon nonprofit corporations under state law.
The enforcers of the nondistribution constraint are the state attorneys
general (whose ability to closely monitor nonprofits in practice has
proven quite limited). 2 While the enforcement of these limitations is
not perfect, the severity of the penalties for non-compliance
(particularly after the enactment of Code section 4958) provides some
meaningful degree of assurance that most charitable organizations will
not siphon funds away from charitable operations.
However, this working conclusion does not alone establish the truth
of the first assumption of the abdication argument. As Professors
Brody 3 and Ben-Ner ° have observed, the nondistribution constraint
merely precludes an organization from distributing net profits; it
certainly does not ensure that the organization utilizes funds in a
socially optimal manner. As Professor Ben-Ner has stated,
[T]he absence of a profit motive does not imply the existence of a
specific alternative goal. Nonprofit organizations may pursue goals
related to various attributes of a service (it's quality, diversity,
frequency of provision, price, or the identity of its beneficiaries) in
ways that fail to meet the demands of some demand-side
stakeholders. 405... The nondistribution-of-profit constraint...
leaves too much room for managers to make programmatic
decisions that may not agree with the economic demand of those
who are dissatisfied with market provision.46
Professor Brody lists several reasons that a nonprofit organization
may fail to operate in a socially optimal manner.' At bottom is the
fundamental problem that nonprofit entities are "agents without
principals."'  The governing boards of such entities have fiduciary
duties, but there is no group completely analogous to the shareholders
of a for-profit firm to whom management must answer. As such, the
401. The term "nondistribution constraint" was coined by Professor Hansmann.
See Hansmann, The Role, supra note 251, at 838. It simply means that a nonprofit
corporation is prohibited by state law from distributing profits to private parties. Id.
402. See Brody, supra note 393, at 467 n.32 (citing authorities): Hansmann, The
Role, supra note 251, at 837-74.
403. See Brody, supra note 393, at 463-66.
404. See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits front the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law
and Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 Yale LJ. 731,753 (1994).
405. "Demand-side stakeholders" are those who have some stake in the price,
quantity, quality, and other features of that which a nonprofit organization provides.
They include consumers of a nonprofit organization's goods and services and donors.
See id. at 749-50.
406. Id. at 752-53.
407. See Brody, supra note 393, at 463-64 (citing the inability of a nonprofit
organization to judge accurately its quality of service, internal agency costs, and the
propensity for corporate waste resulting from the absence of a profit-maximizing
agenda).
408. Id. at 465.
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nonprofit sector suffers from a major accountability problem."
Particularly troubling is the implication of contract failure as it relates
to accountability. As Professor Brody insightfully writes,
[T]he law grants plenary authority to the nonprofit board of
directors to manage the affairs of a nonprofit corporation. Those
who govern a nonprofit firm can exercise discretion to maximize
different goals. Because of the presumed information asymmetry
between the nonprofit and the patrons, the nondistribution
constraint alone cannot assure the patron that his donation... will
achieve his intent. If the public cannot tell what is happening inside
the nonprofit, the patron cannot know whether the nonprofit is
using his or her money to maximize the quality of the charity's
services, to reduce their cost to the public, to augment pecuniary and
nonpecuniary compensation of the charity's workers, or even to save
for the benefit of future patrons. 410
The observations of Professors Brody and Ben-Ner should give us
pause as we consider the first assumption of the abdication
argument-that charities, left alone, make socially beneficial (or even
socially optimal) decisions regarding the use of donated funds.
Because a charitable donee typically lacks accountability to defined
principals, we have little assurance that a charitable donee maximizes
charity. Granted, this lack of accountability means only that
charitable organizations have an opportunity to use donated funds in
a manner that fails to produce the greatest potential societal benefit;
the lack of accountability does not mean that charities actually fail to
maximize charity, or fail to approximate doing so. However, there is
some reason to believe that charities do tend to pursue goals
extraneous to the production of the greatest social good. Professor
Brody has noted the variety of goals that managers of nonprofit
organizations seek to maximize, according to various economists,
social scientists, and management experts.41' Many of these goals
differ from maximizing the impact of a charity's stated mission.
Equally troubling is the prospect that nonprofit organizations tend to
devalue productive efficiency. Professor Brody argues that nonprofit
organizations operate with a higher degree of "slack" than that
present in business corporations (which, at least in theory, are subject
to shareholder demands to maximize profits).412 This organizational
slack results from such internal goals as "avoiding conflict, reducing
409. See id. at 465-67. Professor Brody also argues that for-profit firms suffer from
a lack of accountability because of the separation of ownership and control of large
corporations. See id. at 467.
410. Brody, supra note 393, at 466. Professor Brody writes in a manner reminiscent
of Professor Ben-Ner's earlier scholarship. Cf. Ben-Ner, supra note 404, at 753.
4i 1. See id. at 491-92.
412. Id. at 507. This observation is not intended to suggest that proprietary firms
single-mindedly pursue the goal of profit maximization in reality. There is good
reason to doubt that they do. See id. at 494-505.
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tension, valuing 'fairness,' and making the nonprofit a more pleasant
place to work. 4 13 For these reasons, the first assumption of the
abdication argument is problematic. True, a charitable organization,
left to itself, can be expected to produce "some good" for society, and
often to an important extent. However, because a charitable
organization also is likely to pursue inefficient goals, we have good
reason to believe that it will make sub-optimal decisions. What we do
not know is the extent of social loss resulting from the sub-optimal
behavior of charities.
One may also properly question the second assumption of the
abdication argument: that donors who designate secondary
beneficiaries make poorer (i.e., less socially desirable) decisions than
independent charitable organizations regarding the use of donated
funds. As an initial matter, insofar as donors probably do not care as
much about the internal goals of charities (discussed above) that tend
to reduce efficiency, we may properly question whether a donor's
restriction of funds for the benefit of a named secondary beneficiary is
likely to be less optimal than whatever use the charity would have
made of such funds in the absence of the donor's designation.
Although earmarked contributions may produce other inefficiencies,
at least they tend to reduce those internal inefficiencies discussed by
Professor Brody.414 Further, as argued above, in many cases donors
who offer an earmarked contribution may have superior information
about the secondary beneficiary's worthiness. In such cases, a donor's
judgment of the societal benefit of supporting the secondary
beneficiary may well be superior to that of the charity. Perhaps more
fundamentally, it is far from clear that the judgment of a person who
is so convinced of the worthiness of a named secondary beneficiary
that she is willing to expend her own funds to support her is less
credible than the judgment of one who supports secondary
beneficiaries with other people's money.
More generally, as we complete our brief analysis of the second
assumption of the abdication argument and begin to consider the third
assumption thereof, we should examine the broader question of
whether giving donors (as a group) a greater "voice" in the affairs of
charity is an appropriate way to increase the accountability of these
"agents without principals" (as Professor Brody calls nonprofit
organizations). How one answers this question probably reflects one's
vision of the role of donors and other stakeholders in the oversight of
413. Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
414. The clearest case is a designated gift of cash, to be transferred to a secondary
beneficiary. In that case, the charitable donee will be bound to use the cash as
designated by the donor. In other contexts. such as when a donor earmarks a
contribution for the benefit of a secondary beneficiary who is to receive a benefit in
kind, there is greater opportunity for the charity to waste the gift (e.g.. by paying too
much for food to be provided a homeless person).
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charitable enterprise. On the one hand, as Professor Brody has
observed, the separation of donors' "supply" from beneficiaries'
"demand" may result in an inefficient supply of a good or service
funded by donors.4" 5 In other words, donors may supply only what
they want to supply, not what members of charitable classes need. On
the other hand, as Professor Ben-Ner argues, one may view the whole
class of charitable donors (of time and money) and purchasers of a
charitable organization's goods and services as the appropriate group
of "controllers" of the charity, insofar as they "demand" the provision
of the goods and services they fund and are most analogous to
"owners. '  Under this vision, control by donor-stakeholders (and
other patrons) "provides the only assurance that the firm will operate
according to their economic demand." '417
To defend (or reject) Professor Ben-Ner's vision of the role of
donors in overseeing the affairs of charitable entities is far beyond the
scope of this paper. All I offer here is conceptual agreement with his
argument that charities would likely operate in a manner closer
approximating the social ideal if they were more accountable to a
broad group of donors. Donors lack some of the incentives to
establish and pursue inefficient goals. If many donors are involved in
the oversight of charities, they will likely bring a diversity of
perspective and experience that can be of great value. Donors are
likely to give more to charity when convinced that their contributions
will be expended in a manner that they see fit. Donors involved in
decision-making will probably facilitate the exchange of useful
information amongst themselves and senior officers of charitable
organizations.
These observations should sound familiar, of course. They are
some of the reasons that support a deduction for earmarked
contributions. To be sure, allowing a deduction for earmarked gifts to
charity is an extremely small measure compared to the type of reform
that would comprehensively implement Professor Ben-Ner's vision of
nonprofit governance by stakeholders. My point for the moment is
only that my proposal for deducting earmarked gifts to charity is a
minor step in the direction of implementing more comprehensive and
effective measures to involve a broad class of donors in the oversight
of nonprofits so as to increase the accountability of charitable agents
without principals.
The preceding arguments do not, standing alone, disprove the
second assumption of the abdication argument (i.e., that donors make
poorer decisions than "independent" charities), although they do call
into question the truth of the assumption in the limited context of
415. See Brody, supra note 393, at 470, 512.
416. See Ben-Ner, supra note 404, at 753-61.
417. Id. at 753.
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earmarked contributions. Further, and more generally, the preceding
arguments suggest that even if donors as a class are usually less
competent in determining the use of charitable funds than the
management of charitable organizations, society may still be much
better off in uniting donors and charities in the charitable decision-
making process. In other words, an enterprise in which donors and
charitable managers make decisions together may well be superior to
an enterprise with a decision-making process that is independent of
donor participation.
This thought brings us face-to-face with the third assumption of the
abdication argument-that charities will defer to the choices of donors
if donors can deduct their earmarked transfers to charity. First, in the
context of earmarked contributions, deference to donors may often be
entirely acceptable, even desirable. Such is the case, for example,
when the donor has superior knowledge of the worthiness of a
secondary beneficiary, or when in the absence of a restriction the
charity would waste the donation. But such is not always the case.
Sometimes, the donor may simply be misguided. In such situations,
how significant is the risk that charities will unjustifiably defer to the
wishes of donors?
I can offer here only some reasoned speculation and observations.
For the reasons discussed above,418 most donors (at least those who
otherwise would be inclined to make unrestricted gifts to charity)
probably can be trusted to listen to the concerns expressed by a
charity when considering whether to accept a deductible earmarked
gift. If we assume that donors will listen to the reasoning of
prospective charitable donees who believe that an earmarked grant
would not optimally advance charitable purposes, we may anticipate
that such donors could be persuaded to offer a different earmarked
transfer, which comports with the charitable donee's assessment of the
"worthiest" secondary beneficiary. It is true that this process of
communicating between prospective donor and prospective donee
creates transaction costs. But I believe that the benefits of this
process may justify the costs. Facilitating such communication
between donors and donees is one way of moving the current system
towards the vision of Professor Ben-Ner, a system in which donors
exercise accountability over the decisions of the managers of charities.
The process that I would expect to ensue from allowing a deduction
for earmarked contributions will likely (if only modestly) increase
donor involvement in charitable decision-making, to the betterment of
society. Charitable organizations would need to justify alternatives
presented to donors, a process which requires more critical assessment
of desired uses of funds. In this process, donors have the opportunity
to justify their initial designations to charity. An environment of
418. See supra text accompanying note 394.
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greater cooperation and interaction between donors and charitable
donees could well arise.419
b. The Case of Commercial Nonprofits
There is an important instance in which we may properly question
whether a deduction for an earmarked contribution is appropriate:
where the taxpayer's transfer to charity, which is a commercial
nonprofit, secures market-priced goods and services for consumption
by the secondary beneficiary. The charitable transferee in such cases
often has only modest (or no) interest in the identity of the secondary
beneficiary, and may not view him as uniquely "worthy" or "needy"
of the benefit that he receives. Consider a taxpayer's payment of the
tuition of an unrelated pre-teen child. As long as the child meets the
admission standards of the school (which, we may even assume, are
relatively high), a reasonable working assumption is that the school
generally has little interest in determining whether the child is
"worthier" of his education than any other child who meets admission
standards. This assumption is certainly reasonable when the policy of
the school is to award no scholarships or grants (so as to attract
extraordinary talent, or to benefit the poor). The furtherance of the
charity's mission lies in the nature of services rendered (the
promotion of education), not in the identity of the persons who
consume the services rendered. Accordingly, a charitable transferee
may be perfectly willing to accept an earmarked transfer securing a
benefit for the secondary beneficiary, regardless of whether providing
an education to the secondary beneficiary results in more or less value
to society than providing the benefit to someone else.420
Because the charitable transferee in such circumstances need not
affirmatively determine that the secondary beneficiary is a particularly
worthy recipient of the benefit provided by the charity, we have
insufficient reason to believe that the taxpayer's payment securing
such benefit should be encouraged through the charitable
contribution deduction. Another way of expressing this conclusion is
to say that in these circumstances, the charitable transferee is not
simply abdicating its responsibility to decide upon the worthiness of a
419. 1 concede that this analysis assumes that charities will indeed approach donors
with alternative suggestions if offered earmarked gifts that the charities consider sub-
optimal. I do not think this assumption is unrealistic. True, the charity risks
offending a prospective donor. On the other hand, approaching a prospective donor
with such a suggestion presents an opportunity for the charity to demonstrate just
how well the charity has thought through the potential uses of its funds, and to
demonstrate how seriously the charity views its mission. Such communications may
actually foster donor-donee relations and goodwill, or at least not hinder them.
420. This analysis does assume that the school is not able to attract, or for some
legitimate reason does not seek to attract, a high percentage of those whom some
believe to be the "worthiest" (i.e., most intelligent, most athletic, most artistic, most
disadvantaged, etc.) potential students.
1332 [Vol. 70
THE TAXPAYING GOOD SAMARITAN
secondary beneficiary: the charity has no such responsibility to
abdicate in the first instance. Consequently, we lack adequate
grounds for concluding that the taxpayer's payment benefits a
"worthy" (as opposed to a merely "eligible") secondary beneficiary.
All we know for certain is that the taxpayer's payment has a
redistributive effect.
One qualification of the previous analysis is that a payment which
secures a good or service of a commercial (and charitable) nonprofit
organization by a secondary beneficiary (who is not a member of the
taxpayer's household) probably should still be deductible if credible
evidence establishes that, absent the earmarked transfer, the
charitable transferee nonetheless would have provided such good or
service to the secondary beneficiary without charge (assuming
adequate funds to do so) because of the secondary beneficiary's
inability to pay (particularly if the secondary beneficiary is destitute).
In such cases, the charity furthers its exempt purposes not only by
providing a particular good or service (such as education or hospital
care), but also by benefiting the poor. A taxpayer who makes an
earmarked contribution for the benefit of a secondary beneficiary who
would have received the charity's services at no charge and in any
event on account of his poverty is plainly advancing a charitable
purpose of the charitable transferee. Moreover, if the financial
condition of the secondary beneficiary and the policy of the charitable
transferee to provide free care to such a beneficiary can be
demonstrated, we have adequate assurance that the secondary
beneficiary is "worthy" of support.
4. Encouraging Altruism
As discussed above,12 Professor Atkinson has argued in favor of
income tax exemption for organizations that embody altruism.
Professor Atkinson does not offer a comprehensive justification for
advancing altruism as a desirable norm, nor will I do so here. I simply
desire to note that, just as a charitable contribution deduction in
general tends to promote altruism, so does a deduction for earmarked
contributions to charity. To Professor Atkinson, the hallmark of
altruism is the absence of a material quid pro quo. As limited by the
normative analysis in this Article, the deduction for an earmarked
contribution to charity that I advocate would involve no material quid
pro quo. If altruism is a desirable norm to be advanced through the
tax system, a deduction for earmarked contributions to charity
appears justified.4"
421. See supra text accompanying notes 264-276.
422. One could also argue that altruism would be advanced through a deduction
for personal gifts, at least when made to non-relatives and persons who are not
members of the taxpayer's household. Whether personal gifts should be deductible is
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5. The "Perk of Picking" Secondary Beneficiaries Under Income
Tax Theory
One could argue that earmarked transfers to charity should not be
deductible because when a donor designates her gift to charity for the
benefit of a secondary beneficiary, she necessarily receives a
significant benefit that transferors of "blind" donations do not receive:
the satisfaction of knowing that her transfer will assist a secondary
beneficiary whom the donor considers worthy of beneficence.
However, I believe that other scholars have capably undermined this
train of thought. First, as a matter of income tax theory and policy,
one may observe that such notion is inconsistent with the position of
Professor Andrews (who argues that taxable consumption does not
include the nonmaterial pleasures of giving), and is at least in
considerable tension with the "welfare reduction" theory (which
reasons that a taxpayer making a charitable contribution is less well-
off than he was before the transfer; under that approach, the same
conclusion is true regardless of whether the donation is earmarked).
Moreover, were we to reject these theories in favor of the view of
Professor Koppelman that the real basis for taxing income is accretion
(and the "power to consume"), there is no good reason under that
theory for treating earmarked transfers to charity less favorably than
non-earmarked transfers; both transfers are equally unworthy of a
deduction because the transferor in both cases had the power to
consume the amounts transferred prior to the transfer. If current law
implicitly rejects Professor Koppelman's theory as to non-designated
transfers to charity, I see no principled reason to invoke the theory so
as to deny deductions for earmarked contributions to charity. Doing
so is arbitrary.
Likewise, I do not believe that a sufficient distinction exists between
earmarked and non-earmarked transfers to charity under broad
concepts of "private preclusive appropriation" as consumption. In
critiquing the view of Professor Andrews that charitable contributions
do not constitute "private preclusive appropriation" of divisible goods
and services (Professor Andrews' concept of taxable private
consumption), Professor Kelman has argued that "tied grants"
(contributions restricted for a specific charitable use, such as
scholarship grants) meet the Andrews criteria for consumption; they
"appropriate" the specific services to be funded with the grants.42 3 For
example, a scholarship grant appropriates educational services (albeit,
for someone other than the donor).4"4 Although Professor Kelman
argues that unrestricted grants may be appropriative for various other
a question that I need not address in this Article.
423. See Kelman, supra note 201, at 849-50.
424. See id.
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reasons,4z5 his logic leads to the conclusion that a great deal of
charitable contributions are appropriative. Any time a donation is
made to a charitable grantee, whatever services that particular donee
provides (be they educational services, the relief of poverty, the
rehabilitation of drug addicts, etc.) are "appropriated" for someone
(or some group of persons) (except, perhaps, in the case of pure
public goods producing non-localized benefits). Accordingly, if the
distinction between appropriative and non-appropriative charitable
contributions is our guiding light, I see no compelling reason to "draw
the line" so as to deny a deduction only for earmarked
contributions.426
6. Erosion of the Tax Base and Horizontal Equity
As discussed previously, it could be argued that a deduction for
earmarked contributions is inefficient, because in the absence of a
deduction therefor, donors would simply give the secondary
beneficiaries nondeductible personal gifts. 4-  Another way of
expressing this argument is that the deduction would erode the
income tax base. Although, as discussed above, there are numerous
efficiency-based responses to this argument, there is also an important
response grounded in horizontal equity, which may be illustrated as
follows: a taxpayer with $300,000 of annual income who donates
$100,000 to charity as an unrestricted gift is in virtually the same
position as a taxpayer with equal income who donates an equal sum to
the same charity as an earmarked contribution. If we are to tax
similarly situated taxpayers similarly, we should grant the latter
taxpayer a deduction for her gift if we grant the former taxpayer a
deduction for his gift.
The most rational basis for distinguishing the two taxpayers in the
previous illustration is that the latter taxpayer, unlike the former,
receives the "perk of picking" the secondary beneficiary. However,
the argument that a "designating" donor receives a species of utility
that a "blind" donor does not receive is fundamentally unpersuasive
when one considers the countless forms of utility that tax-advantaged
donors already routinely receive (some of which derive from making
unrestricted gifts). As discussed above, Professors Gergen, Hall, and
Colombo have all acknowledged the (often significant) utility that
donors receive in connection with charitable giving. Yet under
current law, many forms of utility received by a transferor as a result
425. See id. at 850-51.
426. It is no objection to say that earmarked contributions are uniquely
"appropriative" simply because they benefit a single individual. A charitable
contribution is deductible under current law if the donor specifies that donated funds
must be used to benefit one person (unbeknownst to the donor) whom the charitable
donee selects.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 388-390 (responding to this argument).
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of a donation result in no disallowance (nor even a reduction) of the
charitable contribution deduction. The law would be quite peculiar
indeed were it to discriminate amongst taxpayers on the basis of what
type of non-pecuniary, non-material benefits that they receive upon
making a charitable contribution.
To illustrate, there is no obvious reason that we should tax transfers
generating utility merely from the knowledge that a donation will
benefit a particular needy individual less favorably than transfers
generating utility in the form of enhanced social standing from
subsidizing the cost of a building bearing the donor's fine family
name. In the case of similarly situated taxpayers making an equal
dollar contribution and deriving the same quantum of utility from
giving, denying a deduction in the former case while allowing a
deduction in the latter violates horizontal equity. Moreover, we
cannot say for certain that the amount of one taxpayer's utility
generated from the ability to designate the secondary beneficiary is
necessarily greater than the amount of another taxpayer's gift-related
utility taking other forms (such as community goodwill, the relief of a
burdened conscience, the desire to impress friends and neighbors,
etc.). Accordingly, focusing on the expected donor utility derived
from designating the secondary beneficiary generally should not result
in a denial of a deduction under notions of horizontal equity.
7. Consistency with Income Tax Treatment of Personal Gifts
The previous analysis of this Article suggests that a deduction for
earmarked transfers to charity is appropriate in many circumstances
under Code section 170. A skeptical reader may object that while a
deduction for earmarked transfers to charity is justifiable under Code
section 170, the deduction also must pass muster under the policy
considerations that compel the nondeductibility of gifts made between
individual taxpayers. In other words, can the preceding analysis be
reconciled with the denial of a deduction for personal gifts under
current law? Although a comprehensive analysis of the proper tax
treatment of personal gifts is beyond the scope of this Article, I can
offer the following brief explanation of why the proposed deduction
for earmarked transfers to charity under Code section 170 can readily
be viewed as consistent with the income tax treatment of personal
gifts, if Code section 170 remains constant.
Two major schools of thought justify the nondeductibility of
personal gifts. According to adherents of the first, the donor who
makes a personal gift is not entitled to a deduction because prior to
the gift, she had the power to consume assets, and this power to
consume is the essence of income.4"8 A similar expression of this
428. E.g., Koppelman, supra note 203, at 695,706-07.
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position is that the donor had the "ability to pay" taxes prior to the
gift, and therefore the amount of the gift should remain in her tax
base.429  Of course, as discussed above -" taken to its logical
conclusion, this school of thought would deny a deduction for any
contribution to charity-whether or not the contribution is
earmarked-because a charitable donor of one dollar has the same
power to consume (or ability to pay taxes) as the donor of a personal
gift of one dollar prior to making the gratuitous transfer. Thus, to
invoke this first policy explanation for the tax treatment of personal
gifts so as to deny a charitable contribution deduction for earmarked
transfers to charity on the one hand, but to allow the deduction for
non-earmarked charitable transfers on the other, would be entirely
incongruous. Under the assumption that Code section 170 in general
is desirable, we must admit that a charitable donor's pre-contribution
"power to consume" sums contributed to charity is, for various policy
reasons (such as those extensively discussed above), an insufficient
reason for including the donation in her income tax base. When we so
admit, we find that this first explanation for the nondeductibility of
personal gifts is no reason to disallow a deduction for earmarked
transfers to charity.
Nor is the deduction advocated in this Article inconsistent with the
other major school of thought justifying the nondeductibility of
personal gifts. As previously observed, Professor Andrews has
rationalized the current taxation of personal gifts under the
assumption that interpersonal gifts occur primarily between members
of the same household, and taxing the portion of such household's
income attributable to the gift at the income tax rate to which the
donor's income is subject is sensible. 3' This Article does not advocate
a deduction for any earmarked transfer to charity when the secondary
beneficiary is the taxpayer or a member of her household.
Accordingly, under this second school of thought, a properly framed
deduction under Code section 170 for an earmarked transfer to
charity is just as appropriate as that available to a taxpayer who makes
an undesignated charitable gift.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current federal income tax law unjustifiably disallows a charitable
contribution deduction for several types of transfers to charitable
organizations from taxpayers who, like the Good Samaritan, desire to
assist a specified individual. Under prevailing judicial and
administrative interpretations of Code section 170, the circumstances
429. E.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1177. 1186-87 (1978).
430. See supra text accompanying notes 202-214.
431. See supra note 196.
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in which a taxpayer may deduct earmarked contributions to charity
are limited. Generally, current law correctly disallows a charitable
contribution deduction for earmarked transfers in which the taxpayer
or a person closely related thereto is designated by the taxpayer as the
secondary beneficiary. Existing law properly allows a deduction
under Code section 170 for transfers in which a taxpayer simply
expresses a non-binding preference that her donation be used to
benefit an unrelated secondary beneficiary. However, most cases and
revenue rulings mistakenly advance the rule that a deduction must be
denied a taxpayer if she, upon her own initiative (rather than in
response to an appeal by a charitable donee), restricts the use of
donated funds by the charitable donee so as to benefit a named
person selected by the taxpayer. Existing precedent obfuscates the
analysis of the circumstances in which earmarked contributions should
be deductible by advancing an undefined (and largely unhelpful)
"control" test, an overly broad "donor intent" test, and an irrelevant
and counter-productive "but for" test.
Considering existing theories of the proper tax base in computing
personal income, pervasive norms of tax policy, and other policy
norms, goals, and principles, this Article has demonstrated that the
deduction for earmarked contributions to charity should be expanded.
I offer the following framework for determining when an earmarked
contribution should be deductible: In general, a taxpayer should be
entitled to deduct any earmarked transfer to a charitable organization
which both receives delivery of the transferred money or property and
accepts the contribution in its own right (rather than as an agent or as
a trustee of a private trust). There should be two exceptions to this
proposed rule. First, no deduction should be allowed for any
earmarked transfer pursuant to which the taxpayer or a member of
her household is designated by the taxpayer as the secondary
beneficiary. This aspect of the framework attempts to account for the
impropriety of a deduction for a transfer that is, in essence, part of a
quid pro quo exchange. Secondly, a taxpayer should receive no
charitable contribution deduction for any transfer to a charity
operating as a commercial nonprofit, if such transfer secures market-
priced goods and services for consumption by the secondary
beneficiary. An exception to this exception should exist if it is
established that, absent the earmarked transfer, the charitable
transferee nonetheless would have provided such good or service to
the secondary beneficiary without charge (assuming adequate funds to
do so) because of the secondary beneficiary's inability to pay for the
good or service.
Although my proposed framework for determining the deductibility
of earmarked transfers to charitable organizations differs in approach
from that of most authorities directly on point, I believe that most of
the results of cases can be justified under my framework. I also
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believe that this framework can be implemented judicially. For the
reasons discussed above, I do not totally abandon the "'donor intent"
test and the "donee control" test. However, I do strictly confine those
tests to require no more than that which is absolutely essential to
preserve the integrity of Code section 170. Because the proposed
framework can exist harmoniously with the results of most cases,
courts should feel free to adopt it, albeit as a development or
refinement in the law governing earmarked transfers to charity.
Likewise, my proposed framework could be adopted by the IRS,
although doing so would mark a shift in policy for the agency.3
I reiterate the caveat with which I introduced the previous section
of this Article. My proposed framework assumes the existence of the
charitable contribution deduction of Code section 170 (as currently
written) for non-earmarked transfers and the federal income tax
exemption for charitable organizations granted by current law.
Should the Code and state laws governing nonprofit organizations
undergo major reformation, my proposed framework might well be
rendered moot, or even undesirable.
Absent from this discussion is a thorough consideration of how the
common law of charitable trusts and charitable gifts bears upon the
analysis. A comprehensive policy analysis of current law's treatment
of non-charitable gratuitous transfers is also in order. A thoughtful
discussion of these issues may be necessary before my proposed
framework is accepted by the courts.
There remains a need to adopt more comprehensive reform so as to
increase cooperation between charities and their stakeholders. Such
cooperation is likely to improve the efficiency of charities in many
respects. The challenge is to design reforms that will preserve, and
even enhance, the many virtues that are said to characterize the
charitable sector. My framework is but a small step in that direction.
432. The position of the IRS is, in my opinion, too hostile to taxpayers claiming a
deduction for earmarked contributions to charity.
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